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D isserta tio n  Abstra ct  
The problem of mental causation, in the form of the Exclusion Argument, affects 
any variety of dualism or Nonreductive Physicalism. I argue for a solution to the 
problem of mental causation for Nonreductive Physicalism.
The Exclusion Argument consists of a broadly physicalist set of theses, with a 
different variant for each variety o f dualism. These theses are the following:
1) Dualism. The mental and physical are real.
2) Irreducibility. The mental is not type-identical to the physical.
3) Supervenience. The mental is determined by the physical.
4) Causal Closure o f the Physical. The physical is closed to causal influence from 
anything nonphysical.
5) Exclusion Principle. If there is one complete, independent cause (or causally 
relevant property), then there is no other cause (or causally relevant property).
6) Therefore, Epiphenomenalism. The mental is causally irrelevant.
The conclusion, Epiphenomenalism, follows from these broadly physicalist 
assumptions. The physical is determined only by the physical, so the mental cannot 
determine the physical. The mental is also completely determined by the physical, so the 
mental cannot determine the mental. Thus, the mental has no causal work to do. Since 
the physical completely determines everything, the mental can determine nothing. This 
sketch is the essence of any version of the Exclusion Argument.
I set up the most perspicuous version of the Exclusion Argument for the purpose 
of determining which premises are necessary for the argument and finding any important 
relations among the premises assumed in different versions o f the argument. In this way 
I avoid focusing on questions irrelevant to the core issues o f the Exclusion Argument
Next I argue that the mental is causally relevant, so the Exclusion Argument is 
unsound. Epiphenomenalism is not readily shown to be false, as some philosophers 
would claim. However, Epiphenomenalism raises difficult problems of frrst-person 
knowledge and reference that suggest that this view is false. For this reason, either at 
least one of these principles o f Nonreductive Physicalism must be false or the reasoning 
from these premises to the conclusion must be invalid.
Finally, I consider the most plausible attempts to solve the problem o f mental 
causation. The most plausible theories of mental causation assume a dual-explanandum 
or two explananda view, but such views are inconsistent with the Exclusion Argument. 
To make such a theory possible, one must reject either the supervenience of the mental 
on the physical, the Exclusion Principle, or one must reject the reasoning of the 
Exclusion Argument
Many philosophers doubt the premise that local physical properties determine the 
mental. The importance of context in the individuation o f content properties, and 
periiaps special science and mental properties, requires rejection of the determination of 
the mental by local physical properties. However, the failure o f supervenience can only 
allow for the mental to be causally relevant if some mechanism allows for mental 
causation. 1 argue that no such mechanism of mental causation is compatible with failure 
o f supervenience.
The premise that leads to the problem for Nonreductive Physicalism is the 
Exclusion PÂiciple itself. The Exclusion Principle, naively conceived, is false. The 
naive Exclusion Principle excludes as causally irrelevant events or properties that
VIU
intuitively appear to be relevant For example, the Exclusion Principle incorrectly 
excludes determinables as causally irrelevant in favor o f their determinates. A traffic 
light’s being scarlet causes one to stop at the light but this fact does not show that light’s 
being red is not causally relevant to one’s stopping. Some sets o f events or properties do 
not compete for causal relevance. This fact contradicts the naive Exclusion Principle. 
Thus, if  the mental depends on the physical in the correct way, the mental would be 
incorrectly excluded 6om causal relevance by the naïve Exclusion Principle.
These counterexamples suggest a more sophisticated Exclusion Principle, but the 
more sophisticated principle does not rule out causal relevance for the mental if the 
mental is dependent upon the physical. Thus, I propose that the mental closely depends 
on the physical, and this dependence allows for mental causation consistent with a 
correct Exclusion Principle. Thus, the Exclusion Argument, including the sophisticated 
Exclusion Principle as a premise, is invalid, and mental causation is shown to be possible 
for Nonreductive Physicalism.
IX
C h a p t e r I
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Understanding how the mind fits into a physical world is the philosophical mind- 
body problem. Some features of the mind, for example intentionality and consciousness, 
make it difficult to see how the mind could be part of a purely physical world. In contrast, 
the problem of mental causation, the problem of making room for the mental in the causal 
order of the world, makes it difficult to see how the mind could be anything besides a purely 
physical phenomenon. In particular, one variety of the problem, or perhaps one part of a 
larger problem, is presented by the Exclusion Argument The Exclusion Argument starts 
fiom certain plausible views about the structure of the mental and the world to reach the 
conclusion that the mental cannot have causal power.
Descartes' famously encountered the problem of mental causation because of his 
view of the mind as an immaterial substance that somehow interacted with the body. 
Descartes believed that the mind was a non-physical substance whose essence was to think 
or be conscious whereas the body was a physical substance whose essence was to be 
extended in space. Critics of Descartes, even fiom his own time, have thought that this 
distinction between the mind and the body, if true, would make it impossible for them to 
interact How, one might ask, could the non-physical mind 'push’ on the physical body to 
cause it to act in the way one wanted it to? How could brute matter have any effect on a 
non-pl^sical mind? Descartes was unable to explain the interaction adequately. Descartes’
' Whether Descartes* real problem is the one characterized here is a  matter for scholars o f  Descartes. 
Given his belief that God constantly recreated the world, it is hard to see how his view allows for anything 
but God to cause anything. Descartes’ real problem may thus have been one of how any substances could
problem of mental causation, then, was one of determining how non-physical mind-stuff 
might affect the body and, of historically less importance, how the body could affect the 
mind.
Physicalism easily solves Descartes’ problem of mental causation. Indeed, a large 
part of the motivation for accepting Physicalism is its promise o f solving the problem of 
mental causation. If the mind and body are both physical, the mind can affect the body just 
as any other physical object could. If both the mind and body are physical, the mind and 
body can ‘push’ on each other in any way required. Physicalism, thus, promises and is 
motivated by this promise of a solution to the problem of mental causation.
Nonreductive Physicalism, the current conventiomd wisdom in philosophy of mind, 
ironically, has its own version of the problem of mental causation. Nonreductive 
Physicalism in general is the view that there are no immaterial substances; all that exists is 
physical or an aggregate of the physical. There are two varieties of Nonreductive 
Physicalism. One variety of Nonreductive Physicalism is the view that the mental is token- 
identical but not type-identical to the physical. My instance of pain may be a brain state, but 
not all instances of pain are brain states since it is possible that creatures that feel pain not 
have brains like ours. As Putnam (1967) first pointed out, octopi certainly feel pain but have 
brains much different fiom ours. Martians or aliens, if such beings are possible, may have 
silicon brains that are completely unlike ours physically, but these beings may still be 
capable of feeling pain. So, the mental state-type pain is not the same as the brain state-type 
C-fiber firing or whatever it is that occurs in humans when they feel pain. One could
interact at alL Nonetheless, the problem as given above represents the traditionally received view of 
Descartes and presents a major obstacle for anyone advocatmg substance dualism.
somewhat conteiitiously describe this view is as materialist monism combined with property 
dualism.
The other variety of Nonreductive Physicalism is that the mind is not even token- 
identical to the physical but is only constituted by or composed of the physical. The mind, 
on this view, is a macroscopic object, say a brain, composed o f smaller parts, and this object 
is not identical to the sum of its parts. Both nonreductive physicalist views entail that the 
mind is composed of nothing but physical substance, but mental types are not identical to 
any physical type.
The problem of mental causation now arises in a different guise. Mental events can 
unproblematically cause physical events if mental events are physical events. However, 
since each mental event has distinct mental and physical properties, it becomes legitimate to 
ask whether it was in virtue of the mental property of the cause that the effect occurred or 
whether it was in virtue of the physical property of the cause that the effect occurred. For 
example, consider my reaction to touching a hot stove. The brain event caused by my 
touching the stove causes me to pull my hand away. The hand and brain are connected by a 
series of neurons. If any form of Physicalism is true, these neurons &om the hand to the 
brain and back constitute a complete causal chain &om my touching the hot stove to a series 
of neural events in my arm and brain to the physical event of my hand pulling away. If, as 
Physicalism claims, that brain event is a mental event, the mental event causes me to pull my 
hand away. However, since the brain event’s being a pain is not the same as its being, say, a 
C-fiber firing, one may legitimately ask whether my pulling my hand away occurred in 
virtue of the brain event’s being a pain or its being a C-fiber firing. According to the neural 
story told above, it seems that my pulling my hand away occurred in virtue of the event’s
being a C-fiber firing. And, since the neural causal chain is complete, my pulling my hand 
away did not occur in virtue of anything else. Assuming that anything unnecessary for this 
causal chain is irrelevant, my pulling my hand away occurs not in virtue of the cause’s being 
a pain but in virtue of its being a C-fiber firing, and, generalizing, mental properties are 
causally irrelevant or epiphenomenal. If this line of reasoning is sound, the problem of 
mental causation reappears for Nonreductive Physicalism in the form of Epiphenomenalism 
of mental event types.
In some respects, Nonreductive Physicalism is more problematic than Cartesian 
Substance Dualism. Substance Dualism at least allowed mental events to cause other mental 
events, even if it seemed impossible for the mental and the physical to interact However, 
Nonreductive Physicalism appears to have the consequence that mental properties cannot be 
relevant even for other mental properties.
The reasoning quickly sketched above for the case o f pain is the essence of the 
Exclusion Argument Nonreductive Physicalism’s metaphysical commitments seem to 
entail that the mental is causally irrelevant In the next chapter I will explicate varieties of 
this basic argument schema, but in schematic form the Exclusion Argument makes use of the 
following nonreductive physicalist premises^.
Exclusion Argument Schema
1. Dualism. Mental and physical items are both real.
2. Irreducibility. No mental item is identical to any physical item.
3. Supervenieme. Mental items supervene on or are determined by physical items.
4. Causal Closure o f the Physical. No physical effect has a nonphysical cause.
5. Exclusion Principle. Any effect can have only one complete, independent cause.
6. Tbenfon, Epiphenomenalism. No mental item causes any effect
 ^This argument uses the term ‘item* to refer to any entity, event state, process, or property; it uses the 
term cause* to refer to any cause or causally relevant event state, process or property; and it uses the term 
efkct* to refer to any effect or mental property that might be brought about by an event state, processor 
property.
I will explain how the Exclusion Argument works roughly as follows. This 
explanation of the argument involves several oversimplifications that I will address in 
Chapters two and three of this woric. A graphical representation of a putative case of mental 
causation should make the argument clearer.
M,
P.
Figure 1
Figure 1 represents what occurs in a typical case of putative mental causation. M, 
and M2 represent real mental items, perhaps including behavior. We might take M, to be an 
instance of pain and M% to be an instance of a prepositional attitude token, my belief that I 
am in pain. P, and represent real physical items. Let's say for the sake of the example 
that F| is a brain event, following the standard oversimplified philosophical example a C- 
fiber firing, and Pj is a further brain event, one that correlates with my belief-token that I am 
in pain. The single arrow represents causation. The double arrows represent determination 
or supervenience with the physical items as the determinants or supervenience bases and the 
mental items as the dependent or supervenient items.
Now consider that the physical hem P, causes Pj, and, by the Causal Closure o f the 
Physical, principle 4, M, cannot cause P%. The C-fiber firing causes the brain firing 
correlated with my belief and my pain cannot cause this brain event Thus, the mental item 
M„ in this case, my pain, cannot cause P%. Figure 2 includes an arrow with a line through it 
representing this fact
p p.‘  I
Figure!
Moreover, M, cannot cause M; since P; already has a cause. According to the 
Supervenience thesis, premise (3) of the Exclusion Argument, P, determines M%. Since P; 
has P, as its cause, P, causes both P% and M;. The C-fiber firing causes the belief that I am in 
pain and the neural state that correlates with this belief. And according to the Exclusion 
Principle, premise (5) of the Exclusion Argument, when there is one cause of an event, there 
cannot be another. So M, cannot cause M,; my pain cannot cause my belief that I am in 
pain. 1 represent this in figure 3 by drawing an arrow with a line through it between M, and 
M%.
M,
Pi
M,
Pz
Figure 3
Since M, cannot cause either M, or P%, there is nothing that might cause. 
Therefore, Epiphenomenalism is true; mental events, like my pain M, cause nothing.
One simplifying assumption I have made in presenting this argument is that there is 
only one immediate cause for any effect In fiict, there are an indefinitely large number o f 
causal conditions for any effect any one of which might be designated the cause depending
on our interests. A gas leak in one's home might be considered the cause of an explosion, 
and one's lighting a cigarette might be considered only a causal condition of the explosion. 
But, for someone working at the natural gas company, lighting a cigarette might be 
considered the cause and the presence of natural gas only a causal condition of the explosion. 
In each case the causal conditions, the presence of natural gas and the person lighting a 
cigarette (among other factors), are the same, but what we designate the cause differs 
according to our interest By "cause," then, for the rest of this woric, I will mean the 
complete set of causal conditions that bring about an effect
The conclusion of the Exclusion Argument is Epiphenomenalism, the view that the 
mental does no causal work. In addition Epiphenomenalists see the mental as parallel to the 
physical and dependent on the physical. To take an example 6om Huxley (1898), 
epiphenomena are like the steam whistle of a train engine. The steam signals the working of 
the engine but has no effect on the machinery of the engine itself. Or to take the example of 
Plato’s allegory of the cave, epiphenomena are like the shadows on the wall which appear to 
be causes but are only projections of the real causes occurring out of sight These cases, the 
steam whistle and the projected shadows on the wall, provide examples of phenomena 
causally irrelevant to the mechanisms underlying them. These examples are not, of course, 
irrelevant to our perceptions. According to Epiphenomenalism, the mental is not only 
causally irrelevant to underlying mechanisms but is causally irrelevant simpliciter-ix has no 
causal relevance whatsoever, not even to our perceptions.
The consequences of accepting Epiphenomenalism seem devastating. Causal 
relevance of the mental is necessary for us to be agents. If the mœtal is causally hrelevant, 
then we do not act but instead merely undergo processes. We would no more act when our
brains cause our movements than we act when our stomachs digest food or when our hearts 
pump blood.
Moreover, if the mental is causally irrelevant, then &ee will becomes impossible. 
For any theory of free will, it must be possible for us to act, even if, as Compatibilism 
claims, our actions are completely determined. Compatibilism requires as part of free action 
that we act, that our volitions, desires or some other mental state or event cause our actions. 
Libertarianism requires more of free action than merely that we cause our actions, but our 
causing our actions is an obviously necessary condition. So, the problem of mental 
causation negates our conception of ourselves as free and morally responsible agents. The 
incompatibility of Epiphenomenalism with agency is not a response to the Exclusion 
Argument, but it shows what is at stake and provides some compelling reason to find a flaw 
in the Exclusion Argument
The problem of mental causation and the Exclusion Argument in particular is, in my 
view, the single greatest difficulty for Nonreductive Physicalism to overcome. Some 
philosophers' have thought the argument sufficient to refrite Nonreductive Physicalism, and 
thus to force a reconsideration of type Physicalism. The multiple realization argument, as 
noted above, resulted in a widespread rejection of Type Physicalism, but these new type 
physicalists* believe that type Physicalism’s demise was premature and that it should be 
accepted over Nonreductive Physicalism. The present work, then, is primarily a response on 
the part of Nonreductive Physicalism to the problem of mental causation presented by the 
Exclusion Argument but secondarily a defense o f the nonreductive orthodm^ against type
'  See primarily Kim (1993b). Kim’s recent work (Kim 1997 and 1998) favors a varied o f analytical 
functionalism, but the skeptical challenge presented by the Exclusion Argument remains important in 
general and to his work in particular.
*  Including e g. Bickle (1992) and some parts of Churchland (1984).
Physicalism. If Nonreductive Physicalism can allow the mental to be causally relevant, then 
this reason to reject the current orthodoxy in 6vor of a return to type Physicalism can be 
avoided. Thus, this woric in part defends Nonreductive Physicalism by attempting to find a 
way for the mental to be causally relevant without accepting type Physicalism.
The remainder of this chapter will outline the goals of the later chapters of this woric, 
mention some assumptions that I will make, and provide a brief historical introduction to the 
problem of mental causation and the Exclusion Argument In the course of this historical 
introduction I will mention two other problems of mental causation that I will not pursue.
1.2 Outline of the Work
Chapters two and three of this work will constitute an extended look at the Exclusion 
Argument Chapter two will discuss the premises of the Exclusion Argument in greater 
detail. Specifically, I will devise three different Exclusion Arguments for three different 
metaphysical positions. Chapter three will discuss some alternative premises often found in 
the literature and will give reason to reject them in fitvor of the schematic Exclusion 
Argument given here.
Ch^ters four, five and six will constitute a distinct section o f this woric that will 
argue at some length that we cannot accept Epiphenomenalism and so must instead reject the 
Exclusion Argument, either by rejecting one of the premises or by finding the Exclusion 
Argument to be invalid. Recently some philosophers (Bieri 1992, Chalmers 1996, and 
Horowitz 1999) have argued that Epiphenomenalism is more acceptable than is commonly 
believed. Chapter four of this work will consider and reject several arguments found in the 
literature on mental causation. Chapter five and chapter six will argue that, although
Epiphenomenalism is not easily refuted, nonetheless it does not accord with our knowledge 
of and ability to refer to our own minds.
Finally, chapters seven and eight will address the two most controversial premises of 
the Exclusion Argument Chapter five argues that although at least some recent attacks on 
the view that the mental supervenes on the physical are likely correct this Ailure of 
supervenience does not provide a sufficient explanation or mechanism for the mental to be 
causally relevant The conclusion of chapter five is that the failure o f supervenience alone 
cannot plausibly make mental causation possible.
Chapter six argues that the Exclusion Argument is either valid but unsound because 
the Exclusion Principle is false or invalid because the Exclusion Principle is too broad to 
exclude mental causation. The relation of the mental to the physical must be close for the 
mental not to be excluded. Thus, the final conclusion o f this work is that the relation of the 
mental to physical must be a close dependence relation such that the Exclusion Principle 
does not apply to the case of the mental and the physical.
I J  Assumptions of the Work
Before presenting the Exclusion Argument at length in chapters two and three, 1 will 
clarity some assumptions of the argument First, 1 will assume that properties can be 
causally relevant Second, 1 will assume that there is more to causation and causal relevance 
than regularities or coimterfactuals. Third, 1 will assume some variety of scientific or 
explanatory realism.
I will assiune that properties are causally relevant There are three different varieties 
of causal relevance. The first variety is for an event to be causally relevant by causing an 
effect Imagine, fi)r example, the event o f Hurricane Mitch striking Honduras. If Hurricane
10
Mitch is a purely physical event, or set of physical events, then Hurricane Mitch’s striking 
Honduras can cause the damage to Honduras. Hurricane Mitch can be causally relevant 
simply by being a cause. The first, and least controversial, case of causal relevance is of an 
event causing an effect
The second variety of causal relevance is for a property to be that property in virtue 
o f which or became o f which an effect occurs. Consider again the example of Hurricane 
Mitch striking Honduras. Let us say that Mitch is reported on page 13 of the New York 
Times. Mitch did a tremendous amount of damage to Honduras, but it was not in virtue of 
Mitch’s being reported on page 13 of the Times that it damaged Honduras. Instead, Mitch 
damaging Honduras occurred in virtue of the high winds that made up the hurricane. 
Intuitively, some properties of Mitch were causally relevant to Mitch’s damaging Honduras, 
but others were not’. Thus, properties can be responsible for a cause having the effect that it 
does although not all properties are relevant to all effects.
The third variety of causal relevance is for an effect to have a property in virtue of its 
cause having a particular property. This variety of causal relevance or quamation as Horgan 
(1989) characterizes it, "c qua F causes e qua G.” (Horgan, 1989, SO) To illustrate this 
notion Horgan provides a quausation or qua locution paraphrase of statement (7),
(7) He exercised because he wanted to reduce and thought exercise would do it 
(Horgan, 1989,49)
The paraphrase becomes statement (8)
(8) His exercising, qua the property beiitg an ejærcising was caused by his desire 
to reduce and his belief that exercising would result in reducing, qua the respective 
properties being a desire to reduce and being a belief that exercising would result 
in reducing. (Horgan, 1989,50)
’ The point cannot be avoided by btteipteting the example as a mereological sum of microscopic events. 
The point would bold just as well if  the example were one o f an electron and its charge. I use the 
Hurricane Mitch example because o f its intuitive appeal
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Causation is necessary for quausation on this view, but quausation requires more. 
Quausation requires that the effect, insofar as the effect is of the type that it is, occurs in 
virtue of the cause, insofar as the cause is of the type it is.
The essential point here does not require a property ontology. The point could be 
equally well put in terms of event types. Following McLaughlin (1989) one might 
characterize Epiphenomenalism (Type Epiphenomenalism) as the view that events occur in 
virtue of filling under physical types but not in virtue of falling under mental types. I will 
assume at least that events occur in virtue of falling under a type, or in virtue of being 
something of that type.
1 assume that it is completely uncontroversial that causes are causally relevant 
These second two types of causal relevance are more controversial. I can provide some 
reason to think that both of them are real features of the world, but a detailed defense of such 
a position would take us too far afield.
One argument for these latter two notions o f causal relevance is to observe that 
merely giving the cause of the damage to Honduras is an incomplete explanation. A 
complete causal explanation would advert to a law that governs events of one type when 
they interact with events of another type. Thus, a complete explanation of the damage to 
Honduras would appeal to laws of force and momentum and to the properties of the 
hurricane that are adverted to in those laws. Less tendentiously we can always ask about the 
event of Hurricane Mitch striking Honduras why that event should be responsible for the 
damage to Honduras. Some property or set of properties of the hurricane require that the 
hurricane will have that effect when the hurricane strikes Honduras. If there is no property 
or type in virtue of which the effect occurs, it seems that all causal relations are either
12
accidental or involve an appeal to brute Acts. But the Act that some events cause other 
events cannot be merely a brute 6ct; these occurrences cry out for further explanation. 
These considerations, I hope, establish at least the prima facie plausibility of the claim that 
properties can be causally relevant
I cannot here argue in more detail for this assumption, so any readers who disagree 
on this point need read no further. Moreover, the problem of mental causation would not 
affect Token-ldentity Physicalism if properties are not causally relevant However, 1 find the 
claim that properties are causally relevant so overwhelmingly plausible that I cannot accept 
this solution.
My second assumption is that there is more to causation than regularities or 
counterfactuals. This point is related to the previous one in that one might explain why one 
event causes another by appealing to regularities. Appeal to regularities or counterfactuals 
as analyses of causation, 1 assume, are inadequate. Of course, regularity or counterfactual 
theories can easily solve the problem of mental causation. Lepore and Loewer (1989), for 
example, solve the problem of mental causation by accepting a counterfactual notion of 
causation. If causation is just a regularity or counterfactual relation, mental properties can 
easily fit into these regularities as well as physical properties can, especially if mental 
properties supervene on physical properties. However, I take it that accepting regularity or 
counterfactual analyses of causal relevance is really to accept a substitute for real causal 
relevance. Philosophers have argued by counterexample against these theories of causation. 
Correlative effects of a common cause, for example, show that regularity theories or simple 
counter6ctual theories cannot properly analyze our notion of causal relevance. Any 
simplistic analysis in these terms would also fitil to distinguish epiphenomenal byproducts
13
from actual causes. Although some sophisticated analysis may avoid these obvious 
counterexamples, it seems to me that causation and causal relevance are part of the basic 
furniture of the universe and cannot be reduced to anything simpler. Since a detailed 
argument for this claim is beyond the scope o f this woric, readers who disagree need read no 
further and, furthermore, if they are nonreductive physicalists, need have no worries about 
mental causation.
My third assumption is some variety of scientific or explanatory realism. 
Instrumentalism, the view that explanations in science are merely convenient fictions, in 
contrast to scientific or explanatory realism, can accept that some explanation, either mental 
or physical, best fits the data and so is a superior explanation. However, Instrumentalism 
would have no problem with accepting one or many conflicting explanations that were 
useful for certain purposes. Instrumentalism would then have no problem of mental 
causatiotL
Instrumentalism comes in several varieties, so it is impossible to give an unequivocal 
instrumentalist solution to the problem of mental causation. One possible Instrumentalist 
view is to deny the reality of both the mental and the physical. Since neither explanation 
would be considered true, no reason would exist to see them as conflicting explanations. 
Since I will explictly assume realism (or what I shall call "dualism") for the mental and the 
physical for each of three different Exclusion Arguments, I will not discuss this possibility at 
any greater length here.
A second possibility is that the Instrumentalist would see mental explanations as 
objectively true since the mental is directly observed. No philosopher that I know of is an 
Instrumentalist about everything. Thus, a sense-data theorist or Berireleyan Idealist, m i^t
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accept the reality of directly observed mental objects, but reject the reality of physical 
objects, objects external to the mind. This variety of Instrumentalist might believe that 
because our minds and their contents are directly observed by us, but the physical is 
observed only through our conscious states, only the mental is real. On this view mental 
explanation is objectively true, whereas physical explanation can only be a useful instrument 
but not strictly true or Mse. On such a view only mental causation is real; physical 
causation is only a convenient fiction that gives useful predictions. So, on this view, the 
mental cause takes precedence over the physical cause whenever there is a potential conflict 
On either view of the reality of the mental and physical, Instrumentalism has no problem of 
mental causation.
My views on these issues are orthodox enough to require no detailed defense here. 
Although rejecting these assumptions would provide an easy solution to the problem of 
mental causation, rejecting any of them would, 1 believe, commit one to problems even more 
serious. In any case, rejection of causal relevance of properties, acceptance of regularity or 
counterfactual theories of causation, and acceptance of Instrumentalism would appeal to 
only relatively small parts of the philosophical community. So, the problem of mental 
causation, as it applies to the nonreductive physicalist, is quite a real concern for most 
philosophers. Any attempted refutation of the above views detailed enough to convince any 
philosopher attached to them would be outside the scope of this work, so I must settle for 
settmg them to one side at the beginning.
1.4 Brief historical introductioii.
The Exclusion Argument is a recent philosophical development, but it has deep roots 
in the historical problem of mental causation. Contrary to the modem Exclusion Argument,
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philosophers have long thought that explanations of behavior require qxpeals to more than
the merely physical but also to the mental. Perhaps the first appearance of this claim is
Plato's Phaedo (1989). Plato, through Socrates, argues for the necessity of teleological
explanations and for the inadequacy of Anaxagoras’ physicalist explanations. Anaxagoras,
Socrates states, claims that Mind is the cause of all things, but, in reality, Anaxagoras makes
no appeal to mind at all. Socrates says.
As I read on I discovered that the fellow made no use of mind and assigned to it no 
causality for the order of the world, but adduced causes like air and aether and 
water and many other absurdities. It seemed to me that he was just about as 
inconsistent as if someone were to say. The cause of everything that Socrates does 
is mind-and then, in trying to account for my several actions, said first that the 
reason why I am lying here now is that my body is composed of bones and sinews, 
and that the bones are rigid and separated at the joints, but the sinews are capable of 
contraction and relaxation, and form an envelope for the bones with the help of the 
flesh and skin, the latter holding all together, and since the bones move freely in 
their joints the sinews by relaxing and contracting enable me somehow to bend my 
limbs, and that is the cause of my sitting here in a bent positiorL Or again, if  he 
tried to account in the same way for my conversing with you, adducing causes such 
as sound and air and hearing and a thousand others, and never troubled to mention 
the real reasons, which are that since Athens has thought it better to condemn me, 
therefore I for my part have thought it better to sit here, and more right to stay and 
submit to whatever penalty she orders. Because, by dog, I fimcy that these sinews 
and bones would have been in the neighborhood of Megara or Boeotia long ago- 
impelled by a conviction of what is best!-if I did not think that it was more right 
and honorable to submit to whatever penalty my country orders rather than take to 
my heels and run away. (Plato 1989,80)
Although the context here is one in which Socrates attacks Anaxagoras as 
inconsistent, Plato clearly asserts that «q>lanations of human behavior require appeals to 
more than the focts about one’s physical constitution but also to one’s desires and beliefo 
about what is best Plato’s approval of Anaxagoras' claims for the causal power of Mind 
shows that Plato is appealing to something he takes to be obvious, specifically, that our 
intentions cause our actions and that any purely physical explanation o f our actions would be
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inadequate. Although the physical explanations q)pealed to in the passage are comically 
inadequate and could be no more than a caricature of any modem physicalist s position, 
Plato’s claim can be seen as a challenge to physicalist explanation and its correlative 
assumptions that form the basis of the Exclusion Argument The issue we can see Plato as 
raising for philosophy is whether Physicalism can ever completely explain human behavior.
Although Plato raised the topic of the adequacy of physical explanations of behavior, 
it was not until Descartes that philosophers seriously considered the possibility of completely 
mechanistic explanations of behavior. Descartes believed that animal, but not human, 
behavior could be explained completely mechanistically. In fact, o f course, Descartes 
thought humans were immaterial thinking substances which interacted with the physical 
body.
Because of this distinction between the mental and physical substances, the problem 
of mental causation originates with Descartes. In the Sixth Meditation, Descartes argues that 
the mind and body are distinct substances, distinct independent entities. He claims the 
essence of body is to be extended, and the essence of mind is to think.
Descartes gives some indication of the relation between the mind and body in his
Sixth Meditation. He writes.
Nature also teaches me, by th ^e  sensations of pain, hunger, thirst and so on, that I 
am not merely present in my body as a sailor is present in a ship, but that I am very 
closely joined and, as it were, intermingled with it, so that I and the body form a 
unit. If this were not so. I, who am nothing but a thmking thing, would not feel 
pain when the body was hurt, but would perceive the damage purely by the 
intellect, just as the sailor perceives by sight if anything in his sUp is broken. 
Similarly, when the body needed food or drink, I should have an explicit 
understanding of the fact, instead of having confused sensations of hunger and 
thirst For these sensations o f hunger, thirst, pain and so on are nothing but 
confiised modes of thinking which arise from the union and, as it were, 
intermingling of the mind with the body. ^Descartes 1984,56)
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Later in the Meditation he describes how the body affects the mind, however, in a way that
seems to contradict this notion of the mind and body existing as a union. He writes,
[W]hen 1 feel a pain in my foot, physiology tells me that dus happens by means of 
nerves distributed throughout the foot, and that these nervM are like cords which go 
from the foot right up to the brain. When the nerves are pulled in the foot, they in 
turn pull on inner parts of the brain to which they are attached, and produce a 
certain motion in them; and nature has laid it down that this motion should produce 
in the mind a sensation of pain, as occurring in the foot (Descartes 1984,60)
These two passages seem inconsistent How could the mind be a unit with the body and yet
have the mind only be connected to the body in the brain? How could this interaction take
place? Others soon pressed him to explain this interaction.
Pierre Gassendi, for example, in his Objections to Descartes’ Meditations raises
these types of objections to Descartes’ notion of an immaterial, unextended substance and its
interaction with the body.
How can there be effort directed against anything, or motion set up in it, unless 
there is mutual contact between what moves and what is moved? And how can 
there be contact without a body when, as is transparently clear by the natural light, 
’naught apart from body, can touch or yet be touched.’ (Gassendi 1984,237)
To this criticism, Descartes' response is only that, “it is not necessary for the mind 
itself to be a body, although it has the power of moving the body.’’ (Descartes 1984, 266) 
This response is clearly inadequate. So Descartes has given this theory about the distinction 
of the mind and the body such that it is impossible for them to interact His only response 
when questioned appears to be that they do interact
Descartes is less dismissive of Princess Elizabeth' when she voices similar concerns, 
but does not appear to answer her questions. Eventually Elizabeth’s urging led Descartes to 
work on the Passions o f the Soul, published posthumously. Descartes, in this woric, reasserts 
his notion of the mind as existing in union with the body, but then, frunously, argues that the
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mind and body interact in die pineal gland. A 6 ir  criticism of this response is that it tells us 
where the interaction occurs but not how it occurs.
At some points Descartes appears to believe that the mind can affect the physical as 
long as the physical is small enough. Descartes believes that the nerves work by means of 
very small animal spirits. In the Treatise on Man  ^Descartes notes that the animal spirits, 
described as a "very fine wind, or rather a very lively and pure flame" (Descartes 1984, v.l, 
100) and as “the finer parts of the blood" (Descartes 1984, v.l, 100), go into the tiny pores in 
the pineal gland and then are sent ultimately to direct the limbs. This description suggests 
that the soul, situated within the pineal gland, direcdy affects the movements of the animal 
spirits. And, somehow, these animal spirits are small enough for the immaterial mind to 
affect It is as if Descartes thought that the mind could pull on physical levers provided they 
were small enough. This strategy, although absurd, has recendy been pursued by a leading 
neuroscientist and by a leading physicist^ Périras this view of Descartes is a caricature 
based on some incomplete remarks in the Treatise on Man. In the Passions o f the Soul, 
Descartes’ explanadon is clearer but ultimately no more helpful.
In the Passions o f the Soul, Descartes claims that the animal spirits are moved by the
pineal gland, and the pineal gland itself is moved by the soul. He writes.
Let us therefore take it that the soul has its principal seat in the small gland located 
in the middle of the brain. From there it radiates through the rest of the body by 
means o f the animal spirits, the nerves and even the blood, which can take on the 
impressions of the spirits and carry them through the arteries to all the limbs. 
^Descartes 1984, v.l, 341)
* Correspondence with Elizabeth in Descartes (1984) volume 1.
’’ The neuroscientist Eccles (1994) argues that the mind affects the body altering the quantum field o f 
certam parts o f the brain called presynaptic paracrystalline vesicular grids. Eccles's t ^ r y  is that if  he can 
find some part o f the brain small e n o u ^  for quantum effects occur, then he can avoid prtiblems o f 
conservation ofenergy and momentum. The mmd, he thinks, can affect apparently random occurrences 
within these structures to give rise to macroscopic changes in the brain. The moral o f this theory is that 
emphasis on the conservation laws is misguided. The physmist Penrose (1989) appears to follow a similar 
strategy.
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Thus, the anim al spirits act through the blood and nerves on the muscles to cause our actions.
These animal spirits are affected in some manner by the soul in the pineal gland or acting
through the pineal gland. Later he writes,
[T]he mechanism of our body is so constructed that simply by this gland’s being 
moved in any way by the soul or by any other cause, it drives the surrounding 
spirits towards the pores of the brain, which direct them through the nerves to the 
muscles; and in this way the gland makes the spirits move the limbs. (Descartes 
1984, v.l, 341)
Apparently, on Descartes’ more considered view, the pineal gland is moved by the soul, and 
the animal spirits are moved by the pineal gland. But this view of the interaction of the mind 
and body says nothing about how the immaterial mind affects the physical pineal gland. 
Thus, whichever interpretation of Descartes is correct, Descartes says at best where the 
interaction occurs but cannot explain how this interaction is possible.
Descartes’ problem of mental causation has been well documented. However, the 
Exclusion Argument itself does not appear until some time later. Although scientists and 
philosophers must have routinely applied some variety exclusion principle to sets of data, the 
Exclusion Argument as it is applied to the mind or consciousness makes its first unofficial 
^pearance in Huxley’s (1898) argument for Epiphenomenalism. Certainly scientists have 
always thought that once they have given a complete explanation of an effect, they did not 
also need to perform more experiments to show that some other explanation was not also 
correct For example, if one can explain lightning completely in terms of electrical 
discharges in the atmosphere, one does not need to study further to determine whether the 
gods were also involved. However, Huxley was the first to apply this principle to the human 
mmd.
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Huxley, following Descartes, argues that the actions o f animals can be explained 
entirely in terms of the actions of their nervous systems but believes further that the actions 
of humans can be explained entirely in terms of their nervous systems. On his view, since 
there is a complete neural causal explanation for human behavior, the conscious mind cannot 
be causally responsible for any behavior. Huxley cannot deny the existence of 
consciousness-we are too 6miliar with it in our own case—but we can show that 
consciousness cannot be a cause of any behavior.
Huxley’s argument differs from the current Exclusion Argument in that it does not 
generalize to any sets of properties or entities. Huxley discovered, he thought, that the neural 
explanation of behavior was sufficient, so he rejected any connection between consciousness 
and behavior. Nonreductive Physicalism, on the other hand, supposes that the problem 
posed by the Exclusion Argument is one for any pairs of event types or sets of properties, not 
only one of the relation between consciousness and the neurons that underlie it
Norman Malcolm (1968) introduced the Exclusion Argument into recent philosophy. 
Malcolm argued that physical, or neural, explanations of behavior could not be complete. 
The neural explanation, if it were complete, would have to compete with the mental, or 
intentional, ejq)lanation of behavior. Since the intentional explanation of behavior was 
superior, the neural explanation could not be complete. Malcolm's view provides an 
interesting example of how philosophical fashions change. Currently the worry is that 
intentional explanation might be supplanted by neurological explanations, but at that time 
the worry was just the reverse. The essence of Nfolcolm’s Exclusion Argument remains the
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same as ours; one complete «q>lanation or set of causes for an event «ccludes any other 
explanation .^
The Exclusion Argument because of its premises involving the adequacy o f physical 
explanations for human behavior and the metaphysical primacy of the physical is the modem 
analogue of traditional problems of mental causation. Two other problems of mental 
causation have appeared recently in philosophy of mind. These problems are the problem of 
Causal Relevance of Content and the problem of Anomalism of the Mental. Davidson 
(1970) raises the latter problem. This problem hinges on assumptions about the normative 
and holistic character of human rationality and the actions it gives rise to, and assumptions 
about the nomic character of causality. This problem is quite serious, but it does not arise 
immediately from basic physicalist commitments as the Exclusion Argument does, and, 
arguably, relies on notions idiosyncratic to Davidson. Thus, the Exclusion Argument 
presents a more fundamental problem for Physicalism, and so 1 will not address Davidson’s 
argument.
The problem of the Causal Relevance of Content will overlap my discussion in the 
last two chapters of this woric. This problem arises finm the assumption that causation is 
entirely local and recent arguments that mental content is relational or octrinsic to the mind. 
This argument, since it does not arise immediately from basic physicalist assumptions, is 
also less fundamental to Physicalism than the problem presented by the Exclusion 
Argument Whatever the merits o f these other problems for mental causation, it is important 
to keep them separate finm the argument I address in this woric, the Exclusion Argument
* The &ct that Malcolm frames his argument in terms o f counterfactuals mars his argument I have already 
noted that I reject counterfactual accounts o f causation.
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The Exclusion Argument presents a problem that is more fundamental to Physicalism and 
more in line with historical problems of mental causation and mental explanation.
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PARTI:
T h e  E x c l u s io n  A r g u m e n t  
O v erv iew
The problem of mental causation is that of determining how the mind can be causally 
relevant in a physical world. This problem has been derived from a variety of different 
arguments. One such argument, currently of much interest, is the Exclusion Argument An 
Exclusion Argument can be constructed for any of several metaphysical positions. 
Moreover several different sets of premises for the Exclusion Argument have been adduced 
to show that the mental must be causally inert I will analyze the Exclusion Argument to 
show how it affects different varieties of dualism, to show whether the argument is valid and 
whether any of its premises might be false. Because a solution to the problem might depend 
on accidental features of a particular version of the argument the first part of this work will 
set up the Exclusion Argument by constructing the most perspicuous version of it
The most perspicuous version of the Exclusion Argument will include all the 
premises necessary for the argument to be valid, will exclude any unnecessary premises and 
will make explicit any different assumptions that might be combined in other versions of the 
argument In chapter two 1 will discuss three Exclusion Arguments, one for each dualist 
position. Each Exclusion Argument will involve varhitions on the same premises. In 
chapter three I will discuss assumptions made in some other philosophers* versions of the 
Exclusion Argument and relations among these different premises. This discussion will 
show which premises are required for the argument and how premises from different 
versions of the argument are related. The goal o f subsequent chapters will be to analyze the
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more controversial premises of the Exclusion Argument to see which premise or premises 
might be rejected and to investigate the possibility that the mental is causally inert
25
C h a pter  2 
T h e  Ex clu sio n  Ar gum ent
2.1 Introductioii
An Exclusion Argument can be raised for any variety of dualism. In this chapter I 
will describe three different types of dualism and give Exclusion Arguments for each of 
these dualisms. The purpose of this cluster is to get clear on what precisely is required for 
an Exclusion Argument to entail Epiphenomenalism and to show what metaphysical views 
are affected by an Exclusion Argument
The Exclusion Argument, as I showed in the first chapter, appears to entail that the 
mental is epiphenomenal, but there are different varieties of Epiphenomenalism. If the 
mental is epiphenomenal, it is causally inert and plays no role in world or in other mental 
activities. The mental rides along with the physical as the fit)th rides along with the waves. 
In Huxley’s (1898) simile, it is like the whistle of the steam engine that signals that the 
engine is woridng but plays no role in the movement of the engine. According to 
Epiphenomenalism, the mind is nothing more than a causally irrelevant byproduct of the 
brain. All the causal work is done by the brain while the mind’s activities merely 
accompany those of the brain.
Philosophers often consider Epiphenomenalism to be a particular problem for 
meaning or content Dretske (1989) uses the example of an opera singer who shatters a glass 
by singing. Her singing caused the glass to shatter in virtue of its fiequency, say, a high C. 
Supposing that she sang in words, her words had meaning, but the meaning of her words 
could not cause the glass to shatter. The meaning is causally irrelevant to the glass 
shattering; the glass shattered in virtue of the ftequency of her singing but not m virtue of
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the meaning of her words. Thus, if a physical mechanism accompanies every event, 
meaning may be epiphenomenal.
C. D. Broad (1925) first noted a distinction between two varieties of causal inertness. 
These two varieties o f causal inermess are called Token-Epiphenomenalism and Type- 
Epiphenomenalism.
McLaughlin (1989) characterizes the distinction as follows:
Type Epiphenomenalism (Type-E). (a) Events can be causes in virtue of falling 
under physical types, but (b) events cannot be causes in virtue of falling 
under mental types.
Token Epiphenomenalism (Token-E). (i) Physical events can cause mental 
events, but (ii) mental events cannot cause anything. (1989, 109-10)
The characterization of Token-E is self-explanatory. Mental events, either conceived
as belonging to a distinct substance or as aggregates o f physical entities but not identical to
the sum of those entities, cannot be causes. Type-E, on the other hand, requires some
explanation. Type-E is the view that the mental qua mental is not causally relevant, that an
event insofar as it is a mental event is not relevant to the production of an effect Only the
physical properties of an event are causally relevant to the occurrence of an effect; the
mental property are not relevant
If mental events are a species of physical events, then they can unproblematically
be causes. If a mental event is a physical event and the physical event is a cause, then
the mental event is a cause. However, a mental event can be a cause without the effect
occurring in virtue o f the event’s being a mental event without the mental property being
causally relevant Consider the following example'. Let us say Hurricane Mitch, the
hurricane that ravaged Central America, was reported on page 13 of the New York Times.
^ This example is essentially an updated version o f one given by Antony (1989) following Davidson 
(1980).
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Mitch caused a tremendous amount of damage in Central America. However, the 
damage did not occur in virtue o f Mitch’s being reported on page 13 of the Times but in 
vinue of Mitch’s being a powerful hurricane. That Hurricane Mitch was reported on 
page 13 of the Times is causally irrelevant to Mitch’s effects on Central America. In the 
case o f Epiphenomenalism, the physical properties of the cause are already causally 
sufficient for the effect, so mental properties appear quite unnecessary, and, thus, effects 
do not occur in virtue of the mental properties of any cause. Mental properties appear to 
be, like Mitch’s being reported on page 13 of the Times, unnecessary or epiphenomenal 
byproducts of actually causally relevant properties. So, mental events can still be causes, 
just as Mitch is a cause, but their effects may occur only in virtue of their physical 
properties not in virtue of their mental properties. This view o f mental causation is Type 
Epiphenomenalism or Type-E.
As we have seen, Type-E does not entail Token-E, but Token-E does entail Type-E. 
Type-E does not entail Token-E because mental event tokens may be identical to physical 
event tokens. In that case the mental would be Type epiphenomenal without being Token 
epiphenomenal; mental events would be causes, but nothing would occur in virtue of M ing 
under a mental type. However, Token-E does entail Type-E. If mental events cannot cause 
anything, then no mental event can be a cause in virtue of its mental properties. If the mental 
event is not a cause, then no property of the event is causally relevant to producing any 
effect. So, Type-E could be true without Token-E being true, but Token-E could not be true 
without Type-E being true.
I take the in-virtue-of relation in this case to be a real relation of causal relevance. 
Because o f its close similiarity to the because-of relation, McLaughlin (1989) takes the
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relation to be an explanatory and, thus, epistemic relation. On my view, the similarity of the
in-virtue-of relation to the because-of relation is explained by the fact that the in-virtue-of
relation is an objective relation that one might appeal to in explanations but which is
independent of our explanations and other epistemic endeavors. In the case of Type-E, the
in-virtue-of relation is one of causal relevance to an effect
Even if one agrees with McLaughlin about the nature of this relation, assuming
explanatory realism, as I noted in the previous chapter that I do, entails that some real
relation grounds this epistemic one. Thus, I take the in-virtue-of relation to be a real relation
or at least correspond to some real relation. Thus, although I disagree with McLaughlin
about the nature of the relation, if we are to accept explanatory realism, then we must accept
that some real, and not purely epistemic, relation is involved in Type-E.
Most contemporary philosophers of mind have thought it obvious that the mental has
causal power. Virtually all people agree that their thirsts cause them to drink and their pains
cause them to flinch. As Jerry Fodor writes in his inimitable style.
Whereas, if it isn’t literally true that my wanting is causally responsible for 
my rwching and my itchkg is causally responsible for my scratching, and 
my believing is causally responsible for my saying . . . .  if none of that is 
literally true, then practically everything I believe about anything is false and 
it’s the end of the world. (1989,77)
However, belief in the causal efBcacy of mental properties is inconsistent with the
fundamental notions to which the Exclusion Argument appeals. If we are to hold to the
causal efGcarqr of the mental, we must find the argument to be unsound. Unfortunately, the
argument appears to be valid, and each of the metaphysical assumptions is independently
plausible. The Exclusion Argument, then, leads to the problem o f mental causation. We
think mental causation occurs, yet it cannot occur if this plausible metaphysical picture is
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cotiect The purpose of this work, then, is only in part to argue that the mental must have 
causal power but primarily to show how the mental can have causal power.
A variation of the Exclusion Argument afflicts every type of dualism. The 
Exclusion Argument is roughly the following. The mental and the physical are distinct 
and real existants. The physical determines the mental and the mental can have no effect 
on the physical. Because the mental is determined by the physical, each mental effect is 
completely determined by the physical. Finally, because there can be only one complete, 
independent determiner for any effect, the mental cannot be causally relevant to any 
mental or physical effect.
Three forms of the Exclusion Argument correspond to each of three forms of 
dualism. I will show how each of these arguments appears to show that the mental is 
causally inert on the given metaphysical view. 1 will also show, for each view, why we 
might think the premises for that argument are true. 1 will put off careful consideration 
of the contentious premises and validity of forms of the Exclusion Argument until later.
The three forms of dualism are Substance Dualism, Constitution Physicalism, and 
Token Physicalism combined with Property Dualism. Substance Dualism is the 
Cartesian view that there are two distinct types of entities or independent existents. 
Constitution Physicalism is a Physicalism in that it does not postulate immaterial 
substances but is a dualism of macro-entities and their microconstituents. Constitution 
Physicalism claims macroscopic events, states and objects are not identical to the 
mereological sums of their microphysical constituents. Token Physicalism is the view 
that every particular is physical but that event, state or object types are not the same as 
mental types. Each dualism is susceptible to a version o f the Exclusion Argument
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Schema given in chapter one.
2 J  The Exclusion Argument and Substance Dualism
Exclusion Argument for Substance Dualism (EASD)
(1) Substance Dualism. The mental and the physical are real substances.
(2) Irreducibility. Mental substances are not identical to physical substances.
(3) Physical Causation o f the Mental. The physical cauLdly determines the 
mental. All mental events are caused by physical events.
(4) Causal Closure o f the Physical. There can be no cause of a physical event 
that is not itself a physical event.
(5) Causal Exclusion Principle. There can be no more than one complete, 
independent cause for any event. If there is one complete, independent cause 
for an event, there cannot be another cause for that event, except in cases of 
overdetermination.
(6) Mental causation is not a case of causal overdetermination.
(7) Therefore, Token-Epiphenomenalism: the mental substance carmot be a 
cause of any effect.
The Exclusion Argument here follows the general pattern given in chapter one as 
the Exclusion Argument Schema. The assumptions of Substance Dualism and 
Irreducibility, premises (1) and (2), the mental and physical are distinct substances. 
Because of the Causal Closure of the Physical, premise (4), the mental substance cannot 
affect the physical substance. Thus, the mental is a distinct substance that cannot affect 
the physical. Because of the Physical Causation of the Mental, premise (4), the physical 
causes all the mental effects. Finally, because of the Causal Exclusion Principle, premise 
(S), since there is a complete physical cause for everything, both mental and physical, the 
mental substance can cause nothing. Hence, EASD appears to entail Epiphenomenalism.
This argument fills one loophole left open by the Exclusion Argument Schema. 
We recognize that occasionally more than one complete cause occurs for a single effect. 
For example, two bullets may simultaneously strike a person’s heart, and, thus, both 
bullets cause die person’s death. Thus, in some rare cases, more than one complete.
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independent cause brings about a single effect So, EASD adds premise (6) that mental 
causation, if it exists, is not a case of overdetermination.
The problem of mental causation as presented here may seem unfamiliar. 
Traditionally, the problem of mental causation for Cartesian substance dualism has 
centered on the Physical Causation of the Mental and the Causal Closure of the Physical, 
premises (3) and (4) of EASD. However, the premises of EASD, with the exception of 
premise (2), are supported by good evidence.
The purpose of constructing an Exclusion Argument for Cartesian Substance 
Dualism (or, as I shall say interchangeably, Cartesian Dualism or Substance Dualism) is 
to show the generality of the Exclusion Argument, that it need not assume either 
Constitution Physicalism or Token-Physicalism. So, for the moment, I will simply 
assume Substance Dualism, and give some reason to accept the other premises.
2,2.1 Causal Closure of the Physical
Cartesian Substance Dualism is the view that minds and bodies are separate 
substances, distinct fundamental existents, that somehow causally interact with one 
another. The essence of the mind is thinking; the essence of body is extension. Mental 
substance is an immaterial stuff whose nature is to think or be conscious, whereas 
physical substance is a material stuff whose nature is to take up space. Philosophers have 
not improved significantly on the notion o f an immaterial substance since Descartes* 
formulation, but philosophers have improved on the notion o f the physical. The 
characterization of the physical as an extended substance is inadequate because some 
physical entities are considered to be unextended. For example, photons and other 
particles, clearly physical objects, are considered to be point masses, and thus
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unextended. No single characteristic appears likely to provide the essence of the 
physical, but it is often assumed that the nature o f the physical is captured by the sum of 
properties to which a completed basic physics would appeal.
This characterization, o f course, does not mean that our physicists determine the 
nature of the physical, just that the entities are the sorts of entities to which any correct 
theory of physics will appeal. For this characterization of the physical to work, the 
putative physical theory must also be complete since one would not want to rule out 
forces or entities that have not yet been discovered. Assuming our current physics is 
largely correct, the physical could be characterized by a set of well-defined entities and 
their properties, like charge, mass, velocity, momentum, energy, etc.
There is good reason to suppose the Causal Closure of the Physical is true. 
Details about the substances aside, philosophers have demanded since Descartes’ time to 
know how the mental, immaterial substance could affect the physical world. Descartes’ 
interactive Substance Dualism, the view that these two substances causally affect each 
other, violates Causal Closure of the Physical, premise (4) of EASD, but such a violation 
seems impossible. Some philosophers have thought that it was inconceivable that two 
such different types of substance could interact. How could an immaterial mind have any 
effect on ponderous, physical matter? Other philosophers argued that interaction 
required violations of physical conservation laws, conservation of momentum and 
mass/energy. Descartes’ critics in essence assumed something like the principle of the 
Causal Closure o f the Physical.
Although apparently compelling, the conservation law objection to Cartesian 
Dualism assumes the Causal Closure of the Physical rather than supporting i t  Laws of
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conservation of momentum and mass/energy say that for any system closed to outside 
influence the total momentum and mass/energy o f the system must remain constant. So, 
the objection that interaction requires a violation of conservation laws assumes that the 
physical is closed to outside, i.e. nonphysical, influence. The conservation-law objection 
thus assumes the Causal Closure o f the Physical rather than giving evidence for that 
principle.
The conceivability objection against interaction is more convincing when 
interpreted correctly. Conceivability is not a guarantee o f truth; nor is lack of 
conceivability a guarantee of falsity. However, it is hard to imagine how one could even 
begin to answer questions about how a mental substance could ‘push’ on the particles or 
alter the fields that make up the physical universe. The inconceivability of this 
interaction places the burden of proof on the Substance Dualist. The Substance Dualist 
must provide both a plausible and testable theory of the mechanism by means of which 
the immaterial substance could influence the physical and a convincing philosophical 
argument that makes such interaction intelligible. Without a theory o f interaction 
including these features, we must suppose that the physical is closed to mental causal 
influence. Criticism of Cartesian Dualism fits fairly nicely the Causal Closure premise of 
the Exclusion Argument; it is inconceivable that the immaterial mind influence the 
physical body.
2.2.2 Physical Causation of the Mental
Although the Substance Dualist would, presumably, deny the Physical Causation 
o f the Mental, premise (3) of the EASD, the evidence from neuroscience provides reason 
to accept this premise. The success o f neuroscience in finding correlations between
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mental events and neural events suggests that every mental event is caused (or otherwise 
determined) by the neurophysiology o f the brain. Evidence o f mental effects of brain 
lesions, the results of PET (Positron Emission Tomography) scans, the effect of 
chemicals, including chemicals as mundane as alcohol, all clearly support a dependence 
of the mind on the brain. Provided one accepts Substance Dualism, the Physical 
Causation o f the Mental is well supported by the neuroscientific evidence.
This premise does not fit the traditional problem of mental causation for 
Descartes. The problem of how the physical could cause mental effects is historically 
less important but still significant. Premise (3) of EASD, the Physical Causation of the 
Mental, is the principle that all the mental effects that occur have a physical cause. The 
Cartesian picture denies this premise because it claims that only some mental events are 
determined by physical causes. According to Cartesian Dualism, one mental event can 
cause another without any intervening physical activity. However, the relevant problem 
with Substance Dualism is not that all the mental effects have physical causes, but how 
mental effects can have physical causes at all. Just as immaterial substance seemed 
incapable of affecting physical substance, ponderous physical matter seems incapable of 
affecting an immaterial mental substance. So, EASD appears to capture part of the 
problem of mental causation for Substance Dualism, but it does not capture the whole of 
the traditional problem.
For this reason, when I give a solution to the Exclusion problem in the final 
chapters o f this work, that solution will not apply to Substance Dualism. I will argue that 
the Exclusion Principle does not exclude the mental from causal relevance, but Substance 
Dualism has significant other problems with interaction so that my solution will not help
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explain interaction for Substance Dualism.
2.2 J  Causal Exclusion Principle
Kim (1987a) gives the basic argument for an Explanatory Exclusion Principle. 
His argument for the Explanatory Exclusion Principle depends on his claim that having more 
than one explanation creates an epistemic tension. Finding two or more explanations for a 
single phenomenon creates an epistemic tension, a need to discover that either one 
explanation is correct and the other is not, or that both explanations are related as incomplete 
parts of one explanation or in some other way.
More generally, we see that two purposes of explanation are simplification and 
unification. Having multiple explanations of a single phenomenon does not simplify or 
unify the explanation but complicates the explanation. Showing dependencies or relations 
among different explanations better unifies the explanation. Thus, the practice of 
explanation should involve reducing multiple explanations to a single explanation and 
showing how the multiple explanations depend on each other.
If explanatory realism is true, an objective relation must hold between our theories 
and the world. If that is so, then the purposes of simplification and unification are taken as 
likely to lead to true explanations. If those explanations are true, then something about the 
world must correspond, in some way, with those explanations. So, Kim’s Explanatory 
Exclusion Principle corresponds to a metaphysical Exclusion Principle. For the purposes of 
EASDy we can take the Exclusion Principle to be causal exclusion, but the argument above 
shows that we should accept a more general Exclusion Principle, called the 
Generative/Determinative Exclusion Principle^. I will discuss the Exclusion Principle agam
*  Kim appeals to this principle only in his unpublished David Ross Boyd lectures at the Universify of 
Oklahoma. He calls die principle the Generative/Detenninative Exclusion Principle to allow for general
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in later parts of this chapter and more critically in chapter eight
Finally, we must admit that not all events should be excluded fiom causal relevance. 
I noted earlier that this argument filled one loophole left open by the Exclusion 
Argument Schema. In cases of causal overdetermination, more than one complete cause 
can occur for a single effect. For example, two bullets may simultaneously strike a 
person’s heart, and, thus, both bullets cause the person’s death. Or two singers can sing a 
high-C and shatter a glass, but neither one is the single cause o f the shattering. Thus, in 
some rare cases, more than one complete, independent cause brings about a single effect 
So, EASD adds premise (6) that mental causation, if it exists, is not a case of 
overdetermination.
This additional premise is justified as well as necessary for the argument. Cases 
of causal overdetermination are rare and accidental. They are a comparative oddity that 
cannot be explained by any appeal to a deeper underlying cause. However, the case of 
mental-physical causation is ubiquitous and systematic. Every mental event already has 
a physical cause, and assuming that the mental is an additional overdetermining cause 
does not fit the profile of overdetermination. The systematic overdetermination of 
mental events, having both a physical and a mental cause, strains the bounds of 
credibility. Such a systematic overdetermination cries out for further explanation, and 
yet to assume that such causation is simply a case of overdetermination gives up on 
further explanation. Overdetermination of the mental by both mental and physical causes 
seems to require us to believe in an incredible happy coincidence. So, we should not
detennination relations including Goldman’s (1970) notion o f generation o f actions from basic actions. 
Thus, on Goldman’s view, my movmg my arm quickly is not the same action as my moving my arm. 
Goldman argues that the basic action o f moving my arm generates the less fundamental action o f my 
moving it quickly. Kim wishes to include such generation relations with his principle.
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assume that mental causation is a case o f simple overdetermination.
So, EASD appears to be valid, at least on a cursory inspection, and the premises of 
that argument appear to be justified. The Physical Causation o f the Mental is supported 
by evidence fi-om the neurosciences, and it appears inconceivable that the Causal Closure 
of the Physical be false. Therefore, EASD shows that the mental, if  Substance Dualism is 
correct, must be epiphenomenal.
Because Descartes denied both Physical Causation of the Mental and Causal 
Closure o f the Physical, both premises (3) and (4) of EASD, the traditional problem of 
mental causation for Substance Dualism is not generally captured by the Exclusion 
Argument Nonetheless, it is important to note that an Exclusion Argument can be 
constructed for Substance Dualism. If the premises of the Exclusion Argument as given 
above are true, then the mental substance must be causally inert or epiphenomenal. If it 
is impossible for the mental to be epiphenomenal, as I will argue, then Substance 
Dualism is inconsistent with the broadly physicalist premises o f the Exclusion Argument. 
It is hardly surprising that Substance Dualism is inconsistent with these broadly 
physicalist premises, but, despite the differences between the traditional Cartesian 
problem o f mental causation and the problem as given by the Exclusion Argument, a 
version o f the Exclusion Argument applies to Substance Dualism.
Since the Exclusion Argument is not the traditional problem of mental causation, 
giving the Exclusion Argument in terms o f Substance Dualism may seem irrelevant In 
addition, few philosophers now accept Substance Dualism, so no one is apt to defend this 
view. Nonetheless, that the Exclusion Argument can be given against Substance Dualism 
shows that the Exclusion Argument is not strictly speaking a problem for Physicalism.
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Since an Exclusion Argument can be constructed for Substance Dualism, philosophers 
like Kim (1993b) and Van Gulick (1992 and 1993) who include physical monism or 
Token Physicalism as essential to the Exclusion Argument are mistaken.
The only way for Token Physicalism to be necessary is for the thesis to be 
equivalent to a premise that is essential. Without getting too far ahead of ourselves, we 
can see that the only way that Token Physicalism can play an essential role in the 
Exclusion Argument is if it guarantees either that all the causation is physical or that 
everything is determined by the physical. Substituting Token Physicalism for the Causal 
Closure requirement will guarantee that all causes are physical, but it will guarantee 
nothing about the causal relevance of properties or types. Furthermore, substituting 
Token Physicalism for the determination requirement would guarantee that everything be 
determined by the physical if everything is physical, but it will guarantee nothing about 
determination of properties or types. Thus, Token Physicalism cannot be essential to all 
versions of the Exclusion Argument Indeed, a solution to this problem of mental 
causation might be to abandon Substance Dualism in favor of some variety of 
physicalism. So, Token Physicalism seems more likely to be a solution to the problem of 
mental causation than part o f the problem.
Although some broadly physicalist assumptions are essential to any version of the 
Exclusion Argument, the claim that everything is physical is not one of them. Because of 
the differences between the traditional problem o f mental causation for Substance 
Dualism, and because of the current unpopularity of Substance Dualism, I will pursue 
EASD no further but will focus on versions o f the Exclusion Allument for Nonreductive 
Physicalism. I will now turn to these versions o f the Exclusion Argument
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2 J  The Exclusion Argument and Constitution Physicaiism
I have shown that a version of the Exclusion Argument can apply to Substance 
Dualism, so this problem of mental causation is not strictly a physicalist problem. Other 
versions of the Exclusion Argument apply to different varieties o f Physicalism. The 
second version of the Exclusion Argument applies to event dualism and concludes that 
mental events cannot be causes. The third version of the Exclusion Argument applies to 
Token Physicalism combined with Property or Type Dualism.
An increasingly common view of the mind and other macroscopic entities, called 
Constitution Physicalism or Composition Physicalism  ^ is that the mind is constituted by 
or composed o f only physical entities but is neither type nor token-identical to them. It is 
not possible to defend this view in detail, but I can briefly give one argument for the 
view. In brief that argument is that macroscopic objects have different modal properties 
from the sums of their parts, and so cannot be identical to sums o f those parts. Gibbard’s 
(1975) example of Goliath and Lumpl, a statue and the clay that constitutes it, shows that 
macroscopic objects and their constituent matter differ in modal properties'. Goliath 
could exist without his left thumb, for example, but, since Lumpl is the lump of clay that 
constitutes Goliath, Lumpl could not exist without that piece o f clay. On the other hand, 
Lumpl could survive being smashed into a shapeless blob, whereas Goliath could not 
survive being smashed in this way. Assuming that names designate the same object in all 
possible worlds, the names “Goliath” and “Lumpl” cannot designate the same individual 
since one might exist without the other existing. Thus, the argument goes, macroscopic 
entities in general are neither type nor token identical to their constituent matter.
 ^Gibbaid’s conclusion is not mine. He concludes that identic o f objects designated rigidly is contingent, 
not necessary.
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In what follows, I will assume for the sake of convenience that all causal relata 
are events, but if other entities, such as states or objects, can be causal relata, then the 
Exclusion Argument given here will apply mutatis mutandis to those entities as well. 
This assumption only applies, of course, if those other entities are constituted by physical 
parts but are not themselves identical to the sums of those parts.
Exclusion Argument for Constitution Physicalism {EACP)
(8) Event dualism. Mental and physical events are real events.
(9) Irreducibility. Mental events are not token-identical to physical events.
(10) Mereological Supervenience. The mental is determined by the physical.
All mental events supervene on physical events. Any two events with all their 
physical parts indiscernible in an indiscernible physical structure will be 
mentally indiscernible. Fixing all the parts and their relations to each other will 
fix the whole.
(11) Causal Closure o f the Physical. There can be no cause of a physical event 
diat is not itself a physical event.
(12) Causal Exclusion Principle. There can be no more than one complete, 
independent cause for any event If there is one complete, independent cause 
for an event, there cannot be another cause for that event, except in cases of 
overdetermination.
(13) Mental causation is not a case of causal overdetermination.
(14) Therefore, Token-Epiphenomenalism. Mental events cannot cause any 
effects.
Constitution physicalism is in one sense dualist and in another sense physicalist. 
It is dualist in that it involves entities that are not even token-identical to physical 
entities, but it is generally classified as physicalism because macroscopic or mental 
objects are wholes made up entirely o f physical parts. The view claims the only existents 
are physical entities and their aggregates. If no physical entities existed, then nothing in 
the universe would exist. To borrow Kripke’s (1972) image, if God created everything 
physical and put it in its place, then he would not need to do any additional work or 
create anything else. If Physicalism is the view that nothing exists apart fit)m physical 
entities and their aggregates, then Constitution Physicalism is a kind o f Physicalism.
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However, since Physicalism may reasonably be interpreted as the view that nothing 
exists apart from physical entities, Constitution Physicalism is also a kind of dualism.
Terminology need not concern us. The important fact for the purposes of the 
Exclusion Argument is that Constitution Physicalism does involve irreducibly distinct 
sets o f entities. This fact is sufficient for the Exclusion Argument to apply to 
Constitution Physicalism.
The Exclusion Argument presented here should now be familiar. Since the 
mental and physical are distinct real existents, and the physical is closed to nonphysical 
causes, the mental can cause nothing physical. For example, on this view, my pain is 
constituted but is not identical to some underlying physical event, say a C-frber firing. 
I’ll assume that neural firings are physical events. The C-fiber firing causes another 
neural event, p;, which underlies a mental event, ntj, my belief that I am in pain. Given 
the Causal Closure of the Physical, my pain cannot cause the neural event pj. And since 
the physical determines the mental, the mental need play no role in determining the 
mental. My belief that I am in pain is determined by the neural event pjy so my pain has 
no causal role to play. Since the mental and physical are determined completely by the 
physical, and assuming the Causal Exclusion Principle, the mental is causally irrelevant. 
My pain cannot cause my belief that I am in pain.
The Exclusion Argument presented here, however, is invalid. My talk of the 
physical determining both the mental and the physical masks a distinction that needs to 
be made for the argument to be valid. Physical events are caused by other physical 
events, but mental events are not directly caused by physical events. Mental events are 
determined by their constituent physical parts but are not carnally determined by them.
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The determination o f mental events by physical events is not causal but o f some other 
type, perhaps ontological. Wholes depend for their existence on their parts, but this 
dependence is not causal. Intuitively, without suggesting a counterfactual analysis of the 
relation, the whole could not exist without its parts. Physical events, then, may have only 
physical causes, but mental events do not appear to have physical causes. This fact may 
allow for the possibility that mental events cause other mental events.
For this Exclusion Argument to be valid, one needs to appeal to a broader 
Exclusion Principle. Kim’s Generative/Determinative Exclusion Principle, mentioned 
earlier, will suffice.
Generative/Determinative Exclusion Principle: there can be no more than one 
complete, independent determiner of any event; if there is a complete, 
independent determiner o f an event, then there is no other determiner of that 
event.
The reasons for accepting this view have been discussed already. Assuming that 
events are explananda, they require an explanans. If there is both a mental cause and a 
physical determiner o f an event, then the event has two distinct explanations. But these 
two distinct explanations create an epistemic tension. The two explanations cannot be 
complete, independent and correct.
2 J .l  Causal Closure of the Physical
The reasons for accepting the Causal Closure principle are essentially the same 
for EACP as they were for EASD. It is hard to conceive how macroscopic objects could 
affect their physical events except through the physical events that constitute them. How 
could my pains affect my neurons except by the neurons that constitute my pain causing 
other neurons to fire? There does not seem to be a way for the mental to affect the 
physical without some physical implementing mechanism.
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2 J.2 Mereological Supervenience
One reason the Exclusion Argument is seen as more naturally an argument 
against Physicalism is that the problems of interaction between different substances do 
not seem as insurmountable. Constitution Physicalism does not provide a means 
independent o f the physical for the mental to cause physical events. However, 
Mereological Supervenience is much clearer than the Physical Causation o f the Mental 
assumed by EASD. There did not seem to be any way that brute physical matter could 
have any effect on the mental substance. However, it is more plausible on a physicalist 
view that the physical determines the mental. The notion analogous to Physical 
Causation of the Mental, Mereological Supervenience, is clear and plausible.
Mereological supervenience is the thesis that properties of wholes, macroscopic
objects and possibly minds, depend on and are determined by the properties of their parts
and the relations among those parts. If the microconstituents of a macroscopic object or
event are fixed, and the physical relations among them are fixed, then the properties of
the macroscopic object are fixed. Somewhat more precisely, we can state weak
Mereological Supervenience as:
Necessarily, for any object x, that is constituted by the mereological sum y, 
defined as proper parts a, through Uj in relations R, through R^ , and for some 
property F in A, if y has F, then x has some property G in B .^
Weak supervenience states that within a world whenever the subvenient objects 
or supervenience base objects have a certain property, then the whole will have a
* This characterization is potentially inaccurate because, as many philosophers argue, mereological sums 
may not themselves be objects or events. Use of the term y for the mereological sum should be taken as a 
convenience and not as a claim with ontological import For this reason I eschew Khn's (1987b) 
formulations since they require there to be two objects.
It is important to note that the necessity here need only be nomic necessity. Because o f the nature 
o f the evidence for these claims, it is not safe to assume a necessity stronger than nomic. Fortunately, since 
causation is no stronger than a nomic relation itself, the type o f necessity in the supervenience claim need
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correlative property. So, for example, if my neurons have a set of properties, say my C- 
fibers are firing, then I will have a corresponding mental property, pain. And any time a 
person has her C-6 bers fire, she will feel pain. However, weak supervenience is 
compatible with the possibility that I feel an itch when my C-fibers fire, so long as 
everyone else in the world feels an itch when their C-fibers fire. An example fiom a 
moral context should illustrate this point (firom Kim 1984a). Imagine Socrates has the 
nonmoral properties o f honesty, wisdom, etc. Let us assume that Socrates also has the 
moral property goodness. According to weak supervenience anyone else who has these 
nonmoral properties must also be good. However, Socrates in another possible world 
could have these nonmoral properties and be evil, according to weak supervenience. 
Everyone else in that world who had those nonmoral properties would also be evil. 
Weak supervenience says nothing about what is essential to the being with those 
properties. According to weak supervenience, goodness is not essential to anyone who 
has those nonmoral properties. So, weak supervenience seems too weak to capture our 
commonsense notion of dependence of moral properties on nonmoral properties. 
Moreover, weak supervenience seems too weak to capture the dependence of 
macroscopic objects on their parts. For example, in another possible world, my chair 
could be made up o f exactly the same parts that it has in the actual world, but my chair in 
that other possible world could have less mass than it actually has. Thus, weak 
supervenience is too weak to capture our notion of dependence.
One can state a principle. Strong Mereological Supervenience, that better captures 
the notion of dependence:
Necessarily for any object x, that is constituted by the mereological sum y, 
only be nomic.
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defined as proper parts a, through a^  in relations R, through R{, and for some 
property F in A, if y has F, then necessarily x has some property G in B
Strong supervenience does not allow for the problematic variation allowed by 
weak supervenience. According to strong supervenience, if Socrates has the properties of 
honesty, wisdom, etc., then he must be good. If my chair has all the parts and relations 
among them that it actually has, then it must have the mass it does. So strong 
supervenience, in particular strong Mereological Supervenience, better captures the 
notion of dependence we have in mind.
Three types of evidence support Strong Mereological Supervenience. Basic 
intuitions support the principle for ordinary properties. Successes in reductive 
explanation support the principle. Finally, evidence from the neurosciences support the 
principle for mental states in general, and even for conscious states for which we do not 
know and perhaps never will have adequate explanations.
First, the principle is intuitively almost undeniable for common examples of 
macroscopic properties. Ordinary properties o f objects, the mass, rigidity, solidity, etc. 
o f a chair, seem to be obviously dependent on the parts that make up the chair and their 
organization. So intuition provides some reason to accept the principle for some ordinary 
properties.
Second, Mereological Supervenience is a precondition for much of the reductive 
success o f the natural sciences; it is the metaphysical assumption that we grounds our 
scientific strategies o f understanding wholes by understanding their parts and the 
relations among those parts. Reductive explanation, taken as explanations of 
macroscopic objects in terms of their parts, in science is nearly ubiquitous and 
undeniable. For example, natural science explains temperature in a gas as mean
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molecular kinetic energy. Solidity of objects is explained as electromagnetic fields in the 
molecular structure of the objects repelling each other. Science provides examples too 
numerous to mention of macroscopic objects and properties that can be explained in 
terms of their parts and the relations among those parts. Thus, success o f the natural 
sciences supports Mereological Supervenience as a general assumption o f science.
Third, successes in neuroscience suggest that this principle is true at least for 
correlations of mental states with neural states. Even conscious states appear to correlate 
in the required way. Philosophers^ have argued that we can never completely explain 
consciousness itself or the correlations between the physical and conscious states, but the 
existence of such correlations is well supported. For example, my conscious experience 
of a red image in my visual field may not be explicable in terms of the neural processes 
of the visual system, but there appear to be well-established correlations between 
particular color sensations and certain triplets o f spiking frequencies in the visual 
system*. So, even in the most problematic case of consciousness, there is reason to think 
the covariation o f Mereological Supervenience appears to obtain. Thus, the prima facie 
evidence for Mereological Supervenience is substantial. I will discuss supervenience and 
possible failures of supervenience in more detail in chapter seven.
Given the premises of the Exclusion Argument, with the addition of the 
Generative/Determinative Exclusion Principle, mental events cannot be causes. If, as I 
will argue in Part II of this work, chapters four through six, the mental is not 
epiphenomenal, then at least one of the premises o f this version o f the Exclusion 
Argument must be false or it must be invalid. One might decide that the problem of
 ^Especially Nagel (1974) and Levine (1983).
* The example o f color as a triple o f spiking frequencies is suggested by Giurchland (1989).
4 7
mental causation could be avoided by rejecting the first premise o f EACP. If mental 
events are identical to physical events, then it is possible for mental events to be causes 
because physical events are causes. Nonreductive Token Physicalism, however, has its 
own version of the Exclusion Argument with which to contend.
2.4 The Exclusion Argument and Nonreductive Token Physicalism
The third version of the Exclusion Argument entails a rather different form of 
Epiphenomenalism than the previous two versions. The third version raises the problem for 
Nonreductive Token Physicalism, the view that mental event tokens are identical to physical 
event tokens. Thus, any particular mental entity is identical to some particular physical 
entity. However, the Exclusion Argument requires that type physicalism, that each mental 
type is identical to a physical type, be false.
Although 1 cannot argue in detail for Nonreductive Token Physicalism, I can provide 
a brief argument against Type Physicalism. It has become philosophical conventional 
wisdom in recent years that the mental is multiply realizable in heterogeneously digunct 
physical states. Pains may be realized in C-fiber firings in human beings, by some other 
brain state by octopi, and in some state of a silicon-based system in the case of putative 
Martians. These systems appear to have nothing physical in common. Therefore, there is no 
physical type that is identical to the mental type pain. Thus, an event’s mental properties are 
distinct fiom its physical properties.
The Exclusion Argument for Nonreductive Token Physicalism is as follows. The 
mental and the physical are distinct properties of event tokens. When a mental event causes 
some event, the physical properties o f the cause are all that is necessary for the physical 
effect to occur. The jdiysical properties o f any event determine the mental properties of that
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event Therefore, the physical properties of the cause determine the mental properties of the 
effect Hence, the physical properties are causally sufficient for the effect Since there can 
be no more than one complete, independent proper^ causally relevant to any effect, mental 
properties are causally irrelevant Any effect occurs only in virtue o f the cause falling under 
a physical type and not in virtue of its foiling under a mental type.
Exclusion Argument for Nonreductive Token Physicalism (EANTP)
(15) Property dualism. Mental and physical properties are real.
(16) Irreducibility. Mental properties are not identical to physical properties.
For an event to fall under a mental type is not the same as for the event to fall 
under a physical type.
(17) Property Supervenience. The mental is determined by the physical. Any 
objects that are indiscernible with respect to their physical properties must be 
indiscernible with respect to their mental properties.
(18) Causal Closure o f the Physical. There can be no property causally 
relevant to the production of a physical effect that is not itself a physical 
property.
(19) Generative/Determinative Exclusion Principle. There can be no more than 
one complete, independent property causally relevant for the production of an 
effect. If there is one complete, independent property causally relevant for the 
production of an effect, there cannot be another property causally relevant for 
the production of that effect, except in cases of overdetermination.
(20) Mental causation is not a case of causal overdetermination.
(21) Therefore, Type-Epiphenomenalism. Mental properties cannot be causally 
relevant to the production of any effects.
2.4.1 Token PhysicaUsm and Event Identity
I need to discuss two influential views of events, the fîne-grained and coarse-grained 
conceptions of events, and how accepting one or the other might affect this third variety of 
the Exclusion Argument The fine-grained conception of events appears to collapse the 
distinction between the second and third versions of the Exclusion Argument The fine­
grained view of events, Kim’s (1976) view, is that an event is a complex consisting of an 
object exemplifying a property at a time. Thus, my turning on the light switch at 10:00 pjn. 
consists o f me exemplifying a property, turning on the light switch at the time of 1 0 :0 0  pjn.
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On this view of events, my startling the burglar is not the same event as my turning on the 
light switch because each event exemplifies a different property. Since mental and physical 
properties are distinct, for familiar reasons, mental events are not identical to physical 
events. So, on the fine-grained view of events, there is no distinction between EACP and 
EANTP.
The coarse-grained view of events, Davidson’s (1969) view, takes events to be 
simple, fundamental constituents of the world. My turning on the light switch and startling 
the burglar can be one and the same event with two different descriptions or with two 
different properties. Mental events, on this view, can be identical with physical events even 
if mental and physical properties are not identical. Obviously, it would be simpler for 
purposes of exposition to assume the coarse-grained view of events. However, 1 do not wish 
to argue the relative merits of the two conceptions of events, and I do not want to beg 
important questions by assuming either view. Instead, I will present the Exclusion 
Argument in a form that will apply to either notion of events.
The fine-grained view of events is incompatible with Token Physicalism conceived 
as the view that all events are physical events. The only way for the fine-grained view of 
events to be compatible with Token Physicalism is for mental properties to be identical with 
physical properties. Since irreducibility of properties is one of the assumptions of 
Nonreductive Physicalism, it follows that for the fine-grained view of events Nonreductive 
Physicalism is automatically event dualism.
However, the event-dualism that derives finm this conception of events is not a 
substantial dualism. One might not be able to avoid a dualism about events on this 
conception, but one could still be a physicalist about the constituent objects. The objects that
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exemplify certain properties may be identical, and so the view itself may be a form of 
identify theory. Since, on the fine-grained view, events are not the basic constituents of the 
world, the objects that in part constitute events are the fimdamental entities that should be the 
relata in the claims of identify theorists. Property dualism may entail event dualism on a 
fine-grained conception of events, but, since events are not fundamental constituents of the 
world, property dualism does not entail dualism about fundamental entities. One could be an 
identify theorist about objects without committing oneself to any dualism deeper than 
property dualism.
Constitution Physicalism, conversely, accepts a substantial dualism about events 
beyond anything forced on one by a particular conception of events. Let us assume for a 
moment the fine-grained conception of events. For Constitution Physicalism the objects 
that in part make up events are not identical to the mereological sums of their parts. On 
this view, mental events are not identical to physical events for two reasons, because the 
objects exemplifying the properties are not identical and, possibly, because the properties 
exemplified are not identical. Constitution Physicalism entails dualism about events 
even if the coarse-grained analysis of events is correct. The coarse-grained notion of 
events by itself is compatible with mental events being either type or token-identical to 
physical events. But Constitution Physicalism entails that both type and token 
physicalism are false. So, Constitution Physicalism entails a more substantial dualism 
about events than Token Physicalism does.
Perhaps the problem of mental causation is a reason to accept one conception of 
events over another since the the fine-grained conception appears to collapse an 
important distinction. However, I think that even assuming that conception of events, an
51
important distinction can be made for causal relevance. If  events are not fundamental 
constituents o f the universe, and they are causal relata, then it follows that the objects, 
properties and times that constitute them must be causally relevant. On Constitution 
Physicalism, macroscopic objects are not identical (either type of token) to sums of their 
constituent objects. So, even if we accept a fîne-grained conception o f events, we can 
still distinguish questions about the causal relevance of the objects constituting events 
and the causal relevance of the properties constituting the events. Thus, the Exclusion 
Argument for Constitution Physicalism would claim, at least, that macroscopic objects 
and mental objects are not causally relevant; and the Exclusion Argument for 
Nonreductive Token Physicalism would claim only that properties of mental events are 
not causally relevant. Thus, even on a fine-grained conception of events, we can deduce 
a distinct variety of the Exclusion Argument for each dualism. Because of this fact, I 
will assume a coarse-grained conception of events for ease o f exposition.
2.4 J  EANTP mAQwmsation
EANTP addresses the properties of physical events and their causal relevance rather 
than addressing the events and whether they can be causes. Following the terminology 
introduced by McLaughlin, whereas the fîrst two versions o f the argument lead to Token- 
Epiphenomenalism, the third version of the Exclusion Argument leads to Type- 
Epiphenomenalism.
Morgan's (1989) neologism quausation, mentioned in chapter one, will help in
understanding this Exclusion Argument Morgan characterizes this notion as follows.
For any two events c and e and any two properties F and G, c qua F causes e 
^uaGiff:
(i) c causes e;
(ii) c instantiates F;
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(iii) e instantiates G; and
(iv) the fact that c instantiates F is explanatorily relevant to the fact that e 
occurs and instantiates G. (1989, SO)
On Horgan’s notion of quausation an effects occurs and is the type o f event it is in virtue
of the type of the cause. For example, some event token in my brain may instantiate a
pain type and a C-fîber firing type. That is to say, one event is both a pain and a C-fiber
firing. This event causes me to pull my hand from the hot stove. To say that the C-fiber
firing quauses the event o f my pulling my hand from the hot stove is to say that my
pulling my hand away occurs in virtue of that cause being a C-fiber firing. Quausal
relevance seems an integral part of explanations of events and of why those events are of
the type they are. Again, assuming explanatory realism, there must be some objective
fact that makes these explanations correct. Thus, mental quausation must occur iff
behavioral and mental effects, occur in virtue of the mental property of the cause. And
EANTP entails, at least apparently, that the mental quauses nothing. According to
EANTP Type-E or Quausal Epiphenomenalism, as Morgan terms it, is correct.
2.4 J  Generative/Determinative Exclusion Principle
EANTP differs from the EACP in that it assumes properties, or the fact that an
event instantiates a type, are explananda. If we assumed only a Causal Exclusion
principle or the Generative/Determinative Exclusion Principle, it is logically possible that
the mental properties of the cause be relevant to the mental property of the effect. The
mental properties of any event are determined by the physical properties of the event but
are not caused by them. Thus, the Causal Exclusion principle does not exclude the
possibility that the mental property of a cause is relevant to the mental property o f the
effect The Causal Exclusion principle allows the mental property to quause another
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mental property. The G/D Exclusion Principle, in addition, simply does not address 
exclusion of properties of events but only o f the events themselves. Thus, for the 
Exclusion Argument to be valid, we must formulate Kim’s G/D Exclusion Principle to 
include properties.
Generative/Determinative Exclusion Principle for properties: there can be no 
more than one complete, independent determining set of properties for any 
properQf (or the fact that an event e instantiates a property); if there is a 
complete, independent determining set o f properties for a property (or the 
fact that an event e instantiates a property), then there is no other property 
that determines that property (or the fact that an event e instantiates a 
property.
According to this principle, if the mental properties of an effect are determined, as 
Property Supervenience says they are, then there can be no other determiner of the 
mental property. Thus, this principle excludes the possibility that a mental property of a 
cause may quause the mental property of the effect The G/D Exclusion Principle for 
properties rules out the possibility of mental quausation.
This Exclusion Principle is justified in the same manner as the others. As long as 
the fact that some property occurs can be explained, then an Explanatory Exclusion 
principle should apply to i t  And if explanatory realism is true for properties, then this 
principle is as well justified as any previous Exclusion Principle. The fact that my 
experience now is a pain seems in as much need of explanation and as susceptible to 
explanation as the occurrence of the experience itself. Therefore, it seems obvious that 
property instantiations require and are susceptible to explanation.
2.4 J  Causal Closure of the Physical
The principle of the Causal Closure o f the Physical (CCP) also needs to be 
amended to deal with properties. The first formulation for CCP for properties is as
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follows.
Causal Closure of the Physical for properties'. No non-physical property can be 
relevant to any physical effect; for any caused event e that has a physical 
property P, no non-physical property of e’s cause can be relevant to the 
occurrence of e.
This principle asserts that no mental property can be relevant to the occurrence of a 
physical effect if no mental property is a physical property. However, it makes no claims 
about the physical properties of that effect. Thus, the first formulation is sufficient for 
the conclusion that no non-physical property is relevant to a physical occurrence, but it 
does not entail anything about any possible physical property o f the effect. For example, 
this principle would exclude the possibility that my pain might cause some purely 
physical event, say a brain firing b correlated with my belief that I am in pain. However, 
it does not exclude the possibility that the fact that the cause o f 6  is a pain is relevant to 
b's being the neural state it is.
Assuming this version o f the CCP, we cannot be certain that the mental properties 
of the cause do not determine the physical properties o f the effect So, the first 
formulation does not make EANTP valid. The second formulation of the CCP for 
properties remedies this problem. It is as follows.
Causal Closure o f the Physical for properties: No non-physical property can be 
relevant to any physical effect or for the fact that the physical property is 
instantiated; for any caused event e that has a physical property P, no non­
physical property of e’s cause can be relevant to the occurrence of e or to the 
fact that e instantiates P.
This principle seems as safe as the previous Causal Closure principles. It is hard 
to imagine how a mental or otherwise nonphysical property could be relevant to a 
physical effect or to the fact that an effect is physical without some implementing 
physical property. How could my pain be relevant to the neurons in my brain firing or to
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the neurons in my arm firing without some neural basis? Thus, Causal Closure of the 
Physical properties seems secure.
2.4.4 Property Supervenience
Finally, EANTP requires Property Supervenience to entail Type-
Epiphenomenalism. Assuming supervenience, the physical properties of the effect
determine its mental properties. Following Kim (1987b), we formulate strong
supervenience between A properties, or subvenient properties, and B properties or
supervenient properties, as follows.
Necessarily, for any object x and any property F in A, if x has F, then there exists a 
property G in B such that x has 0 , and necessarily if any y has G it has F. (1987b, 
reprinted 1993a, 80)
The physical properties, the A properties, of an object determine the mental 
properties, the B properties, of that object The reasons for accepting strong 
supervenience are approximately the same as for accepting Physical Causation of the 
Mental and Mereological Supervenience. Evidence 6 om the neurosciences suggests a 
close correlation between brain states and mental states; whenever one is in a particular 
brain state, it is nomically necessary that one be in a particular mental state. Thus, 
whenever my C-fibers fire, I must feel pain. The supervenience appears to be of this 
strong variety; C-fiber firings must correlate with pains. I will discuss the varieties of 
supervenience necessary for the Exclusion Argument in more detail in chapter three.
2.5 Conclusion
I have shown that a version o f the Exclusion Argument infects any type of dualism 
given a set of plausibly true, broadly physicalist premises. One can construct an Exclusion 
Argument for Substance Dualisnu This argument does not capture the traditional problems
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of mental causation for Substance Dualism since the greatest problem for Substance Dualism 
is the inconceivability o f interaction with the physical. However, the fact that an Exclusion 
Argument can be constructed for Substance Dualism shows that the problem is not one 
limited to physicalism, strictly conceived, but for any dualism that includes certain broadly 
physicalist premises.
Exclusion Arguments can be constructed for both Constitution Physicalism and 
Nonreductive Token Physicalism. The Exclusion Argument presents perhaps the most 
serious problem for these two views. Although there are differences in the premises of these 
latter two Exclusion Arguments, the similarities between them will be more important than 
their differences. Although it is possible that one variant or isomorph of a premise for one 
Exclusion Argument can be true, and the isomorphic premise for another Exclusion 
Argument be false, the differences between isomorphic premises will not make a difference 
to which theory best deals with the problem of mental causation. I will note different 
commitments of the variants of the Exclusion Argument when it becomes necessary later in 
this woric. The most important fact to note is that isomorphic Exclusion Arguments can be 
given for both types of Nonreductive Physicalism.
The remainder of this woric will address the Exclusion Argument for these two 
varieties o f physicalism. The next chapter of this woric will show the relations between the 
premises presented in this chapter and other alternative premises and will give reasons to 
prefer the premises I have chosen for the Exclusion Argument
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Ch apter  Th ree 
V a ria n t  Prem ises o f th e  Ex clu sion  Argum ent
3.1 Introductioii
Philosophers have presented the Exclusion Argument with premises distinct fiom 
those 1 have used thus far. In this chapter, I will explain the entailments between sets of 
premises assumed by two different versions of the Exclusion Argument In particular, I will 
discuss Exclusion Arguments that assume Supervenience of Causal Powers and arguments 
that assume Property Supervenience and Causal Closure of the Physical. I will show that the 
premise of the Property Supervenience together with the claim of the Causal Closure of the 
Physical entails the claim of Supervenience of Causal Powers; 1 will show that the premise 
of Supervenience of Causal Powers with some uncontroversial assumptions entails the 
principle of the Causal Closure of the Physical. I will then discuss various forms of the 
principle of Causal Closure of the Physical, and show which version is most plausibly true. 
Finally, 1 will suggest that a version of the Exclusion A^ument that assumes Property 
Supervenience and Causal Closure of the Physical is superior to a version that assumes 
supervenience of causal powers.
3.2 Supervenience of the Mental on the Physical
Property Supervenience of the mental on the physical is roughly the claim that, for 
any object, if it has a particular physical property, then it has a particular mental property. 
Philosophers put this claim in several ways. One way is that indiscemibility with respect to 
the physical entails indiscemibility with respect to the mental. Another way of putting this 
claim is that there can be no difference in the mental properties of an object without some 
difference in its physical properties although it leaves open the possibility that there may be a
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physical difiference in the object without there being a mental difference. For example, for 
some event, if it is a C-fiber firing, that event is a pain. Thus, supervenience allows for 
multiple realizabili^ of mental properties in different physical properties but not for mental 
properties to vary when the physical properties are fixed*.
Supervenience has been thought to be an analysis of dependence, the claim that one 
set of properties or facts depends on another set of properties or facts. At least one way for 
some item. A, to depend for its existence on some other item, B, is for B to cause A, but 
there are more forms of dependence than causal dependence. Another form of dependence 
is ontological dependence. Ontological dependence is a relation between items some of 
which are more fundamental than others and that the less fundamental items require the 
more fundamental for their existence. This way of expressing the idea of dependence 
suggests a supervenience account
Recently, however, philosophers have argued that supervenience is inadequate as an 
analysis of dependence. (See Grimes, 1988 and Kim, 1990) The criticisms have focused on 
the fact that supervenience only involves covariation (or necessary covariation) o f properties, 
and thus is too weak a notion to capture the ontological force of a dependence claim. 
Necessary common determinants provide counterexamples to the account o f dependence as 
supervenience since supervenience would be unable to distinguish the determinant fiom the 
necessary common byproducts. Schematically, two properties A and B may be determined 
by a necessary common determinant C. A supervenes on B, but B does not supervene on A.
' As a simplifying assumption, I will only discussion supervenience o f properties o f the same object, not 
supervenience o f properties o f wholes on the properties o f their parts, when the wholes are not identical to 
the sums o f their parts. I believe that everything I have to say in this chapter about the one fype of 
supervenience will hold fiir the other type as well.
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In this case, A would supervene on B but not depend on B but on C. Kim, giving a concrete 
example, writes
Fve heard that there is a correlation between intelligence as measured by the IQ test 
and manual decterity. It is possible that both manual dexterity and intelligence 
depend on certain genetic and developmental factors, and that intelligence strongly 
covaries with manual dexterity but not conversely. If such were the case, we would 
not consider intelligence to be dependent on, or determined by, manual dexterity. 
(Kim, 1990, repr. 1993a, 146)
The possibility of a case like that described by Kim shows that dependence cannot be
captured by supervenience because supervenience, even asymmetric supervenience, only
involves a (necessary) covariation of properties. Since this criticism contends only that
supervenience is insufficient for dependence, it will be safe for the purposes of the Exclusion
Argument to assume (as Kim does) that supervenience constitutes a necessary condition of
dependence. Thus, supervenience is adequate as an assumption of the Exclusion Argument
even if it does not capture the ontological force required of dependence.
Kim (1987b) formulates three different types of Property Supervenience. For
generality Kim puts the relation in terms of A properties, the supervenient properties or, for
our discussion, the mental properties, and B properties, the subvenient or base properties, for
our discussion, the physical properties.
Weak supervenience:
Necessarily, for any object x and any property F in A  if x has F, then there exists a 
property G in B such that x has G, and any y has G it has F. (1987b, reprinted 
1993a, 80)
Strong supervenience:
Necessarily, for any object x and any property F in A  if x has F, then there exists a 
property G in B such that x has G, tmd necessarily if any y has G it has F. (1987b, 
reprinted 1993,80)
Global supervenience:
6 0
Any two worlds indiscernible with respect to Bfroperties are indiscernible with 
respect to A-properties. (1987b, reprinted 1993a, 82)
As Kim argues, global supervenience is too weak to capture ordinary notions of 
dependence because it allows for difference of mental properties without a significant 
physical difference. To take an example like Kim's, global supervenience is consistent with 
the existence of a world identical to the actual world except that it contains one fewer 
hydrogen atom on Jupiter and in that world my C-fiber firings correspond not to pains but to 
contemplation of mathematics or to no conscious mental state at all. So, if only global 
supervenience is true, it is possible that mental properties may not correlate with brain 
properties when only a clearly irrelevant difference occurs across possible worlds. Thus, 
global supervenience is too weak to capture our ordinary notion of dependence.
In addition, global supervenience guarantees nothing even within a possible world 
about the relation between local physical properties and mental properties. Specifically, it is 
possible that any object that has a particular physical property, say being a C-fiber firing, 
might be a pain or it might not be a pain. If only global supervenience obtains, my C-fiber 
firing may correlate with pain and yours may correlate with contemplation of mathematical 
truths. Or, worse, my C-fiber firing at time t, and my C-fiber firing at t% may not correlate 
with pains. As long as fixing all the physical properties o f the world fixes all the mental 
properties in that world, global supervenience is true. However, global supervenience allows 
for my C-fiber firing at t, to correlate with pain whereas my C-fiber firing at tj and your C- 
fiber firing at any time correlate with contemplation of mathematical truths. As long as 
every world with exactly the same physical characteristics has these mental characteristics, 
global supervenience obtains. Thus, global supervenience does not guarantee that I will feel 
pain when my C-fibers fire or guarantee anything else about individuals' mental and physical
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States. So, because global supervenience guarantees nothing across possible worlds and 
nothing about individuals within a possible world, global supervenience is too weak to 
capture dependence.
Global supervenience may, nonetheless, be the strongest type of supervenience 
compatible with extemalism about mental content Mental content as Burge (1979) and 
Putnam (1975) argue, is not determined solely by local physical properties. For example, 
since I know nothing about beeches and elms except that they are trees, my thought that 
beeches are trees and my thought that elms are trees do not differ in local properties, either 
psychological or physical. However, the two thou^ts differ in mental content because they 
are beliefs about different objects. Examples like these make a strong case that mental 
content does not supervene on local physical properties.
I will return to this issue in detail in chapter seven, but for now it is important to note 
that global supervenience is not strong enough to ct^ture anything like our notion of 
dependence or for the Exclusion Argument to be valid. For the Exclusion Argument to be 
valid, physical properties o f individual objects must fix the mental properties of those 
objects.
Weak supervenience, on the other hand, may c^xture a notion of dependence and is 
strong enough to make the Exclusion Argument valid. According to weak supervenience, 
necessarily, for any object that has a particular physical property, it will have a particular 
mental property. Fixing the physical properties fixes the mental properties within a woiid. It 
may seem that global and weak supervenience are equivalent since neither requires a 
difference in mental properties across possible worlds, at least possible worlds in which there 
is any physical difference. However, weak supervenience guarantees that individual objects
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with the same physical pioperQr will have the same mental property at least within a possible 
world, whereas global supervenience guarantees nothing about individual objects. So it 
must be the case that my C-fiber firings at different times are all pains if the property of 
being a pain weakly supervenes on the property of being a C-fiber firing.
Strong supervenience may be the best assumption for the Exclusion Argument 
Strong supervenience gets the closest to dependence of the three types of supervenience, and 
so it is likely the closest to the actual relation between the mental and physical. If only 
global or weak supervenience of the mental on the physical obtains, then the mental 
properties of an object could differ across possible worlds without any difference in that 
object’s local physical properties. In addition, the Exclusion Argument is apparently valid 
(worries about the Exclusion Principle aside) with strong supervenience as the supervenience 
assumption.
Assume for the moment the mental supervenes only weakly on the physical. If 
causal relevance has no modal force, then the Exclusion Argument is valid. In that case, the 
mental cannot be causally relevant if the mental is fixed by the physical within a possible 
world. Therefore, the Exclusion Argument is valid assuming only weak supervenience if 
causal relevance has no modal force.
However, if causal relevance is a modal notion, then weak supervenience may not be 
enough to make the Exclusion Argument valid. The argument for this claim is as follows. 
Assume causal relevance has some modal force. Thus, if the physical properties of an event 
are causally relevant to its effect, then the physical properties make the effect necessary. If 
that is the case, then the physical property of an event ei could determine the physical 
property for its effect across possible worlds, but if only weak supervenience holds, then
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the mental cannot be fixed across possible worlds by the physical. If the mental is only fixed 
by physical properties in one world, and causal relevance holds across worlds, then there 
may be more to mental causal relevance than weak supervenience can capture. Any 
Exclusion Argument that assumes only weak supervenience may allow the mental property 
to be causally relevant by determining a mental property of an effect across possible worlds.
The mental could still be causally relevant if only weak supervenience obtains. 
Consider the case of two events e, and e2. In possible world w„ e, has two properties, a 
physical property P, and a mental property M,. Assuming Causal Closure of the Physical for 
properties, P„ and not M„ is causally relevant to e '^s having some physical property P,. 
Assuming that causal relevance involves some necessity, e /s having P, necessitates ej’s 
having P%. In world w,, if the mental weakly supervenes on the physical, when e^  occurs, 
and has P2, Cj also has some mental property M%. If e% has P% in possible world W;, but only 
weak supervenience obtains, then C2 may have some other mental property M3 in w%. Any 
effect may have one mental property in world w, and a different mental property in w% if the 
mental only weakly supervenes on the physical. The physical property of a cause in one 
possible world cannot fix the mental properties o f an effect across possible worlds if the 
mental only weakly supervenes on the physical. So it is possible that M, might necessitate 
that e2 have M% in w%. It is possible that the mental might be causally relevant by fixing 
mental properties across possible worlds if the mental only weakly supervenes on the 
physical.
Relying on weak supervenience to make room for mental causation would mean that 
no difference could be discerned in the actual world, so the causal relevance of the mental 
would never be apparent Thus, we might doubt whether the causal relevance allowed for by
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wMk supervenience really exists. This type of skepticism about modal properties was 
common in early twentieth-century met*q)hysics, but it is not justified. Similar reasoning 
would show, for example, that causation does not ocist because it cannot be discerned fiom 
mere conjunctions in the actual world. This reasoning really counts against any modal 
claims at all, so as long as we have any modal intuitions, we should be willing to admit 
causal relevance as having a modal dimension.
Accepting only weak supervenience and rejecting strong supervenience is not a 
promising way of making room for the causal relevance of the mental. General skepticism 
about modality and essential properties provide the only reason to accept weak 
supervenience over strong supervenience. This skepticism should qpply to the modality of 
causal relevance exactly if it applies to supervenience. Strong supervenience supposes a de 
re necessity just as I am supposing causal relevance does. So the potential solution of 
accepting only weak supervenience of the mental on the physical but assuming modal force 
of causal relevance is an uneasy solution at best The reasons for accepting or rejecting de re 
modal claims are the same in either case.
Furthermore, there is good reason to accept strong supervenience as obtaining for
dependence relations. Kim (1984a) gives the following example to suggest to bring out
intuitions that some de re modality is inherent in a notion of dependence. He writes.
The idea of strong supervenience comes to this: if S t Francis is a good man, there 
must be some combination o f these virtues (say, honesty and benevolence) such 
that S t Francis, and anyone who has it nrnt be a good man. (Kim, 1984, repr. 
1993,65)
Strong supervenience fits our intuition that these virtues make it necessary that S t 
Francis is good. If only weak supervenience obtained for moral characteristics, if S t Francis 
had those qualities, then he might not be a good man. hi the actual world, if he had those
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characteristics, he would be a good man, but he might not be good even with the same 
nonmoral characteristics. Current philosophy of mind supposes that the mind similarly 
depends on the brain. A wi<te variety of evidence, horn studies o f brain lesions and their 
effect on cognitive, emotional and conscious states, to first hand evidence of the effects of 
alcohol and drugs on the mind, shows that the mind depends on the brain. If we accept this 
evidence that the mental depends on the physical, we should think that, say, when my C- 
fibers fire I must feel pain. Given the occurrence of that event, it has to be the case that I feel 
pain. So, if we share these modal intuitions, we should accept that strong supervenience 
obtains for cases o f dependence, specifically the case of the dependence of the mental on the 
physical.
Therefore, 1 suggest that accepting strong supervenience as a woridng hypothesis is 
justified by our modal intuitions. We can safely assume strong supervenience as the type of 
supervenience assumed by the Exclusion Argument Anyone lacking these modal intuitions 
may wish to accept only weak supervenience, but this is unlikely to provide much relief 
fiom the problem of mental causation because such a philosopher should not agree that 
causal relevance has modal force. The Exclusion Argument could, then, be put in terms of 
weak supervenience only along with the assumption that causal relevance has no modal 
force. However, since most philosophers accept the truth of some de re modal intuitions, 1 
will assume strong supervenience of the mental on the physical.
Ultimately, 1 believe. M ure of both strong and weak supervenience does not allow 
for mental causation, but it is the burden o f ckqiter seven of this work to show that claim. 
For the moment, 1 shall be concerned with the validity of the Exclusion Argument and 
making a prima fade case for the premises necessary for the argument
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3J Commitments of Supervenience
I need to note some important Acts about the ontological commitments of 
supervenience. First, although there are other formulations o f the supervenience thesis that 
avoid explicit appeal to properties, accepting the reality of the mental and physical requires 
some form of dualism. For example, one might accept Heilman and Thompson’s (1975) 
model theoretic account of supervenience in order to avoid a commitment to the existence of 
properties. However, to suppose that their account is true is to commit this version of 
supervenience to some form of dualism. If, for example, some fact about the world makes a 
model theoretic account true, then both the mental and the physical would be real. 
Presumably one could question whether the mental and physical, as real entities, were 
causally relevant to an effect And so, one could generate an Exclusion Argument for 
whatever commitments one's formulation of supervenience requires, so long as one is 
ultimately a realist about the mental and physical.
However, the supervenience thesis itself does not entail realism about either the F or 
G sets of properties, the mental or physical properties. Supervenience does not assume that 
either the F or G set of properties exists. It does not even assume that the properties are 
possible. The property of being a round square supervenes on the proper^ of being a square, 
but the property of being a round square is not even a possible property. Supervenience 
merely is the relation that in all possible worlds, if an object and a property fiom one set of 
properties exist, and that object has that property, then there will be a property fiom another 
set of properties which that object also has. So, the supervenient and the subvenient 
properties may be nonactual. If a supervenient property exists, then so does a subvenient 
property, but unless there is such a supervenient property, there need not be a subvenient
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property. This observation is relevant to the mind-body problem in that, for «cample, an 
Eliminative Materialist œuld agree that mental properties supervene on physical properties, 
but still claim that there are no mental properties. Therefore, we cannot dispense with the 
premise of dualism since supervenience does not entail it  The supervenience thesis alone 
does not commit us to the existence of the properties in question.
We should also note that we need to assume the realism of both the physical as well. 
It is more 6 shionable in recent years to doubt the realism of the mental, but anti-realism 
about the physical could also defeat the Exclusion Argument. If, for example, the physical 
were merely instrumental or a convenient fiction, then one would not think that the physical 
was genuinely causally relevant So, on this phenomenalist or instrumentalist view, the 
mental may have all the genuine causal relevance, and the physical, as a mere fiction, would 
have none. Although it may be that no philosopher currently holds to phenomenalism or 
instrumentalism about the physical, the validity of the Exclusion Argument depends on 
physical realism just as it does on mental realism.
The final note is that supervenience does not entail distincmess of the F and G sets o f 
properties, or, in our case, the mental and the physical. One way to see this fact is to see that, 
consistently with supervenience, the F and G properties may be identical. Supervenience is 
neither a symmetric nor an asymmetric relation^ Supervenience relations may be one-way, 
like the putative supervenience of the mental on the physical or the supervenience o f the 
temperature on the mean kinetic energy of a gas. In these cases the supervenient property is
 ^Symmeny and asymmenty as formal properties o f a relation R must hold for any instance of that relation 
R. So, the relation o f being to-lhe~immediate-l^-ofis asynunetric since when A is immediately to the left 
o f B, B cannot be immediately to the left o f A. The relation of being-adjacent'to is symmetric since 
whenever A is adjacent to B, B is also adjacent to A. But some relations, like being a brother, are neither 
symmetric nor asymmetric, since A can be a brother to B, and B can be abrother to A if  B is male, but if  B 
is female, B is not a brother to A. Supervenience is like the brother-of relation since we can stipulate it to
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multiply realizable in disjunctive physical properties, so the subvenient properties do not also 
supervene on the physical. For example, temperature may be realized in a gas, solid, liquid 
or as background radiation in a vacuum. Fixing temperature, therefore, does not fix the 
realizing, or subvenient, property, but fixing the underlying physical property fixes the 
temperature. In the case of asymmetric supervenience the sets of properties are distinct
However, supervenience does not guarantee distincmess. Since supervenience may 
also be two-way, identical properties are cases over which supervenience obtains. Take for 
example, some property Q. Trivially, fixing the property Q of an object fixes the property Q 
of that object And any property Q essential to an object strongly supervenes on the essential 
Q of that object Or, put another way, if properties F and G are identical, then trivially any x 
that has F must have G and vice versa. In fitct, a type identity theorist would believe the 
mental supervenes on the physical. According to the type identity theory, mental properties 
are type identical to physical properties, so that mental language and physical language are 
merely different descriptions of the same property. This view is compatible with strong 
supervenience since indiscemibility of the physical would entail indiscemibility o f the 
mental for the case in which mental and physical properties are identical. Indeed strong 
supervenience is a necessary condition for and a straightforward consequence of the type 
identity theory.
Since the type identity theory avoids the problem of mental causation by denying 
that mental and physical properties are irreducible, and not by denying supervenience, for 
the Exclusion Argument to be valid, assuming only strong supervenience o f properties is not 
enough for the Exclusion Argument to be valid. The Exclusion Argument requires separate
be symmetric if  A and B properties are identical (or nomically equivalent) or asymmetric if  the relation 
between A and B properties only necessitates in one direction.
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assumptions of realism of the mental and the physical and irreducibility (or M ure of type 
identity) of the mental to the physical. Assuming only supervenience does not guarantee 
these additional claims. Thus, I have shown why the Exclusion Argument needs the 
premises which I have assumed, and supported, to be valid. I will now discuss some variant 
premises that one might use in giving the Exclusion Argument
3.4 Entailments among Variant Premises
Philosophers have given versions of the Exclusion Argument that differ from the 
Exclusion Argument Schema as presented in this work. Fodor (1989) for example, takes as 
a premise the Supervenience of Causal powers. Baker (1993) takes as premises Property 
Supervenience and Causal Closure of the Physical. If these arguments are different versions 
of the same argument then it should be possible to show that the assumptions are equivalent 
Or, if they are not equivalent one could discover which argument makes the least 
controversial assumptions necessary for the Exclusion Argument to be valid. In that case, 
one should find that one set of premises entails the other but not vice versa. If few or none 
of the premises entail each other, then it might be best to consider them different arguments 
for the same conclusion.
The thesis of Property Supervenience does not alone entail the thesis of 
Supervenience of Causal Powers (as one might think) but requires another principle, the 
Causal Closure of the Physical. The thesis of Supervenience o f Causal Powers does entail 
the thesis of Causal Closure of the Physical but does not entail the thesis o f Property 
Supervenience.
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First, I should clarify the notion of a causal power. The term ‘causal power’ appears 
fairly frequently in the literature without much discussion of its nature. Causal powers 
could be either intrinsic (non-relational) or relational properties of an object or event in 
virtue of which that object or event has the effect that it does. To illustrate the difference 
between these views, I will borrow Block’s (1990) example of the matador’s cape and the 
bull. On the first view, that causal powers are intrinsic properties of objects, the redness of 
the matador’s cape is the property that is causally relevant to enraging the bull. On this 
account of causal powers, objects or events have causal powers but properties do not have 
causal powers. On this view, causally relevant properties do not have causal powers, they 
are causal powers. The redness o f the cape is the power of the cape to enrage bulls.
On the second account, causal powers are second-order properties or properties of 
properties. For example, the redness of the matador’s cape has the causal power or capacity 
to enrage bulls, but the redness is not itself the causal power to enrage bulls. Thus, we could 
say that properties have causal powers but not that objects or events have causal powers 
except derivatively by having properties that have causal powers.
Kim (1993b) appears to take a more pluralist approach to the analysis of causal 
powers. In discussing, what he calls Alexander’s Dictum, ‘T o be real is to have causal 
power.” (202) He writes ‘‘I believe this principle, as applied to concrete existents and their 
properties  ^will be accepted by most non-reductive physicalists.” (202, italics added) Kim 
here thinks of causal powers as properties of properties and as properties of objects. On this 
view a property could have a causal power but that property need not be a causal power.
Ultimately, on either account, causal powers are properties o f objects. Second-order 
properties are ultimately properties o f the objects because properties only have causal power
 ^Especially in Fodor (1987) and (1989).
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when they are instantiated. Abstract particulars, particular instantiated properties, have 
causal power, but uninstantiated universels cannot have causal power. In Act, the lack of 
causal power of abstract entities is the primary reason some philosophers have for skepticism 
about them. So, causal powers, as second order properties of objects, are ultimately 
properties of objects, and, as such, will be covered by the supervenience theses above.^
Since causal powers are properties of objects, the theses o f Property Supervenience 
and Causal Closure of the Physical entail the thesis of Supervenience of Causal Powers. The 
reverse is not the case. The thesis of Supervenience of Causal Powers does not entail the 
thesis of Property Supervenience, but it does entail the principle of Causal Closure of the 
Physical. These relations, although I have not yet proven them, show that if one rejects the 
thesis of Supervenience o f Causal Powers, then one must also reject the thesis of Property 
Supervenience. Although one could reject the thesis of claim of Property Supervenience 
without rejecting the narrower Supervenience of Causal Powers, the reasons for rejecting the 
thesis of Property Supervenience will in general be reasons for rejecting the thesis of 
Supervenience of Causal Powers. Finally, if the physical is not causally closed, then mental 
causal powers do not supervene on physical causal powers although the physical could be 
causally closed without mental causal powers supervening on physical causal powers.
3.4.1 Causal Powers
The theses of Property Supervenience and Causal Closure of the Physical entail the 
thesis of Supervenience o f Causal Powers. We have already seen Kim’s formulation of the 
supervenience of one set o f properties on another. We can formulate the supervenience of 
causal powers in a similar manner.
* Some analyses o f causal powers, especially Fedor’s (1989) invoke causal laws, but these laws are not 
themselves properties or causal powers o f objects, so we can safely ignore this issue for now.
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Strong Supervenience of Causal Powers:
Necessarily, for any object x and any causal power F* in A*, if x has F*, then there 
exists a causal power G* in B* such that x has 0*, and necessarily if any y has G* 
it has F*.
The argument that strong supervenience of properties entails that mental causal 
powers supervene on physical properties begins as follows.
(1) Necessarily, for any object x and any property F in A, if x has F, then there 
exists a property G in B such that x has G, and necessarily if any y has G, it has 
F.
(2) Therefore, necessarily, for any object x and any causal power F* in A*, if x has 
F*, then there exists a property G in B such that x has G, and necessarily if any y 
has G, it has F*.
The conclusion (2) appears to follow immediately from (1) by an instantiation of the 
universal in the strong Property Supervenience claim. However, the inference from (1) to
(2) requires more argument, and that argument will differ depending on what theory one has 
of causal powers.
There seem to be three ways to view the nature of mental causal powers. One view, 
the view with the greatest intuitive plausibility, is that mental causal powers are identical to 
(perhaps a subset of) mental properties. On this view, this subset of mental properties 
supervenes on physical properties, provided the Property Supervenience thesis is true. If 
causal powers are properties of objects, then there is be no problem in making the inference 
fiom (1) to (2). For example, if mental causal powers are identical to mental properties, pain 
is identical to the causal power an entity has to engage in avoidance behavior. Thus, we can 
validly instantiate some causal power F* for the property in A in the strong Property 
Supervenience claim, and arrive at claim (2). Thus, on this view mental causal powers 
supervene on physical properties.
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The second possibility is Block’s (1990) view that mental properties are identical to 
second-order properties of physical properties. Block conceives mental properties as 
second-order properties ranging over first-order physical (or at least lower-level) properties. 
So, on Block’s view, mental causal powers are properties of physical properties, so, given 
Block’s theory o f the nature of the mental as second-order properties, the mental properties 
and the mental causal powers are identical. Thus, on this view, again, fixing the physical 
properties fixes those mental properties. The A set of properties, the mental properties, are 
causal powers, so these causal powers supervene on physical properties if the Property 
Supervenience thesis is true. So, on Block’s view of causal powers, the inference finm (1) to
(2) is valid.
The third possible view is that mental causal powers are properties of mental 
properties, then the simple inference fiom (1) to (2) above is not valid. Causal powers, on 
this view, need not be properties in the A set of properties. For the case of the mental and 
the physical, it is possible that the mental causal powers are not mental properties at all but 
properties of those mental properties. Thus, mental causal powers need not be mental 
properties. For example, the causal power of my pain, say its capacity to cause me to engage 
in avoidance behavior, may not itself be a mental property. The causal powers mental 
properties have may not be themselvM mental properties.
An appeal to transitivity of supervenience solves this problem. The view that 
presents a problem to the apparently simple inference fiom (1) to (2) is the claim that causal 
powers are themselves properties of the properties in the A set; that is, the mental’s causal 
powers are not, on this view, mental properties at all but are in some other set of properties 
entirely. This view, which makes our simple inference invalid, still assumes Property
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Si^iervenience thesis, and so the causal powers of mental properties themselves supervene 
on the physical properties by transitivity of supervenience. The mental causal powers, as 
properties o f mental properties, supervene on the mental properties themselves. Because of 
the causal specification of second-order properties, second-order properties supervene on 
their first-order realizing properties. If my pain causes me to act necessarily in certain ways, 
then my pain meets the causal specifications of the second-order property, the causal power 
my pain has. Since that is the case, the physical properties still fix mental causal powers.
So we can add an additional premise, for this view of causal powers, that the 
mental’s causal powers supervene on the mental properties. Premise (4) makes this claim 
for some causal power H in the set of second-order properties C.
(3) Necessarily, for any object x and any property F in A, if x has F, then 
there exists a property G in B such that x has G, and necessarily if any y 
has G it has F.
(4) Necessarily, for any object x and any property H in C, if x has H, then 
there exists a property F in A such tk t  x has F, and necessarily if any y 
has F it has H.
(5) Therefore, necessarily, for any object x and any causal power H in C, if x 
has H, then there exists a property G in B such that x has G, and 
necessarily if any y has G it has F*.
The conclusion (S) claims that fixing the physical properties, the property G in B, 
fixes the mental causal powers, the property H in C. Since fixing the physical properties 
fixes the mental properties, and fixing the mental properties fixes the mental causal powers, 
fixing the physical properties also fixes the mental causal powers. These three views 
exhaust the conventional theories of causal powers as second-order properties, so we should 
suppose that mental causal powers entails that mental causal powers supervene on physical 
prq)erties.
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It follows 6om the Property Supervenience thesis, on any of the three conventional 
views of causal powers, that mental causal powers supervene on physical properties. 
However, because the consequents of the component conditionals in (I) and (2) are 
existential claims, we cannot also assume that any property in B that we instantiate to must 
also be a causal power. Although the mental causal power supervenes on a physical 
property, it does not follow that the mental causal power supervenes on a physical causal 
power. Since properties are a broader category than causal powers, if Epiphenomenalism is 
possible, the mental need not supervene on only those properties that are causal powers.
If causal powers are properties, in particular some subset of the properties of an 
object or event, then the thesis of Supervenience of Causal Powers appears to be a simple 
entailment of the Property Supervenience claim. However, it does not follow from the 
supervenience of mental properties on physical properties and that causal powers are 
properties of objects, that mental causal powers supervene on physical causal powers. If 
causal powers are a subset of the properties of an object or event, then mental causal powers 
must supervene on physical properties but not necessarily on physical causal powers. 
Nothing in the claim of Property Supervenience entails that the mental causal powers will 
supervene only on the physical causal powers. These claims leave open the possibility that 
at least some non-causal physical properties are included in the set of properties the mental 
causal powers supervene on. Hence the argument above does not establish the principle of 
strong Supervenience of Causal Powers.
We could avoid this difficulty by assuming that all properties have or are causal 
powers. Kim calls this Al«cander*s dictum QChn 1993b) after an early twentieth century 
emergentist Samuel Alexander who made this assumption in his (1927). Kim writes, ‘To be
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real is to have causal powers” (202, Kim’s italics) Fora concrete particular or its properties
to exist at all it must have causal power. Using the notion of causal powers given earlier, all
causal powers are properties. Assuming Alexander’s dictum in the context of the Exclusion
Argument would simply beg the question. If we wish to allow, at least for the moment, that
Epiphenomenalism is a coherent possibility, we cannot as yet conclude that all properties are
causal powers. We wish to allow for the possibility of properties that are not and do not
have causal powers. Therefore, we need some further argument to connect the two theses.
3.4 J  Causal Closure of the Physical
This fact shows why thesis of Property Supervenience requires the Causal Closure of
the Physical principle to entail the Supervenience of Causal Powers. The mental causal
power might, if the physical is not causally closed, supervene on some noncausal physical
property instead of on a causal power. Thus, unless the Causal Closure of the Physical
principle or some similar claim is true. Property Supervenience could allow for the mental to
have an effect on the physical directly even if the mental is determined by some physical
property. If only Property Supervenience obtains, it is possible that the physical property not
be causally relevant while the supervenient mental property is.
Before continuing, I would like to digress briefly on the thesis of the Causal Closure
of the Physical. A more formal characterization of the causal closure of the physical than we
made use of in the previous chapter roughly follows Kim (1995). One way to characterize
the causal closure of the physical as a general claim about properties in some set of
properties D as follows.
Necessarily, fisr any object or event x, if x has a cause, there exists some F’, in some 
set of properties D, that is causally relevant to the occurrence of x.
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This Annulation differs from our less formal varieties in the previous ckqxters in two 
important ways. First, it is nonexclusive. This formulation allows that a property outside the 
D set of properties could be causally relevant to the occurrence of x as long as some property 
in D was also causally relevant Second, this formulation does not make the Exclusion 
Argument valid. This formulation has the flaw, discussed in the previous chapter, that it 
does not require that the physical properties, but only the events, be fixed only by the 
physicaL Thus it would allow for downward causal relevance for the occurrence of physical 
properties. And if the physical properties of the effect are not fixed, then the mental 
pn^)erties of the effects are not fixed either. Thus, this statement of Causal Closure does not 
require that the physical properties of a cause fix the physical or mental properties of the 
effect
This version of the Closure principle, we discovered, was not sufficient to make the 
Exclusion Argument valid. We needed a closure principle for the physical properties not 
just for effects with physical properties.
Thus, there are four important versions of the causal closure principle. Two of them
are exclusive as follows.
Exclusive Causal Closure o f the Physical:
Necessarily no non-physical event causes a physical event
Exclusive Causal Closure ofthe Physicalfor properties (or ()uausal Closure):
Necessarily no non-physical property is causally relevant to any physical effect or 
to any effect insoforas that effect is physical.
Nonexclusive Causal Closure Principles could be given as follows.
Nonexclusive Caused Closure o f the Plysical:
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Necessarily, for any physical effect, there is a physical cause for that event
Nonexclusive Caused Closure ofthe Physical for properties (or Quausal Closure):
For any physical property of an effect, necessarily, there is a physical property of 
the cause that is relevant to the physical effect’s occurrence and for the physical 
effect’s having that physical property.
It is possible to formulate a stronger type of causal closure, a de re modal claim that 
any particular effect has a particular cause essentially. The weaker Causal Closure principles 
merely claim that there must be some physical cause for any effect, but they do not specify a 
particular cause that must accompany a particular effect For example, say my arm 
movement away fiom a hot stove is caused by my C-fiber firing. On the de dicto closure 
claims, the arm movement must have some physical cause, but that movement may be 
caused by some different brain firing than it actually is caused by. A de re closure claim 
would not allow for this. The de re principle may be given as follows.
Strong causal closure:
Necessarily, for any effect, there is an event that necessarily causes that effect.
There is good reason, however, to reject the strong causal closure principle. It claims 
that one cause or causally relevant property is essential to an effect, but it seems unlikely that 
this claim is true. An event could have many different causes, or periiaps no cause at all. 
Intuitions about causes suggest that we reject the strong Causal Closure principle and its 
variants.
Moreover, the Exclusion Argument does not require a strong Causal Closure of the 
Physical. All that is required to rule out mental causes is that all the causes be physical (and 
not mental), and not that any particular physical effect have a particular physical cause. 
Thus, the causal closure principle that should be accepted should be one o f the de dicto
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principles given above, depending primarily on which type of physicalism one accepts. The 
Causal Closure of the Physical for properties is necessary for Nonreductive Token 
Physicalism, whereas the simple Causal Closure of the Physical is necessary for Constitution 
Physicalism.
Whether to accept an Exclusive or Nonexclusive Causal Closure principle is a more 
difQcult question. The Nonexclusive Causal Closure principle leaves open the possibility 
that both a mental and physical property may be causally relevant to the production of a 
physical effect, whereas the Exclusive principle does not allow for the mental to be causally 
relevant to the physical. Because the Exclusion Argument assumes an Exclusion Principle, 
it is valid with either an Exclusive or Nonexclusive principle, so for the moment I will 
assume a Nonexclusive principle. The Generative/Determinative Exclusion principle when 
applied to causes of physical events can rule out the possibility that the mental is causally 
relevant to physical effects since, according to the Nonexclusive Causal Closure principle, 
the physical event already has a cause. The same can be said, mutatis mutandis, for physical 
properties. Finally, the argument for causal closure of the physical, that it is inconceivable 
that a physical effect might be caused by a mental event without some intervening or 
implementing physical property, only supports the Nonexclusive Causal Closure of the 
Physical principle. Thus, 1 will assume a Nonexclusive Causal Closure principle. I will 
discuss these issues at somewhat greater length in chuter eight I will now return to the 
main argument o f this chq)ter.
3.4 J  Thesis of Supervenience of Properties and Causal Closure of the Physical entail 
thesis of Supervenience of Causal Powers
The entailment Aom the claim about the supervenience of mental causal powers on 
physical properties to the claim that mental causal powers siq)ervene on physical causal
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powers requires a further premise to the effect that the physical causal powers are the only 
properties on which the mental causal powers can supervene. Without accepting that all 
properties are causal powers, we need to assume die additional premise of the Causal 
Closure of the Physical. One way to guarantee that the mental causal powers of an object 
supervene only on the physical causal powers and not on some non-causal properties is to 
say that the physical is closed to external causal powers. If a mental property supervened on 
some non-causal property and still was causally relevant to some physical effect, this 
occurrence would violate the Causal Closure principle.
If the physical is causally closed, mental causal powers supervene only on physical 
causal powers. According to causal closure for physical properties, no physical effect can 
occur in virtue of some mental property (or causal power) but not in virtue of some physical 
property (or causal power). In other words, if the Nonexclusive Causal Closure principle is 
true, mental causal powers cannot produce a physical effect without some physical causal 
power producing that effect Because mental causal powers are properties, they supervene 
on physical properties. Mental causal powers cannot be causally relevant to the physical 
without some physical causal power being relevant to the physical effect So, because of the 
Causal Closure of the Physical, mental causal powers supervene only on physical causal 
powers. Thus, the theses of Property Supervenience and the Causal Closure of the Physical 
entail the thesis of Supervenience of Causal Powers.
3.4.4 Thesis of Supervenience of Causal Powers entails thesis of Causal Closure of the 
Physical
The thesis of Supervenience of Causal Powers entails the thesis of Nonexclusive 
Causal Qosure o f the Physical. The claim of Supervenience of Causal Powers implies that 
the physical causal powers are enough for any effects that occur. This thesis, again, is the
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claim that if one fixes the physical causal powers, then one fixes the mental causal powers.
Indiscenübility of physical causal powers necessitates indiscemibility of mental causal
powers. If supervenience of causal powers is true, every mental causal power is responsible
for an effect only if there is some physical causal power correlated with that mental causal
power. For any effect, there must be a physical causal power responsible for it. This
conclusion is essentially the Nonexclusive version of the Causal Closure of the Physical.
3.4.5 Thesis of Supervenience of Causal Powers does not entail thesis of Property 
Supervenience
The thesis of Supervenience of Causal Powers does not entail the thesis of Property 
Supervenience. We have already noted that we should not yet assume that all properties are 
causal powers because this assumption immediately rules out the possibility of 
Epiphenomenalism. Supervenience of Causal Powers says nothing about the relations 
among putative non-causal properties. The thesis of Supervenience of Causal Powers would 
not entail that any non-causal properties that exist would have any relation to physical 
properties. Supervenience of causal powers makes no claim about any such non-causal 
properties. If there are some properties that are not causally relevant, then the thesis of the 
supervenience of causal powers has nothing to say about these properties. If these non- 
causal properties exist, they need not supervene on the physical properties. Therefore, the 
thesis of Supervenience of Causal Powers does not entail the thesis of Property 
Supervenience.
Since Fodor’s version requires this somewhat weaker thesis, one might think that it is 
the better versiotL However, this difference is relatively slight and I think we are better off 
using the slightly stronger pair of theses because they allow for a more perspicuous set of 
premises. If  we reject the causal supervenience thesis, then we may do it for one of two
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reasons. We may reject the supervenience thesis in general or the Causal Closure of the 
Physical. The Exclusion Argument is clearer with these two premises instead of the single 
premise of supervenience of causal powers because the two premises allow us to 
differentiate two possible claims either o f which of the two premises might be problematic.
If we want to solve the problem of mental causation with as little violence as 
possible to our metaphysical world view, we should use the version of the argument that 
allows us to reject only one premise and still keep all the others. Some philosophers attempt 
to solve the problem of mental causation by rejecting Property Supervenience without 
rejecting Causal Closure of the Physical. 1 am not yet concerned with whether these 
attempts are possible, but assuming the thesis of Supervenience of Causal Powers as 
fundamental to the Exclusion Argument would not allow one to make this distinction.
In any event I do not think the difference between these two versions of the argument 
will turn out to be relevant for our purposes. If we choose to reject the Supervenience of 
Causal Powers thesis, then we are necessarily rejecting the Property Supervenience thesis. 
Any reason for rejecting the thesis of Property Supervenience is likely to be reason for 
rejecting the slightly weaker thesis of Supervenience of Causal Powers. If we reject the 
Supervenience of Causal Powers thesis, we could not accept the general Property 
Supervenience claim, but we could still believe that the putative non-causal properties do not 
supervene on any physical properties. However, it is difScult to see why we would want to 
hold to that non-causal properties fail to supervene whereas causal powers do supervene. 
Any reason to reject the Stqiervenience of Causal Powers thesis is likely to be reason to 
reject the claim of siqiervenience of non-causal properties as well. I will simply note that the 
Property Supervenience claim applies to putative non-causal properties and the
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Supervenience of Causal Powers claim says nothing about this set of properties. This slight 
distinction in the two formulations of the argument will make no real difference, and so I 
will use the more explicit set of assunqxtions.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I have shown that the two variations of the Exclusion Argument the 
version assuming Property Supervenience and Causal Closure of the Physical and the 
version assuming Supervenience of Causal Powers are nearly equivalent The first set of 
premises entails the second set and includes an additional claim that any putative non-causal 
mental properties supervene on the physical. The second set of premises says nothing about 
these putative non-causal mental properties. This slight difference in the formulations will 
not matter. Thus, the only reason to choose one of these versions of the argument over the 
other is because of perspicuity of premises. I take the version that assumes Property 
Supervenience and Causal Closure of the Physical to be the more perspicuous since it gives 
us two premises that we might have different reasons to reject
In this part of the work I have attempted to show that the Exclusion Argument as I 
have given it is the most perspicuous version of the argument It includes all the premises 
that are necessary for each of two varieties of Nonreductive Physicalism. It includes two 
distinct premises, those of Property Stqiervenience and Causal Closure o f the Physical, 
which are conjoined in other varieties of the Exclusion Argument Thus, the Exclusion 
Argument Schema includes all the premises one needs, and distinguishes different premises 
that may be rejected or accepted for different reasons.
In the next part o f this work, I will argue that the conclusion of the Exclusion 
Argument cannot be true, and so the Exclusion Argument must be unsound, hr Part DI, I
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will consider two premises, the thesis of Property Supervenience and the Exclusion 
Principle, that may be fidse or, in the case of the Exclusion Principle, broad enough to allow 
the mental to be causally relevant But detailed discussion of these premises must wait until 
1 establish that Epiphenomenalism is not an adequate reaction to the Exclusion Argument
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P a r t  H :
A r g u m e n t s  a g a in st  E p ip h e n o m e n a l is m
O v erv iew
One reaction to the problem of mental causation, especially as it appears in the 
Exclusion Argument, is to suppose that the mental is causally inert or epiphenomenal. 
This view, Epiphenomenalism, has been the bogey man of much recent philosophy of 
mind. Epiphenomenalism is frequently treated not as a position on the mind-body 
problem, but as a constraint on theorizing about that problem. A view’s leading to 
Epiphenomenalism is taken as suffrcient reason to reject or revise that view.
Two varieties of Epiphenomenalism, Type Epiphenomenalism and Token 
Epiphenomenalism, correspond to the conclusions of the two varieties of Exclusion 
Argument discussed in previous chapters. I will argue that Token Epiphenomenalism 
can be effectively refuted. I will also conclude that although no knock-down argument 
refutes Type Epiphenomenalism, there is good reason to think it false and no good 
reason, aside from the Exclusion Argument itself, to think it true. Thus, in later chapters 
I will consider which thesis, or piece of reasoning, of the Exclusion Argument could best 
be rejected.
In arriving at my admittedly weak conclusion, I will discuss several arguments 
against Epiphenomenalism. First, I will briefly examine several common arguments 
against Epiphenomenalism and conclude that they are not effective. Second, I will give a 
longer defense of Epiphenomenalism against the charge o f incoherence. Third, I will 
argue that problems of knowledge of nonconsdous mental entities will show that Token 
Epiphenomenalism cannot be true. Fourth, I will argue that the possibility of nomic
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correlations of the mental with the physical make problems of knowledge, reference and
representation of our own qualia, including the possibility o f skeptical hypotheses, less
than decisive criticisms of Epiphenomenalism. Nonetheless, I will argue, fifth, that the
burden of showing that these nomic correlations could ground the relations just
mentioned cannot be met by Epiphenomenalism, and so we should reject this view.
A brief reminder of the two varieties of Epiphenomenalism is necessary before
discussing these arguments. McLaughlin (1989) following Broad (1925) distinguishes and
characterizes two types of Epiphenomenalism, Type Epiphenomenalism and Token
Epiphenomenalism. The distinction, in McLaughlin’s words, is as follows,
Type Epiphenomenalism (Type-E). (a) Events can be causes in virtue of 
M ing under physical types, but (b) events caimot be causes in virtue of 
falling under mental types.
Token Epiphenomenalism (Token-E). (i) Physical events can cause mental 
events, but (ii) mental events cannot cause anything. (1989,109-10)
The characterization of Token-E is self-explanatory. Type-E, on the other hand, requires
some explanation. Type-E is the view that the mental qua mental is not causally relevant,
that an event insofar as it is a mental event is not relevant to the production of an effect
Only the physical properties of an event are causally relevant to the occurrence of an effect;
the mental properties are not
Type-E does not entail Token-E because token mental events may be identical to
token physical events. If token mental events are identical with token physical events, then
thQT are causes if and only if the physical events are. However, one need not think on this
account that the mental properties are relevant to producing the effect since the effects may
be causes in virtue of falling under the physical event type but not m vhtue of M ing under
the mental event type, hi other words, the mental properties would be causally irrelevant if
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the effect occurs because they are physical events and not because they are mental events. 
Thus, an argument that Token-E is fiUse will not entail that Type-E is also 61se.
Token-E does, however, entail Type-E. If mental events cannot cause anything, then 
no mental event can be a cause in virtue of its mental properties. If the mental event is not a 
cause, then no property of the event is causally relevant to producing any effect Type-E is 
the weaker view because it is entailed by but does not entail Token-E.' Thus, a reason to 
think Token-E is false is not necessarily a reason to think Type-E is fidse.
I will not specify the variety of Epiphenomenalism until the distinction becomes 
relevant to the argument under consideration. Thus, for generality, I will continue the 
discussion in terms of Epiphenomenalism without distinguishing the two types.
At this point I will briefly examine several common arguments for the causal 
efRcacy o f the mental. The following is a list of these arguments. I will discuss the first 
five briefly and spend considerably more time on the last two.
1. Argument fiom Ordinary Language or Common Practice
2. The No-Causation-at-AU argument
3. Fodor’s End-of-the-Wbrld argument
4. Davidson’s Argument firom Explanation
5. Argument fiom Simplicity
6. Argument fiom Incoherence of Epiphenomenalism
7. Argument fiom First-Person Knowledge
In chapter four 1 will discuss the first five arguments Airly briefly. Then I will discuss the 
sixth argument in more detail. I will find that none of these arguments convincingly refutes 
the possibility of Epiphenomenalism. In chapters five and six I will discuss the final
'Philosophers recently have been more concerned with Type>E. Campbell (1970), Ar example  ^embraces i t  
Muchhas been written on ifaequestk»ofwfaetfaerDavidson(1970)ncommitied to suchaview. For example, 
Sosa (1984). Hdnderich (1982), Stoutland (1985), Johnston, (1985), Kim (1984b) and (1989b), and Dretske 
(1989) claim that he is committed to such a view. MclJUghlih (1989) and (1993)and Lgxae and Loewer (1987) 
clam tthatheisnot
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argument at length for different types of mental entities, for non-conscious mental entities in 
chapter five and for conscious entities in chapter six.
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CHAPTER4
B r ie f  Argum ents A g ain st  Efiphenom enalism
4.1 Introduction
The first argument appeals to ordinary language use of causal terms or to ordinary 
practice of causal ascriptions to show that Epiphenomenalism is false. The second argument 
is that if there are no mental or special science causes, then our paradigm cases of causation 
are not cases of causation at all. Thus, it is possible that causes disqipear altogether or are 
replaced by something altogether different fiom causation as ordinarily conceived. A third 
argument, implied by Fodor’s (1989), is that our knowledge that our minds are causes is 
better justified than any philosophical argument leading to a contrary conclusion. The fourth 
argument, which comes fiom Donald Davidson (1963), is that for mental ascriptions to 
provide real explanations, the mental must be causally relevant The fifth argument is that 
Epiphenomenalism countenances unnecessary entities and should be rejected by an appeal to 
simplicity. The sixth argument is an argument for the incoherence of Epiphenomenalism 
given some commonplace assumptions about the mind. The seventh argument is that 
Epiphenomenalism conflicts with the fact of our knowledge of and reference to our own 
minds. I will devote the next two chapters to this last argument.
42  Argument from Ordinary Language or Common Practice
The first argument is based on our ordinary language use of causal terms. The 
argument proceeds as follows. We use mental causal language in ordinary life, in folk 
psychological explanations, and in scientific, including scientific psychological, discourse. 
If Epiphenomenalism is true, then all of these causal explanations of our behavior are 
incorrect According to Epiphenomenalism, my hunger does not cause me to eat nor do my
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belief cause me to act Instead microphysical interactions cause me to act as I do. In 
accepting the Exclusion Argument, we must think that insoAr as the psychological is 
irreducible to the neurophysiological and the neurophysiological is irreducible to the 
microphysical only the basic microphysical, perhaps quantum mechanical, could cause my 
actions. However, since our causal terms have their reference fixed not by use in quantum 
mechanical contexts but in mental, folk psychological and special science contexts, it must 
be that our causal tarns in fact refer to these macrophysical events and properties. 
Therefore, so the argument goes, these macrophysical and mental properties or events are 
causally relevant
This argument can hardly be convincing by itself since ordinary practice is 
defeasible. For example, ordinary language and common practice assumes that the sun rises 
and sets, but science tells us that the earth rotates. More seriously, common practice has at 
one time or another made false assumptions about the motion of the Earth, celestial bodies, 
and the nature of the physical world. Scientific advances often show that common practice 
is wrong. We might consider common practice to provide justification until some reason 
overrides or defeats that justification, as astronomy has overridden our assumption that the 
sun revolves around the earth. However, one might suppose that the Exclusion Argument 
itself provides a reason to defeat the prescriptions of common practice. The second 
argument, however, makes appeals to the Exclusion Argument less attractive.
The No-Caiisation-at-AU Argument
The second argument is an objection to the Exclusion Argument rather than simply 
an argument against Epiphenomenalism. The No-Causation-at-AlI argument attempts to 
show that the Exclusion Argument must be unsound because if it were sound, there would be
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no causation, or no recognizable causation, at ail. This result is thought to be absurd, so the 
Exclusion Argument must be unsound. This argument does not afifect Epiphenomenalism as 
such, but the Exclusion Argument, and our present reasons for accepting Epiphenomenalism. 
If we had independent reasons for Epiphenomenalism, this argument would not affect them'. 
It is, nonetheless, appropriate to discuss this argument here since it is directly involved in the 
possibility that the Exclusion Argument might defeat the presumption in fiivor of ordinary 
practice.
Again, the second argument is that if the Exclusion Argument is sound, no causation 
at all occurs or the little causation that occurs bears no resemblance to our common 
conception. As Baker (1993) suggests, if we find the Exclusion Argument to be reason to 
reject the causal relevance of the mental, we must suppose that few recognizable properties 
are causally relevant The Exclusion Argument holds for any sets o f properties distinct from 
more basic properties. So, if the Exclusion Argument is sound, the only potentially causally 
relevant propertiM must be those in the most basic science. If quantum mechanics, which 
involves interactions that are fundamentally either indeterministic or nonlocally 
deterministic, is the most basic science, then the most basic science involves at least some 
events for which our concept of causation does not apply. According to quantum theory, 
properties, like position and momentum of particles, are indeterminate until an observation is 
made. There can be determinate facts only if the particles somehow “know” that a 
measurement is occurring or will occur. In either case, the causation left by the exclusion 
argument is 6 r  stranger than our normal concept of causation. Therefore, the argument
'  h  addition, one could avoid a  rejection o f the Exclusion Argument along these lines by trying to show 
that the Exclusion Argument does not generalize. This is Khn*s (1995,1997 and 1998) strategy. I End 
Kim's arguments unconvincihg since he assumes the problem arises primarily fiom the thesis o f physical 
realization o f second-order properties. In contrast, I hope to have shown that the problem arises fiom the
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for our talk of causation to have any referent, it must refer to those paradigm 
cases of causation involved in the special sciences and in mental causation.
This reasoning still does not suffice for rejecting Epiphenomenalism. Even if our 
ordinary notion of causation lacks the referent we previously thought it had, it is possible 
that it actually refers to some set o f events in the world. Perhaps we could alter our notion of 
causation, so that we applied the term ‘causation’ to a different relation, just as we could 
apply the term ‘unicorn’ to horses when we discovered that unicorns did not exist. But using 
a term to refer in that way does not make the horses unicorns, nor does it make 
epiphenomena causes. So, in the case of causation, perhaps common practice uses the term 
to apply in cases in which it should not, but that Act does not make minds and the special 
sciences causally relevant
Whether we continue to apply the word 'causation* in these cases is of little interest 
It is more interesting whether causes really exist, not whether we choose to call certain 
relations causation. No doubt interesting distinctions among epiphenomena could be 
captured by the term ‘causation,’ but I am here concerned with whether mental causation 
really occurs
4.4 Fodor’s End*of>the>World Argument
A third argument in a similar vein, suggested by Fodor (1989), is a Moorean style of
argument He writes.
Whereas, if it isn’t literally true that my wanting is causally reqwnsible for my 
reaching, and my itching is causally responsible for my scratching, and my 
believing is causey responsible for my saying. . .  if none of that is literally true, 
then practically everything I believe about anything is &lse and it’s the end of the 
world. Ellipsis in original, 1989,77)
broader assumption o f supetvenience.
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Fodor argues here that the causal relevance of the mind is so fundamental to our beliefs that 
it is essentially unrevisable. 1 am unsure if Fodor intends this view, but a similar argument 
could be made that mental causation so obviously occurs that we must reject any argument 
that leads to the conclusion that it does not occur. Any argument that leads to such a 
conclusion must be more suspect than the position it attacks. Fodor, apparently, thinks that 
nothing could be more obvious and more fundamental to our understanding of the world that 
our mental states cause our actions.
However, the apparent obviousness of a thesis is not conclusive evidence for it, and 
it is hard to imagine an empirical thesis that should not at least in principle be open to 
revision. That the mental appears obviously causally relevant is not enough to overwhelm 
any argument against i t  It seemed obvious that the earth stood still while the sun and stars 
revolved around it; it seemed obvious the world consisted of solid physical objects, but now 
we know that the earth revolves around the sun and physical objects consist mostly of atoms 
and empty space or perhaps something even less Athomable. Our understanding of the 
physical universe is arguably as fundamental as our knowledge of our own minds as causes. 
These beliefs about the physical universe certainly must have seemed as unrevisable as our 
beliefs about ourselves and the causal power of our minds seems to Fodor. Thus, although 
Fodor’s point gives a compelling reason to discover a flaw in the Exclusion Argument, until 
we can show how it is possible for the mental to be causally relevant, we cannot reject 
Epiphenomenalism.
43 Davidson’s Argument from Explanation
The fourth argument against Epiphenomenalism is given by Davidson (1963). His 
target is the view that reasons explanations are not causal explanations. On this view.
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reasons explanations, or rationalizing ocplanations, do not give causes of actions but instead
show how actions are rational. This view is not quite the Epiphenomenalism I am discussing
because it denies that reasons are the right sorts of things to be causes at all.
Epiphenomenalism, as I understand the view, claims that mental phenomena are causally
irrelevant This view of rationalizing explanations is that reasons are not causally relevant or
irrelevant; understanding reasons in this way is a category mistake. It would be equally
misleading to say that the number 1 did not make the last out in the baseball game; numbers
are not the kinds of things that play baseball. Nonetheless, Davidson’s argument is relevant
because it appears to show that any purported non-causal explanation cannot be correct He
argues that for reasons explanations to be adequate explanations, reasons must be causes.
Child (1994) summarizes the argument as follows.
Reasons explain actions. But we have not yet explained an action if we have said 
only that S acted some way and had a reason to perform that action: Tor a person 
can have a reason for an action, and perform the action, yet this reason not be the 
reason why he did it Central to the relation between a reason and an action it 
explains is the idea that the agent performed the action because he had the reason.’^
But what is the force of the ’because’ which captures the link between reason and 
action it explains? We have two options. Either we say that the link between 
reason and action is sui generis, a basic relation; in which case there is no further 
mystery. Or we give some kind of analysis of the relation; and what could that be 
but a causal analysis? As Davidson says; ‘One way we can mcplain an event is by 
placing it in the contact of its cause; cause and effect form the sort of pattern that 
explains the effect, in a sense of “explain” that we understand as well as any. If 
reason and actirat illustrate a different pattern o f acplanation, that pattern must be 
identified.’^  And, Davidson thinks, there is no plausible candidate for the pattern o f 
reason explanation other than the causal pattern: ‘the best argument for a [causal] 
scheme . . .  is that it alone promises to give an account o f the “mysterious 
connection” between reasons and actions.’'  (1994,91)
1 cannot add anything to Child’s analysis o f Davidson’s argument The confirmed 
Epiphenomenalist could avoid Davidson’s conclusion in one of three ways: by claiming that
^Davidson (1963) 691 
* ibid. 692
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reasons explanations are sui generis, e^qilanations of their own unique type, by claiming that 
reasons «q>lanations are not real «q)lanations at all, or by claiming that tiiey are some other 
huniliar type of eqilanation. The first response is unappealing in the context of the 
Exclusion Argument Epiphenomenalism, when viewed as a reaction to the problem of 
mental causation, must not appeal to mysteries that are as great as problem of mental 
causation itself. The idea that reasons explanations are sui generis essentially appeals to one 
mystery to explain another and represents no significant advance over the notion that 
somehow mental causation just mysteriously occurs.
The second response suggests we take Davidson’s argument as showing, not that 
reasons are causes, but that for reasons explanations to be real explanations, reasons must be 
causes. This response to Davidson’s argument, combined with the next argument, shows 
that an Epiphenomenalist cannot afford to reject the use of reasons explanations, even in 
principle. I will briefly discuss this argument before moving to the third possible 
Epiphenomenalist response, that reasons explanations are some other familiar variety of 
explanation.
4.6 Argument from Simplicity
The fifth argument against Epiphenomenalism is that it should be rejected for its 
unnecessary ontology. Since epiphenomena, according to the second response to 
Davidson’s argument, can play no role in our explanations, th ^  should be rejected on 
grounds of sinqilicity. This argument, combined with Davidson’s, seems unassailable. 
Although it may still be possible for an entity that plays no explanatory role whatsoever to 
exist, maintaining a belief in it is indeftnsible. Simplicity is no guarantee of truth, but belief
ibid. 693
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in an explanatorily irrelevant entity is indefensible unless that entity is known independently 
of any explanatory role it may play.
The Epiphenomenalist can give two responses to these combined arguments short of 
rejecting Ockham’s Razor. First, the Epiphenomenalist could respond that some causally 
irrelevant entities can still play a familiar role in explanations; this response is to repeat the 
third possible response to Davidson’s argument I will show in a moment what that familiar 
explanatory role might be. Second, the Epiphenomenalist should point out that we do not 
believe in the mental, at least our conscious mental states, because of some explanatory role 
they fill but because they are themselves our conscious mental life. Ockham’s razor can 
only be used to reject explanations of phenomena, not to rejecting the existence of the 
phenomena, in this case the conscious mental states, themselves.
The first Epiphenomenalist response is that we should only reject the existence of 
entities that play no explanatory role, but that the mental does play some explanatory role. 
Mental and special science properties may play a non-causal explanatory role by capturing 
an important second-order or some other similarity among disjunct physical entities. Thus, 
Ockham’s razor may not be sufficient reason to reject type Epiphenomenalism.
Ockham’s razor may still be sufficient reason to reject Token Epiphenomenalism. 
On Token Epiphenomenalism, mental events cannot be causes. Furthermore, since mental 
events are tokens and cannot be shared, they cannot play the explanatory role o f capturing 
similarities as mental types can. Thus, since mental events can play no explanatory role, we 
should not believe in them. This argument is sufficient for rejecting Token 
Epiphenomenalism about non-conscious events on a coarse-grained conception of events.
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However, the Epiphenomenalist may argue that a fine-grained conception of events 
allows for mental events to be explanatorily relevant If events are individuated by their 
properties, they may derive some explanatory relevance finm their individuating properties. 
Whatever this explanatory relevance might be it clearly cannot be the same sort of relevance 
a causally relevant event would have despite the surfiice similarity of such explanations.
This explanatory role cannot help those who appeal to reasons explanations, 
however, since reasons are particular justifications for particular actions. I conclude that 
Davidson is wholly successful in his criticism of those philosophers advocating a non-causal 
role for reasons-explanations. Nonetheless, we still may have reason to believe in the mental 
insofar as it captures similarities among physical states. Mental properties may be relevant 
for this reason. Mental events may be individuated by these properties, and so they might be 
relevant as well. I will discuss knowing our own mental states as second-order properties 
two sections of this chapter hence to see whether this response is effective.
The second Epiphenomenalist response is that conscious mental states differ fiom 
the properties or events adverted to in the special sciences. Consciousness, arguably, does 
not play any role in scientific explanations, so an appeal to simplicity of explanation is no 
reason to conclude anything about its causal relevance or existence. Moreover, we do not 
know about our own consciousness because of the explanatory role it may play but because 
it self-evidently exists as our mental life itself. Our conscious states, thus, provide reason not 
to reject the existence of epiphenomenal mental entities. Consciousness may also, however, 
provide a different reason to reject Epiphenomenalisna.
Our direct knowledge of our own minds suggests two further arguments against 
Epiphenomenalism. The first o f these arguments, argument 6 in the list above, is that
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Epiphenomenalism is incoherent .^ The second of these arguments, argument 7 above, is that 
that we could not know or refer to our minds if Epiphenomenalism is true.
The argument that Epiphenomenalism is incoherent proceeds as follows. If 
Epiphenomenalism is true, then one cannot know that it is true or truthfully state i t  If 
Epiphenomenalism cannot be known or truthfully stated, then we have no reason to accept i t  
Thus, we have no reason to accept Epiphenomenalism. Although this argument is not 
convincing, it will raise considerations about our knowledge of and reference to our own 
minds that will ultimately merit rejection of Epiphenomenalism.
4.7 Arguments against Coherence of Epiphenomenalism
The argument for the incoherence of Epiphenomoialism has at least two distinct 
forms. One argument is that Epiphenomenalism is, one might say, epistemically incoherent 
This argument is put in terms of knowledge of our own minds or formation of beliefs about 
our own minds. The second argument is that Epiphenomenalism is referentially incoherent 
and is put in terms of reference to our own minds. Neither o f these arguments prove that 
Epiphenomenalism is incoherent
The epistemic argument proceeds roughly as follows. If Epiphenomenalism is true, 
then one cannot know that one’s mind is causally inert If one caimot know that one’s mind 
is causally inert then one cannot know that Epiphenomenalism is true. Therefore, if 
Epiphenomenalism is true, then one cannot know that it is true. Finally, if one cannot know 
that something is true, then one should not believe that it is true. Therefore, one should not 
believe that Epiphenomenalism is true.
* McLaughlin (1994) presents an argument against the coherence o f Epiphenomenalism. He argues that 
Epiphenomenalism cannot be truthlül^ stated because the act o f making a  statement requires that one’s 
belief causes one’s utterance, so, if  Epiphenomenalism is true, it cannot be stated. McLaughlin notes that 
this argument is ineffective because the Epqthenomenalist coiild easily doubt the causal theory o f
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The problem here is not a question of whether one would be justified in believing 
that Epiphenomenalism is true. It may be that we should believe even if we cannot know it 
Periiaps if a theory is incompletely justified, we should believe that theory even if we cannot 
know it  The problem this argument presents is rather that one could not even come to have 
the belief that Epiphenomenalism is true if Epiphenomenalism is true.
The second argument for incoherence of Epiphenomenalism is an argument for 
referential incoherence. If Epiphenomenalism is true, then we cannot refer to our own 
minds. If we cannot refer to our own minds, then when we attempt to state the thesis of 
Epiphenomenalism, then we refer to nothing when we state it. When we say that minds are 
causally irrelevant, the term, “minds,” does not refer to anything. And if a statement 
includes a term that fails to refer, the statement is meaningless. Thus, Epiphenomenalism 
cannot be stated meaningfully, and any theory that cannot even be stated meaningfully 
cannot be true. Thus, the Argument from Referential Incoherence has a stronger conclusion 
than the epistemic version, that Epiphenomenalism cannot be true.
The Epiphenomenalist can raise several objections to these arguments. First, the 
Epiphenomenalist might claim that the arguments incorrectly assume simple causal theories 
of knowledge and reference. Admittedly, if Epiphenomenalian is true, and knowledge, 
belief formation or reference requires that some entity cause our belief or the putative act of 
reference in the right way, then we cannot know or refer to our own minds. In the next two 
chapters, without assuming a simple causal theory of knowledge, belief formation and 
reference, I will argue that Epiphenomenalism is inconsistent with knowledge of and 
reference to our own minds. But before raising that issue I will argue that the above
statements (and action). Thus, I will not puisiie this aigiunent here.
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arguments for incoherence of Epiphenomenalism each involve a scope ambiguity that 
renders them unsound.
Each of the above arguments involves a scope ambiguity. Each argument requires a 
premise that, on one reading, may be true but is harmless to the Epiphenomenalist, but under 
the required reading, is false. Thus, the arguments are unsound either because they are 
invalid, when assuming the (possibly) true reading, or because th ^  have a false premise.
In the Argument for Epistemic Incoherence, the second premise involves a scope 
ambiguity. The relevant premise is that if Epiphenomenalism is true, then one caimot know 
one’s own mind. The claim, ‘We cannot know that our minds are causally inert,’ can be 
understood in two ways. First, it could mean that we cannot know of our minds, of those 
very things, that they are causally inert Second, it could mean that we cannot know the 
proposition that our minds are causally inert It is true that we cannot know, assuming a 
causal theory of knowledge, o f some particular causally inert entity that it is inert However, 
that claim is not necessary for the Epiphenomenalist to be said to know his own theory. All 
the Epiphenomenalist needs to know is the proposition that minds are causally irrelevant 
The second reading of the controversial claim is 61se. If Epiphenomenalism is true, we can 
know that propositioiL
The Argument from Referential Incoherence involves a similar scope ambiguity in 
its premises. The relevant premise of this argument is that if  Epiphenomenalism is true, we 
cannot refer to our own minds. This premise also involves a scope ambiguity. The claim 
could be interpreted in one of two ways. We could take it as meaning that o f those things, 
our minds, we cannot refer to them. Or it could mean that we cannot state the following 
proposition: we cannot refer to our own minds. The first reading is true if
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Epiphenomenalism and a simple causal theory of reference are true. If Epiphenomenalism is 
true, then, of those things, we can say nothing because we are not related to them.
However, this reading is not the one we need to state Epiphenomenalism. To state 
Epiphenomenalism, we need only state a proposition, the proposition that minds are causally 
irrelevant If we say that need only take the second reading of the controversial premise. If 
Epiphenomenalism is true, we caimot state the proposition: minds are causally irrelevant 
This reading is the only one the Epiphenomenalist needs to state her case, but this reading is 
clearly false. One can state a proposition in which one o f the terms is causally inert
Assuming a simple causal theory of knowledge, one cannot know of a particular, 
either a concrete or abstract particular (an entity or one of its particular properties, like its 
particular redness), with which one has no acquaintance that it is causally inert. Since, 
according to Epiphenomenalism, one’s mind can never cause one’s beliefs, on this view, one 
caimot know of one’s mind that it is irrelevant
Similarly, following a simple causal theory, one cannot say of a particular (rigidly 
designated) unicorn that it is causally inert or even that it does not exist O f that particular 
Unicom one can know nothing because that unicorn does not exist, and one can know 
nothing of or refer to a nonexistent particular. To take another example, one cannot know of 
phlogiston, of that natural kind, that it does not cause combustion. No phlogiston exists for 
anyone to know these Acts about So, on the narrow scope reading of these claims, prima 
facie, we cannot know or refer to those entities^
 ^These examples may instead be taken to show that causal theories o f knowledge and reference are false. I 
do not wish to endorse this argument here although it does nothing to endangK my argument If these 
causal theories are Alse, then the incoherence arguments fail anyway. However, even ifw e accept these 
causal theories, the incoherence arguments will M .
102
I do not want to argue that these claims are true. For the moment, I am willing to 
concede these claims, but only for the puipose of arguing that even if these claims are true, 
the argument does not go through. In the next two chapters I will argue that even on a less- 
simple causal/nomological theory of reference, we cannot be acquainted with our own 
minds, and for this reason Epiphenomenalism cannot be true. The reasons I have given in 
the preceding paragraph are too simplistic to establish such a conclusion. However, 1 intend 
to accept them for the sake of argument for the rest of this chapter.
A dififerent reading of the relevant claim is all that is necessary to know, believe or 
claim that Epiphenomenalism is true. One can know the proposition that minds are causally 
inert just as one can know the proposition that unicorns do not exist, that unicorns have one 
hom, or that phlogiston is not the cause of combustion. To belabor the point, we can 
meaningfully state, and know, truths of number theory even though we are not causally 
related to numbers or sets. None of these claims requires acquaintance with any particular 
for one to know that it is true. These claims only require that one know a proposition that 
minds are causally inert, that unicorns and phlogiston do not exist, or that elementary 
number theory is true.
I will state the two arguments more formally to show how the scope ambiguiQr arises 
and how that ambiguity renders the arguments unsound. The first form of the argument is as 
follows.
(1) If Epiphenomenalism is true, then for any person S and any mind x, such that x 
is S’s mind, it is not possible that S knows (or comes to have beliefs about) x.
(2) For any person S and any mind x, such that x is S’s mind, if it is not possible 
for S to know (or come to have beliefe about) S’s mind, then it is not possible 
that S knows (or comes to have belief about) that x  is causally inert
(3) Therefore, if Epiphenomenalism is true, then, for any person S, it is not 
possible Aat S knows (or comes to believe) Epiphenomenalimn.
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(4) For any person S, if it is not possible that S knows (or comes to believe) a 
theory, then we should reject that theory.
(5) Therefore, if Epiphenomenalism is true, we should reject EpiphenomenalisnL
(Q If Epiphenomenalism is not true, then we should reject Epiphenomenalism.
(7) Either Epiphenomenalism is true or it is not true.
(8) Therefore, we should reject Epiphenomenalism.
This first argument for incoherence of Epiphenomenalism purports to show only that 
we should not believe Epiphenomenalism because even if it were true, we could not know or 
come to believe it  And, given our goal of acquiring truths, we should reject any theory that 
is false. Thus, the argument from (5) to (8) is uncontroversial and valid.
However, the inference fiom (1) and (2) to (3) is invalid with this premise (2). This 
version of premise (2), which we can call the wide-scope reading because the scope of the 
quantifier x ranges over the whole conditional, is arguably true on a generally causal account 
of knowledge. However, (3) does not follow fiom (1) and (2). (3) states that S cannot know 
that Epiphenomenalism is true. However, all that follows fiom (1) and (2) is that, of x. S’s 
mind, S carmot know that x is causally irrelevant But that claim is not equivalent to the 
claim that Epiphenomenalism is true. Given the examples of unicorns, phlogiston, number 
theory, one can know a proposition or set of propositions without being acquainted with any 
particular that fits into those propositions. The theory of Epiphenomenalism is, prKumably, 
a proposition or set of propositions, and S can easily believe or perhaps even know that that 
theory is true without being acquainted with his own mind.
The argument for Epistemic Incoherence requires a dififerent version of premise (2) 
to be valid. The argument for (3) can be given as follows.
(1) If Epiphenomenalism is true, then for any person S and any mind x, such that x 
is S’s mind, it is not possible that S knows (or comes to have belief about) x.
QO For any person S, if it is not possible for S to know (or come to have beliefo 
about) S’s mind, then it is not possible that S knows (or comes to believe) the
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proposition that, for any person T and any x such that x is T s  mind, x is 
caukily inert
(3) Therefore, if Epiphenomenalism is true, then, for any person S, it is not 
possible that S knows (or comes to believe) Epiphenomenalism.
The revised premise (2') makes the argument valid. Assuming that the claim for any 
person T and any x such that x is Ts mind, x is causally inert is equivalent to the thesis of 
Epiphenom enalism , then (3) follows &om (2*). However, this revised argument is unsound 
because premise (2') is fidse. We might call (2') the narrow scope version of the premise 
because the scope of the quantifier, x, covers only the predicate, is causally inert. As noted, 
one can know a proposition about particulars, with which one is not acquainted. I can know 
the proposition Unicorns do not exist without being acquainted with any particular uniconu 
In fact, if I were acquainted with such a unicom, then I couldn’t know that proposition. So, 
the Argument for Epistemic Incoherence is unsound either because it is invalid, under the 
wide scope premise, or has a &lse premise under the narrow scope reading.
The second argument for incoherence of Epiphenomenalism purports to show that 
Epiphenomenalism is referentially incoherent This argument involves the same type of 
scope ambiguity. It proceeds as follows.
(9) If Epiphenomenalism is true, then for any person S and any x such that x is S’s 
mind, it is not possible for S to refer to x.
(10) For any person S and any x such that x is S’s mind, if it is not possible for S to 
refer to x, then it is not possible that S meaningfully assert that x is causally 
irrelevant*.
'  There ts an additional response the Epiphenomenalist might make to this premise. She might claim that, 
following the causal/historical theory of reference apparently assumed, when S makes claims about minds,
S refers to something other than minds, say brains. Thus, when S claims that minds are causally irrelevant, 
his term “minds” actually refers to brahis, and so S has said something meaningtW albeit Gtlse.
This response has two problems. First, it seems &Ise that S refers to brains when he uses the term 
“mind.” We would not wish to say that chemists who used the term “phlogiston” were in fiKt referring to 
oxygen when they used that term. Such an mterpretation would seem to make them correct when th ^  were 
in feet wrong to say, for example, that phloguton causes combustion. Cases like these are something of a 
puzzle for the causal/historical account because the referent is not the cause. A  causal/historical theorist 
would respond that being a cause is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for reference. Questions 
about the simple «plication o f a  causal/historical account will be discussed in the next two chapters.
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(11) Therefore, if Epiphenomenalism is true, then it is not possible for any person 
S to meaningfully state if.
(12) Any theory that cannot be meaningfully stated cannot be true.
(13) Therefore, Epiphenomenalism cannot be true.
This Argument for Referential Incoherence is unsound just as the Argument for 
Epistemic Incoherence was. In this argument, we may call premise (10) the wide scope 
claim because the scope of the quantifier x ranges over the whole conditional. This wide 
scope reading is apparently tme on a causal/historical account of reference. One cannot, on 
this view, refer to some particular with which one cannot be causally related. But (12) does 
not follow fiom premises (9) and (10). The reason is that we can make meaningful 
statements without referring to any particular. For «cample, we can meaningfully make 
claims about unicorns and phlogiston without being causally related to them. So, the 
argument for (11) that assumes (10) is invalid.
The Argument for Referential Incoherence of Epiphenomenalism would be valid but 
unsound with (10% a narrow scope reading of (10).
(9) If Epiphenomenalism is true, then for any person S and any x such that x is S’s 
mind, it is not possible for S to refer to x.
(100 K for any person S, it is not possible for S to refer to x, such that x is S’s 
mind, then it is not possible that S meaningfully assert the proposition that x is 
causally irrelevant
(11) Therefore, if Epiphenomenalism is true, then it is not possible for any person 
S to meaningfully state it
The second problem with this response is that it does not appear to help the Epiphenomenalist On 
this view Epiphenomenalism could not be stated truthfully because tte  basic statement of 
Epiphenomenalism, that minds are causally irrelevant would become Alse. If Epiphenomenalism cannot be 
sated truthfully, then that still seems reason to reject i t
’ An additional point to note is that Epiphenomenalism is not a claim about only one's own mind, but is a 
clahn about anyone's mmd. Since the epistemic and referential considerations apply equally well to 
anyone's mind, it should be easily possible to state these arguments in more general terms. I state the 
arguments only in terms o f first-person knowledge and reference because our abOi^ to know and refer to 
our own minds is, I hope, uncontroversial, and because I will fecus on the first premise o f each o f these 
arguments m die next chapter.
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However, premise (100 is false. As we noted above, we can make meaningfiil, even 
true, statements about particulars to which we cannot refer. So, on either scope reading of 
the appropriate premise, the Argument for Referential Incoherence is unsound.
PeAaps it will be argued that these examples I appeal to are relevantly different fiom 
the case of Epiphenomenalism since they all involve nonexistent or fictional entities. 
Traditionally philosophers have had difficulty dealing with nonexistent entities, but our 
ability to make coherent and true statements about them is uncontroversial if puzzling. My 
argument appeals to nothing more controversial than the 6 c t that we can speak and know 
about non-existent objects. Thus, epiphenomena and nonexistent entities should not be 
disanalogous in this respect Furthermore, it is possible to give examples of abstract entities 
about which we can know or make meaningful statements. I did not emphasize an analogy 
with abstract objects because they represent a problematic class o f apparent counterexamples 
to causal theories of knowledge and reference. We are able to know propositions or make 
meaningful statements about fictional or nonexistent entities, and Epiphenomenalism need 
appeal to nothing more than a similar ability for the case of causally irrelevant particulars.
This reasoning shows that there is no difficulty with coming to believe that 
Epiphenomenalism is true. However, knowing is more than having a true belief Ignoring 
Gettier problems, we may be safe in assuming that justification is also required for 
knowledge, hi this case, the Epiphenomenalist may be justified in holding his belief by 
appeal to the Exclusion Argument itself. The Exclusion Argument certainly spears to be 
sound, and believing something on the basis of a sound argument seems as good a 
justification as one might need. Therefore, if Ep^enomenalism is true, there is no reason to 
think Epiphenomenalism incoherent We should presume in favor of coherence of a theory
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unless it can be shown not to be coherent Since these arguments have Ailed to show 
Epiphenomenalism incoherent we should presume that it is coherent
Since, as I have argued in this chapter, none of these brief arguments against 
Epiphenomenalism is effective, we must appeal to a more careful argument to show that 
Epiphenomenalism is false. In the next two chapters, I will argue that problems with 
knowing and referring to one’s own mind effectively refute Epiphenomenalism. In 
effect, I will argue against Epiphenomenalism based on a causal or nomic theories o f 
knowledge and reference for a sophisticated version of the controversial premises 
assumed in the arguments for Epistemic Incoherence and Referential Incoherence of 
Epiphenomenalism. This premise will conflict with our uncontroversial ability to know 
and refer to our own minds.
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Ch a pt e r s  
Kn o w in g  NoNCONSCious M ental Items
5.1 Introduction
In the last chapter I claimed that many arguments against Epiphenomenalism were 
not sound. In this chapter I will discuss problems Epiphenomenalism might have with first- 
person knowledge and reference. I will argue that Epiphenomenalism can avoid many of the 
problems that have been thought to defeat it by appealing to a metaphysical, nomic or causal 
connection between the mental and the physical. I will conclude this chapter by arguing that 
the relation, whatever its variety, of the mental to the act of reference or the our beliefs is not 
one that grounds reference, belief formation or knowledge.
Although Epiphenomenalism is coherent, it does raise problems for knowing or 
referring to our own minds'. Let us retum to the question of whether we could know our 
own minds if Epiphenomenalism is tme. I assumed for the sake of argument, in argument 6 
in the previous chapter, the Argument against the Coherence of Epiphenomenalism, that we 
could not know our own minds if Epiphenomenalism were tme. Although the Argument 
against the Coherence of Epiphenomenalism is not sound, problems of knowledge and 
reference to our own minds make it unlikely that Epiphenomenalism is tme.
Two varieties of mental entities (identified by our epistemic relation to them) are 
relevant to our discussion here. The first are mental entities that can be known only 
inferentially or indirectly. Prepositional attitudes, cognitive processes and unconscious 
belief and desires are arguably o f this type. I will call these mental entities NCEs for non-
' Fiank Jackson (1982), fbr example, thinks that problems with coming to know one’s mind show diat the 
mental must be relevant fixr the production ofother mental properties or stales. Jackson thinks that the mental is 
not completely causally men, onty unable to have any pl^^cat effect Thus, alAough he claims to defend 
Epqiheiiomenalism, he defends only a restricted version o f ^ iqphenomenalism, not the robust
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conscious entities. The second type are mental entities that are at least sometimes known 
directly. Conscious mental states are of this type. I will call these qualia  ^ following the 
common philosophical terminology for conscious states or the essential character of those 
conscious states.
Existence of Nonconscioui Mental Entities.
I will first pursue how Epiphenomenalism might deal with problems of knowledge 
of and reference to NCEs. 1 will argue for the causal relevance of the mental fix>m our ability 
to know or come to have beliefe about our own minds. I assume that some NCEs exist and 
that we do know or come to have beliefe about at least some of these mental entities. First, I 
will argue that Token Epiphenomenalism is not consistent with our knowing or having 
belief about NCEs, and so. Token Epiphenomenalism is false. Second, 1 will discuss 
Block’s (1990) limited form of Epiphenomenalism about second-order properties and argue 
that it is incompatible with the exclusion argument Third, 1 will argue that Block’s notion 
of a second-order property as characterizing mental properties allows Type-E to be 
compatible with us to knowing our own NCEs inferentially.
The terms ’NCE’ and ’qualia’ in the following arguments are intended neutrally 
assuming nothing about the kind of Epiphenomenalism under discussion. When it becomes 
relevant, I will ^p ly  these criticisms of Epiphenomenalism to type Epiphenomenalism. In 
addition, these terms are not meant to imply anything about the possibility of a mental item’s 
independent existence. These items may be independently existing objects or substances, or 
they may be different properties of the same object that depend for their existence on that 
object In short nothing significant yet depends on the choice o f terminology; convenience
^>^>henomeiHdi8m here at issue.
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and generality are the only reasons for this terminology. When it is important to distinguish 
the varieties of entities and Epiphenomenalisms, I will do so clearly.
One argument against Epiphenomenalism is based on our knowledge of our own 
minds. This argument proceeds as follows.
(1) If Epiphenomenalism is true, it is not possible for us to know our own minds or
to form beliefs about them.
(2) We do know our own minds or to form belief about them.
(3) .*. Epiphenomenalism must be false.
Statement (1) is uncontroversial, but statement (2) requires considerable argument 
There seem to be several possible ways for us to know our NCEs. They may fill some 
inferential or explanatory role for them to ground our beliefs; they may be related to us in 
the right causal or nomological way; they may be known as we know nonexistent or 
fictional entities. According to the first premise, if Epiphenomenalism is true, it is 
impossible to know our NCEs in any of these ways.
That we know our mental processes or properties by the inferential or explanatory 
role they play contradicts standard philosophical wisdom that our knowledge of our own 
minds is direct and non>inferential. However, the view that our knowledge of at least some 
kinds of mental states is inferential is fairly well-established.
It is fidrly commonplace to note that the heavy lifting o f many mental processes are 
unconscious'. For example, language processing, perceptual processing, including 6ce 
recognition, and other perceptual and motor processes occur entirely unconsciously. We are 
conscious only of the end product of these mental processes.
Nisbett and Wilson (1977) argue persuasively that our knowledge of at least some 
kinds of mental entities, in particular (what we would ordinarily consider) causes o f our
 ^This claim is often lefented to as “Lashley’s Observation," fiom L ash l^  (1956)
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actions and decisions, and the cognitive processes Q)utatively) underlying our behavior, is 
based on inference fiom our actions and background Qputatively) causal theories of action. 
For example, Nisbett and Wilson found a handedness bias in reported preference for 
identical nylon stockings. Subjects rated the best of a set o f stockings, all o f which, 
unknown to the subjects, were identical. The subjects gave the highest rating significantly 
more often to the pair that corresponded to the subjects’ dominant hand. Right-handed 
subjects, for example, were more likely to say that the pair placed on the right was the best 
pair of stockings.
When confix>nted with this Act about their decision-making, subjects generally 
responded with incredulity. So, although there is a lively debate in the psychology literature 
about the extent of our access to these processes (and to what extent we merely forget the 
determinants of our decision-making), it seems undeniable that at least some aspects o f the 
(putative) causes of our behavior re not directly available to or introspectible by us.
In addition, prepositional attitudes are at least sometimes known only indirectly even 
in the first person case, except in cases of occurrent thoughts. First-person attribution of 
propositional attitudes is generally taken to be authoritative, but, without some associated 
phenomenology, it is a mystery how such knowledge could be direct One explanation for 
how we make such attributions is that we make them by inference. In addition, in learning 
folk psychology, for example, children appear to make inferences in attributing propositional 
attitudes and intentional states to themselves (Gopnik 1996)\ These claims are not entirely 
uncontentious, and I cannot argue more for them here, but they do make a strong case that 
our access to at least some of our mental entities is inferential. Arguing that these items
 ^These attributions may become automatic over time so that we may not think o f them as infeiences, but 
they still do not appear to involve the kmd o f durect acquaintance that we have with our conscious mental
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cannot be known if Epiphenomenalism is true constitutes a meaningful critique of 
Epiphenomenalism, at least for these kinds of mental states. Nonetheless, for those 
philosophers not convinced by the preceding evidence, I will later argue that conscious states 
cannot be known if Epiphenomenalism is true.
We have two ways of knowing our own NCEs by inference. The first possibility is 
that we know our NCEs in the same way we know unobservable entities postulated by a 
scientific theory. The second possibility is that we know our NCEs, in the same way we 
know abstract objects, by their picking out similarities in the world.
The first possible way of knowing our own mental entities is suggested by Nisbett 
and Wilson. They claim that first-person knowledge of cognitive processes is a variety of 
inference to the best explanation. At least some mental entities are, on their view, 
unobservable entities required for our theory to explain our behavior.
However, Epiphenomenalism gives no grounds for believing in these mental entities 
because of their explanatory role in an inference to the best explanation. A realist about 
unobservable or theoretical entities believes in them because they unity the observable 
phenomena.^  An unobservable entity that unifies phenomena is one which we believe is a 
single cause for a diverse range of experimental evidence. For example, the electron is an 
unobservable entity whose existence we infer because it unifies a range of experimental 
evidence fiom the movements of charged oil droplets in Millikan’s experiment to the 
conduction of electric current to the occurrence of lightning. The electron is the single cause 
of these diverse {dtenomena. However, since epiphenomena caimot be the cause o f any
states.
* An anti-fealist about unobservables would, o f course, find the mental entity’s explanatoiy role no reason to 
believe in its existence. So, fixr this case, we need only worry about the realist about unobservables, h rary  
event, lassume for the sake of this work that scientific realism is true.
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phenomena at all, they cannot be the unifying cause in the explanation o f our own behavior. 
Therefore, one cannot know one’s own NCEs in the way that we know unobservable or 
theoretical entities if Epiphenomenalism is true.
The Epiphenomenalist may respond that although epiphenomena could not fill the 
role of an unobservable entity, epiphenomena could be effects of some causally relevant 
entity, say a physical or neural entity, that did unify the obsovable phenomena. The mental 
entity may, thus, be known as an effect of the theoretical entity that does play a role in 
explaining the phenomena. This response may describe a genuine possibility, but it gives no 
reason to believe in the NCE. Without already knowing that there is a relation between the 
NCE and the physical entity, belief in the physical entity would give no reason to believe in 
the NCE. Therefore, on this view, we are trapped in a vicious circle; we cannot know our 
own NCEs without already knowing our own NCEs. So, the possibility that our mental 
entities are effects o f an unobservable entity will not provide reason to form belief about our 
own mental entities.
The second possible way of knowing our own minds, that we know mental entities in 
the same way we know abstract entities, offers more hope. Although problems with whether 
and how we can know abstract entities are the primary reason many philosophers question 
the existence of abstract entities, if we have the same grounding for our belief in NCEs that 
we have for our belief in abstract entities, then knowing our NCEs does not present a 
special problem for Epiphenomenalism. Abstract entities in general play an important 
mcplanatory, but non-causal, role that may ground our belief in them by explaining 
similarities among particular objects. Red objects are red, one might think, because they 
share the universal property of redness. Thus, the view that NCEs can be known because of
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the similarities they explain can avoid the problem of knowing our NCEs by incorporating it 
into the general problem of knowing abstract entities. If we can give the same reasons for 
believing in NCEs that we can give for believing in abstract objects, then Epiphenomenalism 
does not have any special problem.
At this point Broad’s (and McLaughlin’s) distinction between Type- 
Epiphenomenalism and Token-Epiphenomenalism becomes important Token-E cannot 
allow for the possibility that we know NCEs because of similarities they explain. On Token- 
E, the epiphenomena are events or singular occurrences, not properties. Singular 
occurrences clearly caimot be adverted to in an inference based on a shared similarity. % as 
I have argued, the only way to know our own cognitive processes and propositional attitudes 
is by appeal to similarities among different types of beings with minds, then Token-E is 
incompatible with our knowing at least some of our own mental events. And, as I am 
assuming, since we can know or come to have belief about these mental events. Token 
Epiphenomenalism must be incorrect, for the case of inferentially known entities. In the 
next chapter I will raise the issue o f knowledge of conscious states for both Token-E and 
Type-E. But, assuming we can know all mental tokens, the case of mental tokens that we 
know only inferentially shows that Token-E cannot be true for these mental tokens.
Type-E can, on the other hand, tqjpeal to the possibility o f shared similarities among 
beings with minds since, according to Type-E, the epiphenomena are properties. A purely 
physical description of a human brain might be enough to explain human behavior, but it 
would not be enough to explain similarities to the behavior of other beings with mental lives. 
A characterization in terms of functional roles, for «cample, may be necessary to explain the 
shnilarities we can see or which seem possible among the behavior of beings with
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heterogeneous physical realizations, e. g. octopus brains or silicon based Martians. If Type- 
E is true, appeal to NCEs can still play an explanatory role by picking out some similarity 
among beings that all share a mental property.
At first glance, we might think that appealing to a functionalist account of mental 
similarities conflicts with Epiphenomenalism. If Epiphenomenalism is true, mental entities 
do not have causal powers. If minds do not have causal powers, the only similarity of causal 
powers they have is that they have none. Therefore, if the similarity among minds fiom one 
species or individual to another is the causal role of the entity, then Epiphenomenalism does 
not allow us to know our own NCEs by an inference to the similar causal powers they have 
in difierent species or individuals.
5 J  Block’s Theory
Block (1990) argues, to the contrary, that mental terms categorize causally relevant
physical properties without being themselves causally relevant Block’s view is that mental
properties are second order properties of physical entities. A good explanation of second-
order properties comes fiom Kim.
Let Z? be a set of (’first-order’) properties: a second-order property over D is 
the property of having some properQr in D satisfying a certain specification 
C. Where C involves causal relations (that is, C specifies a ‘causal role’), we 
may call the second-order property a Junctional property. Properties in D 
satisfying C are the realizers of the second-order property in question. 
(1997,290)
Functionalism in the philosophy of mind appears committed to the view that the mental 
properties are a variety of second order properties. If the only way to ctq>ture the similarities 
among beings with mental properties is by taking mental properties, at least cognitive 
processes and propositional attitudes, to be functionally defined, then these mental properties 
must be a variety of second-order prq)erty.
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Block (1990) argues for the skeptical claim that functional properties in general are 
not “causally relevant to the effects in terms of which they are applied.” (Block 1990, 156) 
Block illustrates this claim with the example of the second-order property of dormitivity. 
Dormitivity is “the possession o f some property or other (for example, a first-order chemical 
property) that is causally relevant to sleep. That is, x is dormitive = x has some property that 
is causally relevant to sleep (when x is ingested).” (Block 1990, 155) However, dormitivity 
is not itself causally relevant to making one sleep; in general the first-order chemical 
property alone is causally relevant to making one sleep. If Block’s claim is correct, then 
mental properties are in general causally irrelevant to the effect in terms of which they are 
defined, but mental properties can still be explanatorily relevant
Block’s suggestion  ^is a limited form of Epiphenomenalism. He does not commit to 
the view that second-order properties are completely irrelevant but only generally causally 
irrelevant to the effects that are adverted to in defining the property. The second-order 
property can be causally relevant to the knowledge that the pill puts one to sleep. The causal 
inermess of the mental only extends to the effects the second-order property is defined in 
terms o^ so the mental can still be relevant for our knowing our own mental states. Thus, 
Block’s theory might provide a way for the mind to be known without thinking that it is 
causally relevant to first order properties.
Block’s restricted EpiphenomenaUsm does not, however, solve the problem 
presented by the Exclusion Argument According to the assumptions of the Exclusion 
Argument some physical state or event determines our knowledge of the second-order 
property. Some physical property, periuqrs the writing on the box of the pharmaceuticat
* Block seems to take this variety o f Epiphenomenalism as a  skeptical challenge to be overcome rather than 
a position he wishes to defend.
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produces a brain property that determines our knowledge. And, according to the Exclusion 
Principle, since some physical property determines our knowledge, no other property can 
cause the knowledge. If this conclusion is correct, then it must be that in general we do not 
know our mental properties by their causal relations to us. Without rejecting the Exclusion 
Principle, one cannot accept Block’s limited form of Epiphenomenalism. Therefore, for 
Type-E to be consistent, it must be that our mental properties are completely causally inert, 
and if we are to know our mental properties at all, it must be in some non-causal, or 
indirectly causal, way.
The argument is that Block’s position will not provide a solution to the problem of 
mental causation as it is raised by the Exclusion Argument (although Block is not concerned 
with the Exclusion Argument). To accept Type-E as a solution to the problem of mental 
causation, we must accept that second-order propertiM cannot be causally relevant to 
anything, including our knowledge of them. Nonetheless, the second-order property 
conception of the mind provides a way of knowing our own minds.
5.4 Knowledge of the Mental as Second-Order Properties
The notion of mental properties as epiphenomenal second-order properties makes 
knowledge of one’s own mind seem mysterious. Appeal to the property of dormitivity does 
not appear to explain much on its own since it explains why some substance puts one to 
sleep by «qipealing to its dormitive virtue, its capacity to put one to sleep. Nonetheless, 
appealing to second-order properties can avoid vacuity if the appeal is to a complex web of 
propositions, an autonomous science, that ultimately does not rely on any underlying 
physical structure. Various drugs that act by distinct chemical means but which all have the 
effect of putting people to sleep really do have something in common. A science of
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psychology that q^lied both to putative Martians with silicon-based brains and to us would, 
presumably, involve appeal to causally individuated second-order properties.
The problem, then, is to e?q)lain how, if Epiphenomenalism is true, we can know this 
similarity among first-order properties. In an ordinary case of seeing a similarity among 
objects with a certain property, say redness, we see the token of the property, the redness of 
that apple, and notice that that redness is like another redness, say the redness of that tomato. 
Thus, ordinarily, to know a universal or a type, we need to know the property tokens first, 
then infer the existence of the type. However, in the case of Type-E, we cannot know the 
type by simple inference fiom the tokens. To know the second-order type, we must first 
have the concept of the second-order type, and then see that the particular first-order 
property meets the causal specification of the second-order type.
This theory of second-order properties raises two important questions. Can these 
epiphenomenal second-order properties be real? And is this theory compatible with 
Epiphenomenalism?
In answer to the first question, we should think that these properties are r«d insofar 
as we think the science that appeals to them is true. If we can specify the property without 
being acquainted with its tokens, then the property can be causally inert And it does seem 
possible to specify properties without being acquainted with any instances of them. For 
example, I can, more or less arbitrarily, specify the property of having the shape of a 
chiliagon, to borrow Descartes’ example, without having any acquaintance with chiliagons. 
I can specify the property of being the third person mentioned in the Bible without having 
any idea who that person might be. These examples show that we can arbitrarily invent 
properties (or periuqs less contentiously second-order predicates). Some of the properties
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specified in this way may not be real, but one way, but not the only way, for those properties 
to be real is if tb ^  fit into a true scientific theory. This answer to the question may seem 
question-begging-tbe theory can only be true if the properties adverted to in it are real. 
However, we have ways of testing for the truth of scientific theories, for example, by 
empirical hypothesis testing, that do not require us first to know the reality o f the properties. 
Thus, if functionalism (or any second-order property account) can provide true 
explanations^, then the second-order properties themselves can be real.
The second question about second-order properties is whether their reality is 
consistent with Epiphenomenalism. These properties, even properties that are individuated 
by their causal roles, can be epiphenomenal. Second-order properties, I have suggested, are 
known by one’s first having a concept of the property, and then matching the causal 
properties of the event with the second-order concept So, second-order properties need not 
have causal power themselves. If we can specify the concept independently of any 
experience with instances of the property, then there is no reason to think the second-order 
property must be causally relevant
Thus, the notion of second-order properties provides a way that we might know the 
mental if the mental is epiphenomenal. The conception of the mental as epiphenomenal is, 
therefore, consistent with our knowing our own minds (at least some mental properties) by 
inference. So, this conception of the mind counts against argument 4, the Argument fiom 
Simplicity, and argument S, Davidson’s Argument Davidson’s Argument was supposed to 
show that the mental had to be causally relevant for it to play any explanatory role. And the
* A possibility very much indoubt Block (1978) argues that hmctionalism cannot find a  middle-ground 
that is neither too chauvinistic, arbitrarily IW ting minds to humans, nor too liberal, allowing things that 
clearly have no minds to be judged as having minds. So, fimctronal characterization o f the mental may 
simply fiul as a  philosophical theory o f the mind.
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Argument &om Simplicity was supposed to show that, because epiphenomena could play no 
explanatory role, we should reject the existence of the mental if Epiphenomenalism were 
true. Since the second-order property conception of the mind allows for the mental to play a 
non-causal explanatory role, the Epiphenomenalist can reject a crucial premise of the above 
argument So, Davidson’s Argument and the Argument &om Simplicity do not show that we 
should not believe in the existence of the mental if Epiphenomenalism is true.
Reasons or other mental explanations may fulfill some explanatory role for 
particular events if reasons are not themselves causally relevant The explanatory role 
played by a second-order property can capture some similarity among events, and by 
fitting those events into a larger scheme, the second-order property can explain why a 
particular event’s occurrence counts as an event of that type. For example, 
Epiphenomenalism can provide an explanation of why Fred’s action of getting a beer 
counts as an action of beer-getting. Fred’s brain event that realizes his desire to get the 
beer can be seen to have a second-order property, some non-physical similarity with 
other physical events. These other physical events resulted in acts of beer-getting ceteris 
paribusy but such an explanation need not explicitly advert to the causal powers of the 
realizing brain-state. So the second-order property view can explain why Fred’s behavior 
is one of getting beer by an appeal to a general theory of beer-getting that makes no 
assumptions about the physical realization of Fred’s beer-desires. So, the second-order 
property theory o f the mental allows for genuine explanations that do not require causal 
relevance of the second-order properties themselves.
The conception of the mental as second-order properties provides a way we could 
know, by mferenc^ some of our own mental properties if Epiphenomenalism is true. If the
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mental properties fît into explanations like that of Fred’s beer-getting behavior, Fred can 
know his own mental state, his beer-desire, by appealing to that theory of beer-getting 
behavior. He can see his own action of getting beer, and infer that this action was caused by 
a brain state, which he infers is an instantiation of a beer-getting desire, and so he knows or 
has reason to believe he was in a beer-desiring state. This explanation is too trivial to be 
truly convincing, but if Fred’s beer-getting desires fît into a complex web of common-sense 
or scientifîc psychology statements, then the explanation can be less than trivial. For 
example, Fred has a theory of mind that desire-states are instantiated by states that, ceteris 
paribus, cause attempts to get the object desired. Fred’s theory, then, would include some 
specifîcations of the ceteris paribus conditions under which one would exhibit beer-getting 
behavior, and these conditions could be specifîed (although not completely) in terms of 
second-order properties like beliefs and other desires. So Fred’s explanation, by fîtting into 
a complex common-sense or scientifîc psychology can genuinely explain behavior without 
assuming causal relevance of the beer-desire itself. So, Epiphenomenalism does not raise 
insurmountable problems of inferential knowledge of our own minds.
This conception of how we know our minds does not fît well with the views of 
Epiphenomenalists. H uxl^ (1898), for example, clearly viewed the mind as caused by the 
neurophysioloRT of the brain, but if the mind is a second-order property of the brain, the 
mind is not caused by the neurophysiology of the brain.
One response to this point is that we need not respect the intuitions of philosophers 
who have thought minds are effects. It may be that Ending any solution to the problem of 
mental causation is sufBcient reason to accept the analysis. Nonetheless, it may be possible 
to capture something of the original intuition about the dependence of the mind on the brain
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within the second-order property account Since the second-order property is defined in 
terms of the first-order property, it follows that the second-order properties will supervene on 
the first-order properties. Anything with the same first-order property will have the same 
second-order property. Although the dependence of the mental on the physical will not be 
causal dependence, it is true that any event will fidl under a mental event type in virtue of 
falling under a physical event type. This variety of dependence may satisfy the intuition that 
the mental is determined by the physical even though that determination turns out not to be 
causal. However, even if this formulation does not satisfy the intuition, the motivation for 
finding a solution to the problem of mental causation may be reason to accept whatever form 
of Epiphenomenalism is available.
5.5 Conclusion
I have argued for three main th^es in this chapter. First, because Token-E does not 
allow us to know some mental entities that we can know, Token-E is false. Second, Block's 
suggestion of a limited form of Epiphenomenalism does not offer an Epiphenomenalism that 
is compatible with the Exclusion Argument However, third, his notion of the mental as 
second-order properties can make Type-E consistent with our knowing our own minds, 
specifically our non-conscious mental properties, by inference.
This solution must remain somewhat tentative because it depends on a theory of 
mental properties as second-order properties. This second-order property account may not 
capture the nature of conscious mental states. In addition, the second-order property account 
does not seem to fit well with the possibility that mental content is wide. If mental content is 
individuated nonlocally, then content properties cannot be simply properties of neural 
properties. For these reasons, we can take the second-order property account as only a
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tentative view of the mind, and less conqxUing as a solution to the problem of causal 
relevance of mental content, and so this solution to the problems raised by 
Epiphenomenalism must be equally tentative.
The above arguments against Epiphenomenalism apply to our knowledge of others’ 
minds just as they do to our knowledge of our own minds. In Act, they apply to any set of 
second-order properties. The main difference between these kinds of knowledge is that we 
tend to be more certain that we know our own minds than that we know others’ minds or 
know other second-order properties. Epiphenomenalism raises problems unique to knowing 
our own minds firom our direct knowledge of conscious mental states. In the next chapter I 
will turn to knowledge of one’s own conscious states.
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Ch a pt e r 6
First-Person  Know ledge  o f  C onscious States
6.1 Introduction
Consciousness, to paraphrase Nagel (1974), makes Epiphenomenalism seem really 
impossible. Consciousness appears to resist explanation in terms of second-order 
properties. More importantly and less controversially, we do not know or refer to our 
conscious states inferentially. Epiphenomenalism is intuitively appealing for 
consciousness because it is hard to see how consciousness could be explained in causal 
terms, but consciousness raises more problems for Epiphenomenalism.
In the previous chapter I argued that the problems with knowledge of our own minds 
could be overcome assuming a controversial theory of the mental as second-order properties, 
properties of physical properties. This view provided a tentative solution to the problem of 
knowing epiphenomenal mental states that we could reasonably be thought to know by 
inference. However, it is not in general true that we know our conscious mental states by 
inference. Thus, consciousness resists the solution an Epiphenomenalist might give along 
these lines. Problems of knowledge o ( and reference to, our own minds continue to plague 
Epiphenomenalism about consciousness. I will argue that the Epiphenomenalist must reply 
to these objections by appealing to a nomic or causal correlation between qualia and the 
physical. Finally, I will argue that we have no reason to think the nomic or causal 
correlation envisioned by the Epiphenomenalist will be of the correct kind to ground 
knowledge or reference.
For simplicity, I will call the view that our conscious mental states are 
ep^henomenal ‘(^ualia Epqphenomenalism.* ‘(^ualia* is a term of art in philosophy of mind,
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refetrmg to the subjective character of our experience, the qualitative feel of our 
consciousness, or the feeling of what it is like to be in a conscious state. ‘Qualia’ is most 
generally used to describe properties of experience although sometimes it is used to refer to 
the experience itself. I will take the term to have either sense, and will distinguish the two 
possible senses if the need arises.
Philosophers who think that it is impossible to explain the nature of qualia in causal 
or functional terms tend toward Qualia Epiphenomenalism. If consciousness defies analysis 
in terms of functional roles, they argue, then it plays no functional role, and so is causally 
irrelevant'. Thus, Qualia Epiphenomenalism is a view held by many philosophers 
independently of the Exclusion Argument As such a view, Qualia Epiphenomenalism may 
provide an independently justified solution to the problem of mental causation. For this 
reason, it is especially important to consider whether Qualia Epiphenomenalism can be 
correct
One criticism of Qualia Epiphenomenalism is that it is unfalsifiable^, that no possible 
evidence would count against i t  If I suddenly ceased to have conscious mental states, I 
would not thereby cease to have all the same beliefs about my mental states that I do. If the 
lack o f consciousness could not convince me that I did not have them, then nothing could. 
The conclusion, then, is that Qualia Epiphenomenalism is not really an empirical hypothesis, 
and so should be rejected.
This criticism is incorrect for two reasons. First, the required counterfactual claim is 
61se. It is not true that if I did not have conscious states, then I would still believe that I did.
' This criticism appears in Shoemaker (1975) as an argument for fiinctionalism although Block (1978) 
argues that simply because a  conscious state cannot be analyzed in functional terms does not imply that the 
conscious event is causally irrelevant Finally, Chalmers (1996) accepts an argument like the one above 
while embracing consciousness Epiphenomenalism.
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If consciousness is nomically correlated with physical states, then the physical states could 
not occur without the conscious states. It certainly seems to be true that consciousness is 
nomically correlated with neural states of the brain\ Thus, the counterfactual premise 
necessary for the argument is false.
Second, &lsifiability is a consideration only for empirical theories or explanations. 
We know our qualia but not, in general, as an explanandum. Three different justifications 
support this claim. (1) Mental phenomena are themselves our experiences. It is impossible 
to deny the existence of our experience. (2) Qualia, although mysterious, must exist because 
we have direct access to them; we must have qualia even if they explain nothing because we 
are directly acquainted with them. We know our minds immediately, through direct 
acquaintance. (3) Qualia are the data that we must begin with, the essence of our mental 
lives. Conscious phenomena are the means by which we perceive the world, our 
representations. These responses to the qualia skeptic all appear to be true, but they may not 
be compatible with Epiphenomenalisnt
That conscious states and physical states may be nomically correlated shows that the 
argument against Epiphenomenalism must be formulated not as a claim about Alsifiability 
of Qualia Epiphenomenalism but as a problem about our knowledge and reference to our 
own minds. The second two responses, (2) and (3), make claims about knowledge o f and 
reference to our own minds*.
 ^This criticism appears in Lycan (1987) in defense of functionalism and in SmuUyan (1980) as a criticism 
o f dualism.
 ^This example assumes that brain states are physical states. I assume this claim only for the sake o f clarity. 
Presumably, consciousness would also correlate with whatever basic physical states underlie the brain
* Tye (1995) gives petlugis the most detailed argument against Qualia Epqphenomenalûm involving problems of 
knowledge. He argues that Epiphenomenalism makes the problem o f other minds msuperable. It would be 
impossible, the argument goes, to know whether someone else is conscious since someone could always have 
the same causal relations with the observer without bemg conscmus. Jackson’s (1982) response to a similar
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6J2 Problems with (1): Hiving Qualia
The claim (1) above does not directly involve knowledge o f our own minds but it 
deserves mention as a difficulty diat Epiphenomenalism encounters. The claim is that our 
conscious states, like pain, simply are our «cperiences, and, we cannot possibly doubt the 
edstence of our experiences. This claim may be evidence against the eliminativist about 
conscious states, but it does not help the Epiphenomenalist Our having experiences is, 
rather, a problem for Epiphenomenalism since having a concrete existent or property appears 
to require that existent or property to have causal power. If our experiences are not causally 
relevant then it appears impossible for us to have them.
The Epiphenomenalist may respond that having a property does not require a causal 
relation between the object and the property that inheres in it Thus, having an itch, for 
example, may just be the instantiation of the property itchiness. A relation to a universal, the 
property itchiness, carmot require a causal relation between the person instantiating the 
universal and the universal Itself. However, one’s having experiences is not simply a matter 
of instantiating a property. By having an itch, I instantiate the property itchiness^  but in 
addition, I have a relation to a spatio-temporal entity, the itch. My relation to the type 
itchiness is one of inherence, but my relation to that particular itch is something more. The 
most plausible candidate for this relation is a causal one.
The Epiphenomenalist could argue that mental entities could be had by the subject in 
a noncausal way, without the subject being causally related to those qualia. The
problem is that one could know that others were conscious by analogy with oneself. This argument is, o f course. 
Mill's analogical argument &r the existence o f other mnids. One knows in one’s own case that one is conscious, 
and. smce others ate relevantly like cneseK others are conscious.
Tye rqriies that Jackson cannot argue in this way because he cannot know in his own case that he is 
conscious. As alreatty noted, Jackson is not committed to Ae view that quaikt are completely causally melevant, 
only hrelevant to physical events. Thus, Jackson does not have die problem that Tye suggests, but the 
Epiphenomenalism under consideration here mry have this problem.
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Epiphenomenalist would then need to explain the relation in some way that did not merely 
assert that some mysterious noncausal relation holds between a person and her conscious 
states. Without a plausible explanation of this relation, accepting Epiphenomenalism 
requires believing a mystery every bit as large as the mystery of mental causation that 
Epiphenomenalism is an attempt to avoid. Certainly the Exclusion Argument seems to entail 
Epiphenomenalism, but perhaps mental causation actually occurs mysteriously without any 
explanation. This mystery would be no greater than accepting the mystery of a non-causal 
relation to our mental states, and so we would have no reason to accept Epiphenomenalism 
as a response to the problem of mental causation as it appears in the Exclusion Argument
A better response for the Epiphenomenalist is to concede that my relation to my 
conscious states is causal but deny that this &ct shows that Epiphenomenalism false. We 
might be causally related to a physical state that either causes or nomologically determines 
the conscious state. If the conscious state has a physical cause or determining property, then 
one could have the experience by having this physical state. We could have the conscious 
state by means of its physical determiner, which relates to the qualia causally or nomically. 
Thus, the physical cause or correlate of the conscious state could be a means to have 
0 q)eriences even if we are not directly causally related to the conscious states.
It appears, then, that the problem for the Epiphenomenalist o f how we can have our 
mental states can be handled provided that mental entities can be causally or nomologically 
determined by physical entities. This claim in defense of Epiphenomenalism will be the 
common response to other problems I will raise against Epiphenomenalism. Although the 
Epiphenomenalist can hold this view of having one’s qualia, it remains to be seen whether 
Epiphenomenalism allows one to know or refer to one’s qualia.
129
The (2) and (3) justifications for belief in qualia raise problems for bow we know 
or refer to our own quaba.
6J Problems with (2): Fbrst-Person Knowledge of Qualia
Response (2) is that we know our own minds because we are directly acquainted 
with them. The problem with this claim is that it seems impossible for us to be directly 
acquainted with our own minds if Epiphenomenalism is true. Thus, if we really are directly 
acquainted with our own minds, Epiphenomenalism is false. Acquaintance is a causal 
relation, yet Epiphenomenalism does not allow for our qualia to cause our beliefs. This 
raises one basic problem with knowledge of our own qualia that I will address immediately, 
and two further problems based on our purported privileged access to our own quaba and on 
the coherence of skeptical hypotheses. But first, I wiU discuss the basic argument In the 
chapter four I discussed the following argument (renumbered for this chapter).
(4) If Epiphenomenabsm is true, then for any person S and any mind x, such that x 
is S’s mind, it is not possible that S knows (or comes to have bebefe about) x.
(5) For any person S and any mind x, such that x is S’s mind, if it is not possible 
for S to know (or come to have bebe6 about) S’s mind, then it is not possible 
that S knows (or comes to have bebefe about) that x is causaUy inert
(6) Therefore, if Epiphenomoiabsm is true, then, for any person S, it is not 
possible that S knows (or comes to bebeve) Epiphenomenabsm.
(7) For any person S, if it is not possible that S knows (or comes to bebeve) a 
theory, then we should reject that theory.
(8) Therefore, if Epiphenomenabsm is true, we should reject Epiphenomenabsm.
(9) If Epiphenomenabsm is not true, then we should reject Epiphenomenabsm.
00) Either Epiphenomenabsm is true or it is not true.
01) Therefore, we should reject Epiphenomenabsm.
hr chtqrter four, I tried to show that this argument was invabd. However, now I will 
argue simply for the first premise and attempt to show that it is incompatible with the fact of 
our knowledge of our own quaba. If Epiphenomenabsm is true, then we can no longer take 
our conscious experiences, our pams, to be immediately or directly known. We cannot be
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acquainted with causally iiTclevant entities. To be acquainted with something, I will assume 
for the moment, is for the entity one is acquainted with to be the immediate cause of one’s 
belief, or whatever mental state we have when we are acquainted with an entity. To know 
something immediately is to know it without any causal or inferential intermediaries. If 
Epiphenom enalism  is true, then our qualia cannot be the immediate causes o f our belief. 
Thus, we cannot know our qualia immediately.
The basic argument, put somewhat more formally in terms of direct acquaintance 
with qualia, is as follows.
(12) For any person S and any x, such that x is S’s quale, if S is directly acquainted 
with X, then x must be the immediate cause of S’s belief.
(13) If Epiphenomenalism is true, then it is not possible that, for any person S and 
any quale x, such that x is S’s quale, x is the immediate cause of S’s belief.
(14) Therefore, if Epiphenomenalism is true, then it is not possible that, for any 
person S and any quale x, such that x is S’s quale, S is directly acquainted with
X.
(15) For any person S and any quale x, such that x is S’s quale, S is directly 
acquainted with x.
(16) .*. Epiphenomenalism is false.
This argument begins fiom the assumption (12) that direct acquaintance requires the 
object one is acquainted with be the immediate cause of one’s internal state. This premise is 
the one most likely to be contested. (13) is, I take it, a direct result of Epiphenomenalism^ 
epiphenomena since they can cause nothing cannot be immediate causes of anything. The 
argument is valid. Given the stipulation about the direct acquaintance, the concept of 
Epiphenomenalism itself and the assumption that we are acquainted directly with our minds, 
the conclusion follows.
 ^Note that this argument does not specify Token-E or Type-E. The argument is equally efRctive agamst 
either if  properties are the sorts o f things we can be acquainted with. I will discuss how these arguments 
affect the dff&rent Epiphenomenalisms m section 6.7.
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Again the Epiphenomenalist can insist this argument begs the question by assuming 
a causal theory of knowledge. The Epiphenomenalist might argue that a subject could know 
his or her own qualia directly in a non-causal way, perhaps by means o f a kind of direct 
intellectual perception like the direct perception of the Forms imagined by Plato. This model 
for perception of epiphenomenal qualia may be coherent, but I simply cannot imagine what it 
means to say that one can directly perceive non-causally. Plato never managed anything 
more convincing than visual, and therefore causal, metaphors for this perception, and 1 see 
no reason the Epiphenomenalist could give a better explanatiotL
The Epiphenomenalist can better respond to problems of direct knowledge of our 
own minds without insisting on any mysterious direct perception. She could claim that one 
perceives qualia by means of some mediating physical state that is either nomically or 
through a common cause to the mind‘.
Either of these possibilities requires that the Epiphenomenalist abandon the notion 
that our knowledge of our own quale is direct in the sense that the quale is the immediate 
cause of our knowledge. However, one might take the notion of direct knowledge to be 
merely non-inferential knowledge. Thus, we could be said to know directly that the sky is 
blue or to know directly that one is sitting and typing. These examples seem good 
candidates for direct, albeit defeasible, knowledge. Candidates like these statements about
* Goldman (1967) in presenting his causal theory o f knowledge was fixced to deal with the problem of knowing 
the future. It seemed to Goldman that one can know what will occur, but one cannot have one’s belief caused 
by something that has not occurred yet He solved the problem by appealing to a common cause. For example, 
some event causes both my belief that I will visit New York and my getting on the plane and arriving in New 
York.
One might try to generalize the solution to the ^ iphenomenalist problem of how we know our minds 
by appealing to the model ofknowmg the fiduie on any theory o f knowler^ and, thus, avoid commitment to a 
causal theory. The onhr possible models o f knowmg the tinure however are one o f the three possibilities 
mentioned above or an mfoential model An m&rentml model ofknowmg the future is unlikely to help the 
Epiphenomenalist with qualia since inArence is not likely to capture the w ^  we seem to know our sensations 
and perceptions.
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the external world have been considered to be direct in foundationalist epistemology yet are 
clearly mediated by one’s senses. The Epiphenomenalist can appeal to a natural sense of 
direct knowledge as non-inferential knowledge, knowledge that is not immediate but arrived 
at without inference.
On this revised notion of direct acquaintance or knowledge, Epiphenomenalism 
appears to be compatible with acquaintance or knowledge o f our own minds. One directly 
knows that one is in pain because one comes to believe that one is in pain without an 
inference to that belief. This belief may count as knowledge in virtue of its resulting from a 
common cause or in virtue of the mechanism reliably giving true beliefs or whatever else is 
required for direct knowledge.
The Epiphenomenalist can respond to the challenge that his theory cannot allow for 
acquaintance with or direct knowledge of one’s own qualia by assuming that acquaintance or 
direct knowledge do not require immediate causation by the qualia. However, the 
Epiphenomenalist requires some close relation between the qualia and the belief or 
knowledge state of the cognizer to ground this acquaintance or knowledge. Presumably this 
relation is some variety of causal relation or a nomic correlation^.
I will now raise two further epistemic objections to Epiphenomenalism based on our 
purported privileged access to our own minds and on claims of the coherence of skeptical 
hypotheses. Neither of these objections refutes the Epiphenomenalist provided she appeals 
to some causal or nomic relation between qualia and the physical and accepts the possibility 
of defeasibility of our knowledge of our own qualia.
6J.1 Privileged Access and Skeptkisin
’ This claim assumes that a causal or nomic relation is necessary for a reliable, non-inforential belief- 
forming mechanism. 1 assume that a reliable mechanism is more than merely one that accidentally leads to
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Relying on a mediated nomic or causal relation may not satisfy many philosophers 
who think that our knowledge of our own qualia is privileged in a way that knowledge of 
physical states cannot be. Philosophers with Cartesian intuitions would thiiüc that if  the 
theory entails that knowledge of qualia is no more certain than our knowledge of external 
objects, then some part o f our theory must have gone badly awry. If Epiphenomenalism 
leads to the consequence that the mental is not known incorrigibly, then many philosophers 
would find that adequate reason for rejecting Epiphenomenalism.
Given the Epiphenomenalist requirement of a physical causal or nomic mechanism. 
Incorrigibility theorists will admit that it is logically possible for the belief that one's C- 
fibers are firing to occur without the C-fibers firing. Any relation between a belief and a 
physical has an inherent possibility of error or unreliability. Any physical mechanism that 
normally has a certain effect can fail to have that effect In foct it is this fallibility of all 
physical relations that is supposed to make qualia unique. The Epiphenomenalist solution to 
the problem of how one could have epiphenomenal qualia is that there must be some 
mediating physical state between one’s belief and the quale itself. If such a mediating 
physical state is required, and if the connection between that mediating physical state and the 
belief can be broken, then the connection between the belief and the quale must be broken as 
well. Since it is at least logically possible that the mediating physical state occur when the 
belief does not, it is also possible that the belief might occur without the quale. And for this 
to be possible for a belief and a quale shows that the belief is not incorrigible. Thus, the 
Epiphenomenalism is mconsistent with incorrigible access to one’s own qualia.
Nonetheless, a weaker form of privileged access to one’s qualia can he maintained. 
One may know the quale better than one knows the physical intermediaries. In fact, one
truebeliefi.
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need not know the physical intermediaries at ail to know the quale if Epiphenomenalism is 
true. Unless we are cognitive scientists, we have no idea, for «ample, what process 
converts a two-dimensional set o f dots on the retina into a three dimensional picture of the 
world; yet, the process of turning that two dimensional image into a three dimensional 
picture causally mediates our perception of the world. Clearly, then, we need not know the 
processes that lead to a belief for us to come to have that belief. A fortiori^  we need not 
know the causal intermediaries any better dian we know the results Thus, 
Epiphenomenalism does not require that we do not in general have better access to our 
minds than to the causal (or nomological) intermediaries between our beliefs and our qualia. 
Although Epiphenomenalism is inconsistent with incorrigibility, the Epiphenomenalist may 
still think that qualia are known as well as objects of perception.
Rejecting Cartesian intuitions may create some tension with the reasons many 
philosophers have for accepting property dualism. Chalmers (1996), for example, thinks that 
taking consciousness seriously requires that we believe the mental is known better than the 
physical world. If one is the sort of person who accepts Epiphenomenalism, then one is 
likely to think that our mental states have a certain privileged status that other states do not 
If one thinks that our mental states are known only as well as physical objects, say perceptual 
objects, then one has taken away much of the reason many philosophers have for thinking 
the mental is unique, that it resists reduction to the merely physical. One of the common 
reasons for thinking the mental is irreducible is its unique or privileged epistemic status. 
Thus, giving up the mental’s unique epistemic status is antithetical to some motivations for 
Epiphenomenalism.
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If Epiphenomenalism is correct, then we have to give up the notion that the mental is 
better known than perceptions of the physical world. If qualia are correlated with physical 
states that give rise to our belief, then we could be wrong about the qualia just as we could 
be wrong about our perceptions of the external world.
A second objection along these lines is that Epiphenomenalism cannot make sense of 
standard skeptical problems*. If Epiphenomenalism is true, we cannot even formulate 
skeptical problems, the argument goes, that philosophers have thought we could. Skeptical 
arguments require that we could be appeared to just as we are even if the external world did 
not exist or even if everything we believe about it were wrong. Epiphenomenalism must say 
that we cannot be appeared to as we are without any physical state existing. We could have 
skeptical doubts about the nature of the external world but not with the existence about 
something physical. So puzzles about the existence of a world outside our minds carmot 
even arise if Epiphenomenalism is true.
The Epiphenomenalist response is that belief in Epiphenomenalism does not meet 
the high standards of proof demanded by the skeptic. It is logically possible, or at least 
conceivable, that Epiphenomenalism is 61se, and that is all that is required to formulate the 
skeptical problem. This fact about skepticism is irrelevant to Epiphenomenalism. For 
example, if we were to accept the above argument we would have to admit that if the type 
identity theory is true, then we cannot state skepticism properly because that view claims 
that our qualia and brain states are identical. But this &ct about skepticism, presumably.
* Chalmeis (1994) suggests an argument along these lines, but argues that the close access we have to our 
own consciousness allows skeptical problems to occur even if  Epiphenomenalism is true. Chalmers thinks 
that taking consciousness seriously, i.e. eschewing eliminativism and reductionism about consciousness, 
requnes that we have epistemic access to our experiences although this access may not involve beliefs 
about thenu This access, on his view, is closer than one could have with a causally mediated physical state, 
so he thinks rejecting the argument fiom skepticism is a natural consequence o f taking consciousness 
seriously. What this epistemic access might consist in, I find as wholly mysterious as the possible direct
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does not provide a reason to think the identity theory is false. It merely shows that the 
identity theory does not itself live up to the standards the skeptic demands for knowledge. 
The same claim is true of Epiphenomenalism. Epiphenomenalism does not live up to the 
strict demands for knowledge that skepticism requires. So all this criticism shows is that 
skepticism is a problem for Epiphenomenalism just as it is for any theory that asserts 
anything. Epiphenomenalism has no special problem with skepticism.
Epiphenomenalism conflicts with incorrigibility of knowledge of our qualia but is 
compatible with fallible but noninferential access to our qualia. Skeptical problems are 
reasonably statable even if Epiphenomenalism is true. And, provided there is a nomic 
connection of some sort between the quale and a physical state, we seem able to know or 
form beliefs about our own minds, refer to them and represent them.
6J#2 Acquaintance with Qualia
If Epiphenomenalism is correct, then it appears to be impossible for us to be 
acquainted with our own qualia. 1 will argue in this part that the Epiphenomenalist can 
defend his position by assuming a close nomic or causal coimection between qualia and 
physical or brain states.
In chapter four 1 argued that Epiphenomenalism is coherent by appeal to the 
possibility of knowing propositions about fictional and nonexistent entities. This model may 
woric for knowing propositions about epiphenomenal qualia, which was enough to defeat the 
incoherence arguments of chapter four, but this model of knowing qualia is insufficient for 
acquaintance with those qualia. And, 1 assume, we are acquainted with our qualia. Thus, the 
Epiphenomenalist cannot pursue an analogy between qualia and fictional entities to deal 
with the problem of first-person acquaintance with qualia.
peiceptioii I have already dismissed.
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A brief digression on qualia realism, or reification, is in order here. One theory of 
qualia that competes with this reifying qualia is the adverbial model of qualia. On the 
adverbial model of qualia, qualia are not entities with which we are acquainted but are ways 
in which we perceive or are iq)peared to. So, when I see red, I am not acquainted with a red 
percept or quale but I perceive redly, I am in a redly-sensing state. This view would deny 
that we are acquainted with qualia at all. In fact, we would not, strictly speaking, know 
qualia at all, since qualia could not be objects of knowledge on this view. This adverbial 
model may be correct, but it does not affect my argument in any deep way. If the adverbial 
theory is correct, then we would need to rephrase the argument, but that is all. The 
adverbialist would admit that we are tq)peared to in certain qualitative ways, and presumably 
he would admit that these appearances are known to us. So, I merely have to argue that there 
must be some causal relevance of these adverbs, these properties of our experiences, for us 
to be directly aware of the way we are speared to. And any view would have to admit that 
we are directly aware, defeasibly, of bow we are appeared to. That is all my argument really 
requires, that we be directly aware of how we are tq)peared to. Whether we are aware of an 
object or only of a property of our experience, these qualia are still part of our direct 
conscious experience. Since it is convenient, I will continue to speak as if qualia are objects, 
but the argument should apply to the adverbial view as well.
It is possible that we know epiphenomenal qualia in the same way we know 
nonedstent or fictional entities, but this model will not allow us to be acquainted with qualia. 
The distinction between acquaintance and propositional knowledge played some underlying 
role in my previous argument that Epiphenomenalism is coherent It is important to make 
the distinction here to show that we can have knowledge but still not acquaintance. Having
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propositional knowledge of epiphenomenal qualia is not problematic. We can have 
prepositional knowledge of fictional and nonexistent entities; by analogy, we should be able 
to have knowledge of epiphenomenal qualia. We know that Sherlock Holmes was a brilliant 
detective who noticed details that escaped everyone else. We know that unicorns do not 
exist We may know, or at least believe, that epiphenomenal qualia must be unusual or odd 
phenomena. Perhaps we can have propositional knowledge of qualia in whatever way we 
have such knowledge of nonexistent and fictional entities. If we can have propositional 
knowledge in this way, then this knowledge may not require a nomic or causal connection. 
We have no causal connection to Sherlock Holmes or to unicorns since none of them exist, 
nor can we have a nomic connection to nonexistent entities except in some trivial sense. So, 
if the model of knowledge of nonexistent and fictional entities holds for propositional 
knowledge of qualia, we need not tqxpeal to a nomic or causal connection between our 
beliefs and the qualia.
Some philosophers (e.g. Lycan 1987) may be tempted by this approach to 
knowledge of qualia. Certainly this approach will not appeal to realists about qualia (e.g. 
Jackson 1982 and Chalmers 1996), and, moreover, this approach will not allow for 
acquaintance with qualia that I am supposing we have.
However, acquaintance and knowledge are quite distinct We know Acts about 
Holmes, but we have no acquaintance with him. Appealing to the model of knowledge of 
fictional and nonexistent objects solved our problem for the Argument against the Coherence 
of Epiphenomenalism. But this model cannot help with the problem of acquaintance with 
our own minds since we are not acquainted with fictional or nonexistent entities. The best 
Epiphenomenalist response is, again, to appeal to a close relation between the qualia and the
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physical states by means of which a person is acquainted with the qualia or is aware of the 
quality of his experiences.
6.4 Problems with (3): Qualia as Representations
The third response to the rejection of qualia Epiphenomenalism (3) raises additional 
problems for Epiphenomenalism. The response (3) is the claim that qualia are the means by 
which we perceive the world; qualia represent the world to a subject This view need not be 
the controversial idea that qualia are pictures or objects of perception by some iimer eye. All 
this view claims is that qualia represent states of affairs, external states of affairs like the fact 
that the stove is hot, or internal states of affairs, like the fact that my stomach is empty. But 
in whatever way qualia represent, they must represent to a subject However, if 
Epiphenomenalism is true, then it appears to be impossible for qualia to do this. If qualia are 
causally irrelevant, then they cannot represent anything to anyone.
One view of representation, perhaps a simplistic view, is that representations must 
represent to a subject The representation must be causally relevant to the subject in some 
way, perhaps not as a simple percept, but it must somehow relate to the subject. It is hard to 
see what kind of relation this could be other than a causal or nomic one. So, the possibility 
that qualia represent the world seems to require that they be causally relevant to a subjects 
beliefs and other internal states. It is impossible for epiphenomena to fulfill this role, so 
either they are not representations, contra this response, or they are causally related by means 
of some mediating physical states.
Mental representation is a large and difGcult issue in contemporary philosophy of 
mind. Periuqrs the idea that representations must represent to a subject reduces to a 
rébarbative Cartesian Theater (Dennett 1994 and elsewhere) view, an unnecessary holdover
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from a substance dualism that sees the self as an homunculus viewing internal pictures. 
However, my point can be made without making this kind o f controversial assumptions 
about the nature of this representation. Most theories of representation require that an 
internal token represents because that token is related in some, perhaps complex, causal, 
counterfactual or nomic way with the fret that it represents. Any theory along these lines is, 
so far, compatible with Epiphenomenalism. However, any theory of representation must 
commit to the view that the representation is had, stored by, or acted upon by a subject For 
example, for my token of a syntactic representation, #water#, to represent water requires that 
the token occur in a system with a complex structure with inputs and outputs relating to the 
world. On most theories this syntactic form #water# encodes some information about the 
world by means of a nomic, causal or counterfactual relation to the objects in the world, 
either internal or external to the system. For this token to be part of such a complex system, 
it must be causally related to the other parts of the system. Epiphenomenal qualia cannot be 
a cause in any such system, so they must be effects of some cause that does play such a role.
Barring an idiosyncratic theory of representation, the Qualia Epiphenomenalist’s 
view that qualia are representations commits the Epiphenomenalist to the view that qualia 
are nomically or causally connected to some physical state or token that plays a causal role 
in the organism’s internal information processing system.
6,5 Problems nvith Reference to Qualia
The last problem I will raise for Epiphenomenalism is one of reference to one’s own 
qualia. I will argue that this problem o f reference to one’s own qualia can only be solved by 
assuming a close nomic, causal or metaphysically necessary connection between a physical 
property and the qualia itself.
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The argument against Epiphenomenalism from the problem of reference is that since 
we cannot refer to epiphenomena directly, we cannot rigidly designate them at alL The 
argument in outline form is as follows.
(17) If Epiphenomenalism is true, then it is not possible that for any person S and 
any quale x, such that x is S’s quale, S rigidly designates x.
(18) It is possible that for any person S and any x such that x is S’s quale, S rigidly 
designates x..
(19) Epiphenomenalism is folse.
According to this argument, Epiphenomenalism does not allow one to rigidly 
designate one’s qualia. Since one cannot be directly causally related to one’s qualia, one 
cannot rigidly designate them. The case is analogous to that of Newman’. Imagine that we 
invent a name, say "Newman^” to refer to the first person bom in the 22nd century. This 
name does not refer to the same person in all possible worlds since the name may apply to 
one of two possible individuals, say Sam and Terry, either of whom might be bom before the 
other. Thus, “Newmauj” cannot refer to either individual rigidly.
To designate an individual rigidly is to pick out that individual in all possible worlds. 
Thus, the tom  “Bill Clinton’’ picks out that person. Bill Clinton in all possible worlds. It is 
impossible for Bill Clinton not to be Bill Clinton, so the term identifies Bill Clinton in all 
possible worlds. On the other hand, the term, “the second President to be impeached," does 
not pick out Bill Clinton in all possible worlds. Several possible scenarios would fiilsify the 
statement “Bill Clinton is the second President to be impeached.” First, Clinton might not 
have been impeached. Second, Andrew Johnson might not have been impeached, so Clinton 
would have been the first President to be hnpeached. Third, Richard Nixon or some other 
President m i^ t have been impeached, so Clinton would have been at least the foird 
President to be impeached. Definite descriptions that are contingently true of the objects
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they designate, then, do not rigidly designate those objects. Names and natural kind terms, 
like “pain,” by contrast, designate objects rigidly.
In the case o f Newman% we have to say that “Newman;" does not pick out one 
person across all possible worlds because more than one person might have been bom first in 
the 22nd century. One possible response to this puzzle is to claim that “Newman;” is a non- 
rigid designator, like a definite description, that picks out a person in the actual world but 
which would not identify the person across all possible worlds. We should not accept this 
response, however, because it treats “Newman;” as something other than a name, perhaps a 
disguised definite description. But “Newman;” certainly appears to be a name. Treating 
some apparent names as something other than names raises problems for determining when 
a name is really a name and when it is a disguised definite description. If we could 
somehow distinguish these two types of “names,” then we would have to resort to a 
bifurcated theory of names, one theory for one type of names, for example “Newman;,” and 
a second theory for another type, for example, “Bill Clinton.” But the two types of names 
and “Bill Clinton,” for all other purposes must be treated as the same kind of thing. So 
treating names as only one type of thing avoids these problems.
The better option in this case is to treat the term “Newman;” as a name that does not 
yet designate at all. Since no one has yet been bom in the 22nd century, the name does not 
refer to anyone yet This example shows that in general we cannot refer, with a rigid 
designator, to someone who does not yet exist
This result affects Epiphenomenalism, first, in that we cannot take reference to minds 
to work on the model of reference to the future. Since future events could turn out 
differently, we cannot generally use terms to rigidly designate future entities. If we are to
’ This case is discussed in Adams (1986).
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refer to our minds, then we must be able to refer to them with rigid designators. For 
example, pains are generally taken to be a natural kind, but natural kind terms rigidly 
designate their referents. If that's correct, then when we attempt to refer to our pains, we 
must fail to designate anything at all. Unless we take all mental terms to be disguised 
descriptions or some other nonrigid designator, which I think anyone would find 
implausible, then we cannot both accept a model of reference for the mind following a 
model of reference to the future and believe that we can refer to our minds.
One exception to the rule that we cannot refer using rigid designators to future 
entities is the case in which a present object determines some future object in a 
metaphysically necessary way. For example, following Kripke (1972), I can rigidly 
designate a future person by referring to the union of that sperm and that egg, presuming that 
the union could only result in that person. Metaphysical necessity, on Kripke’s view, holds 
across all possible worlds, in the way that identity does, but it implies nothing about the 
analyticity of such relations that broadly logical possibility does. So, on Kripke’s view, that 
Hesperus is Phosphorus is metaphysically necessary. Both terms refer to the same object 
rigidly, and that object, the planet Venus, could not fail to be Venus. But this kind of 
necessity is not obviously logical necessity since there is no logical requirement that any 
identity claim involving two different terms must be true. Thus, we can rigidly designate 
some future entities provided that the present entities metaphysically necessitate the future 
ones.
This exception provides the Epiphenomenalist's best response. We can refer, the 
Epiphenomenalist would claim, to our own minds because th ^  are necessitated strongly by 
the physical entities underlying diem. FoUowmg Kripke's suggestion, we might think that
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the necessitation must be metaphysical, but perhaps a weaker nomological necessity would 
suffice.
Moreover, a purely nomological relation between the referring term and the entity 
designated may be sufficient for reference. For example, in a dubbing ceremony, or in 
whatever way a term first gets fixed to the person or entity, the naming requires only a 
nomological or causal connection between the entity dubbed and the term that refers to it 
For example, when one refers to cats by ostension, one points to a cat or set of cats and says, 
effectively, the term “cats” refers to that kind of thing. One’s act o f ostension is mediated by 
causal or nomic intermediaries. Thus, acts of ostension, for example, which are perfectly 
adequate for fixing a rigid designation, require only certain kinds of causal or nomic 
relations. So, reference to epiphenomena may only require a nomological or causal relation 
between the term and the object
I have shown that the Epiphenomenalist’s best, periiaps only, response to a series of 
problems involving knowledge, belief formation, representation and reference is to postulate 
a close nomic or causal relation between the quale and some underlying physical state. I will 
now turn to a final argument that counts against Epiphenomenalism. The final argument I 
will present is that there is no reason to think the nomic connection is of the right kind to 
support knowledge, belief formation, reference or representation.
6.6 Objection to the Nomic Correlation Response
The nomic or causal connection between the quale and the physical entity is not the 
right kind o f nomic connectitm to ground acquaintance or reference. Some but not all nomic 
or causal cormections can provide this grounding. For instance, the sputtering noise my car 
makes is nomically related to its lacking a belt; whenever the belt is trussing, as a matter of
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law, the car makes a sputtering noise. The missing belt is also causally related to the 
sputtering noise; the lack of a belt causes the sputtering noise'”. This sputtering noise is 
nomically related to my belief about the noise, and it causes me to have worries about the 
noise. Thus, there are nomic and causal relations between my beliefs and the sputtering 
noise and between my belief and the missing belt However, intuitively, I am acquainted 
only with the sputtering noise not the missing belt Moreover, I do not refer to the missing 
belt when I say, “There’s that sputtering noise again." The nomic or causal relations 
between the sputtering noise and my beliefs and utterances ground knowledge and reference; 
the nomic and causal relations between the missing belt and my belief and utterances 
simply are not the right kind of relations to ground knowledge and reference". Some nomic 
or causal connections can ground these relations whereas other such connections cannot
The Epiphenomenalist can give no reason the connection between qualia and 
knowledge or utterance is the correct kind without begging the question. The cases to which 
the Epiphenomenalist must appeal are cases of perception or ostension in which the object 
perceived or ostended is ultimately a cause of the belief or utterance. These acts of 
perception or ostension are mediated, but the thing perceived or ostended is still a mediate 
cause (or perhaps more accurately one of a set of causal conditions) of the belief or act of 
referring. So, given that not all nomic or causal connections, can ground such relations, the 
Epiphenomenalist needs more than these loose analogies. The analogies «qxpealed to appear
'** How can a lack or an absence be a cause? I don’t know, but it seems to be true tbat absences can be 
causes. The absence ofoxygenm the brain causes humans to M  unconscious and ultimately die. Alack 
of careful oversight may be a  partial cause o f industrial accidents. Companies are often held responsible 
not for what they have done wrong, but for what they have foiled to do. The notion o f an absence being a 
cause is puzzling but common, and in any case not relevant here. Another example could be found if  this 
one is too puzzling.
“ Ultimately, given the Exclusion Argument, we may not be able to know or refor to the sputtering noise 
either, but this conclusion, which we can avoid if  we find something wrong with the Exclusion Argument, 
does not affect the example as a usefiil illustration o f the intuition.
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not to be relevantly similar to the case of acquaintance with and reference to epiphenomenal 
qualia."
My argument here is not the 6Uacy that because these two things, the sputtering and 
the missing belt, are not both known to me, they are not identical. The argument is just that, 
given two distinct entities that are both nomically related in some way to my beliefs, only 
some of them are related in the correct way to ground knowledge. So, given that the entities 
are distinct, even though both have some nomic or causal relation to me, I do not necessarily 
know or refer to both.
The Epiphenomenalist may insist that, nonetheless, the relation of the quale to these 
states is one that can ground such a relation, but she cannot provide an independent reason 
(aside 6om a need to avoid the problem of mental causation) for thinking this claim is true. 
It is hard to see how one might specify the right kinds of nomic connections without simply 
begging the question one way or the other. However, given the disanalogy between the 
cases the Epiphenomenalist needs to appeal to as a model, the burden of proof should be on 
the Epiphenomenalist to show that epiphenomenal qualia are related in the correct way.
My main worry about this line of argument is that it may beg the question. I do not 
want to assume a simple causal theory of knowledge and reference, yet, when the possibilify 
of knowledge of and reference to an entity that does not fit the simple causal theory, I claim 
that it needs to mimic the simple causal theory. Thus, my argument appears to make a de 
f<Kto assumption of a simple causal theory.
"  Perhaps a strong metaphysically necessary relation between the epqthenomenal qualia and the belief may 
ground knowledge or reference as in Kripke’s sperm and egg designation. But the same problem can be 
raised for this view, I think. The relation between a new person, an effect o f common causes that 
metaphysically necessitate that person’s existence, may be analogous to the relation o f qualia to the 
physical, but it seems in these cases that we have to know that the necessary connection holds for the 
attempted reference to hold. Whether such knowle(%e is possible is still very much at issue.
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My response to this worry is that it is incorrect There are reasonable exceptions to 
these causal theories. Abstract fictional, and nonexistent entities all appear to be exceptions 
to simple causal theories of knowledge and reference. That we can know and refer to some 
or all of these entities shows that a simple causal theory is not correct or at least not 
comprehensive. However, as I have noted, epiphenomenal qualia do not fit any of these 
models. Thus, the Epiphenomenalist needs to give some reason to expand the class of 
entities we can know and refer to include epiphenomena, and 1 do not see how she could 
accomplish this task. My argument, then, does not assume a de fiu:to simple causal theory, 
but merely demands a reason to include a problematic new category to those categories that 
already provide exceptions to the simple causal theory.
6.7 Type-B and Token>E Revisited
One point that needs to be addressed is whether these arguments are convincing 
against type Epiphenomenalism. Type-E, recall, is the view that the events do not occur in 
virtue of falling under a mental type or in virtue of their mental properties. The following 
propositions restate the argument in terms of properties.
(20) If Type-E is true, we can be neither acquainted with nor refer to the conscious 
properties, the qualitative character of the experiences, of physical events.
(21) We can be acquainted with or refer to our own conscious properties.
(22) .". Type-E is fhlse.
If we are acquainted with or refer to properties of objects as well as objects themselves, then 
the argument of this chuter affects Type-E just as it does Token-E. If we can be acquainted 
with and refer to the qualitative aspects of our experiences, treating qualia as properties, then 
those properties must be related in the right nomic or causal way. But th ^  are not related in 
the right way. Thus, Type-E is shown to be false if Token-E is.
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I think that the case of Type-E is entirely analogous to the case of Token-E. We do 
seem to be acquainted with the painfulness of our experiences, the pleasurableness of our 
sensations, and, in general, the properties o f our mental events and states. At least, we are 
directly aware of these properties or qualities of our experiences. We are able to talk about 
them and designate them rigidly. Thus, if Type-E is taken as a claim about events M ing 
under types rather than as a claim about properties, perhaps from a suspicion about 
properties, I can put the argument in less contentious terms.
(23) If Type-E is true, we cannot be acquainted with or refer to our qualia insofar 
as they are mental or conscious.
(24) We can be acquainted with or refer to our own qualia insofar as they are 
mental or conscious.
(25) .". Type-E is felse.
Whatever one's Avorite phrase for describing Type-E, the argument can be given for 
that phrasing. It seems uncontroversial that we can be acquainted with mental events in 
virtue of their falling under a mental type. In Act, most of our acquaintance with our own 
minds is in virtue of the event falling under a mental type. It does no good to object that we 
are acquainted with objects only and not properties because we still are acquainted with them 
as mental. We can still refer to our mental events or states qua conscious events. To deny 
this claim is to deny a fact as obvious as that we are acquainted with our own minds at all, 
but we could not be acquainted or refer if the nomic or causal relation between the qualia 
and the physical state is not of the right sort. Thus, Type-E does not avoid the argument 
against Epiphenomenalism as I have fiamed it in this chapter.
6.8 Conclusion
I have argued in this chapter that Qualia Epiphenomenalism must be &lse. Causal or 
nomic correlations are not enough to ground knowledge and reference, and we have no good
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reason to think that the relations of epiphenomenal qualia to our belief and acts of referring 
are of this correct sort This argument is not a knock-down argument against 
Epiphenomenalism. It is possible that the nomic or causal relation involved in 
Epiphenomenalism really is the right kind to ground these relations. However, this argument 
does show that Epiphenomenalism is most likely false. Epiphenomenalism is not likely to 
be the best available option in solving the problem of mental causation.
I have some qualms about arguing a priori that the mental must have causal power. 
Ordinarily we discover from experience whether some event is a cause or some property is 
causally relevant to the production of an effect; a priori considerations should not in general 
tell us whether a property is causally relevant to an effect However, a priori considerations 
might tell us whether it is possible for some property to be completely causally irrelevant In 
addition, the argument for the causal relevance of the mind does rely on some empirical 
evidence. The argument reÜM, for example, on the facts that we know and can refer to our 
own minds. These claims, I suppose, could be shown empirically to be false although the 
evidence for them seems to be so overwhelming as to need no argument
The most promising solution, then, to the problem o f mental causation, as it is 
presented by the Exclusion Argument is to find this argument unsound, to find reason to 
reject one of its premises or to show that the conclusion does not follow from the premises. 
Two of the premises of the Exclusion Argument are especially controversial. Thus, the goal 
of the remaining part of this work, chapters seven and eight is to consider whether either of 
these controversial premises o f the Exclusion Argument might be false, and fidse in a way 
that allows for mental causation. So, in chapter seven, I will argue that although the 
supervenience thesis is almost certainly false, that fiict provides no mechanism for the
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mental to be causally relevant, and so cannot help in solving the problem of mental 
causation. In chapter eight I will argue that the Exclusion Principle is fidse for closely 
related sets of properties, and so the mental can be causally relevant if it is closely related to 
the physical.
ISl
PARTin
P r e m is e s  o f  t h e  E x c l u s io n  a r g u m e n t  
O v er v iew
In previous chapters I have carefully analyzed the Exclusion Argument and the 
problem it raises for the possibility of mental causation. In the previous part of this 
work, chapters four through six, 1 argued that Epiphenomenalism could not be correct. If 
Epiphenomenalism is not correct, then the Exclusion Argument must be unsound. It is 
now time to investigate the validity of the Exclusion Argument and the truth of its 
premises.
1 have characterized the Exclusion Argument in its most general physicalist form 
as follows.
1. Dualism. The mental and the physical are real.
2. Irreducibility. The mental and physical are not type identical.
3. Supervenience. The mental supervenes on or is determined by the physical.
4. Causal Closure o f the Physical. No physical effect can occur without a physical cause or 
except in virtue of a physical property of its cause.
5. Generative/Determinative Exclusion Principle. For any effect or property, there can be 
only one complete, independent cause or set of causally relevant properties.
6. Mental causation is not a case of causal overdetermination.
7. Conclusion; Epiphenomenalism. The mental is not causally relevant to the production 
of any effect
These premises lead to the conclusion that the mental is epiphenomenal in the 
following way. The mental and physical are real entities that are not type-identical (1) 
and (2). The physical can only be caused by something physical (4), so there is no 
independent downwards causation from the mental to the physical. The mental is 
determined by the physical (3), so the mental effect is determined by the physical. Thus, 
the physical determines all the effects there are, both mental and physical, and, since
152
when there is one complete, independent cause, there cannot be another (5), the mental 
must be causally irrelevant
I argued in the previous part of this work that we cannot accept 
Epiphenomenalism, the conclusion of the Exclusion Argument It follows from this that 
either at least one of the premises of the Exclusion Argument is false or the argument is 
invalid. If a premise is false, importantly, it must be false in a way that allows for mental 
causation.
The most frequently questioned of the premises are the Irreducibility of the 
mental to the physical, the Supervenience o f the mental on the physical, and the 
Exclusion Principle itself. The irreducibility thesis has been criticized and defended at 
length elsewhere'. At least some of that criticism, and the most effective to my mind, 
arises directly from the Exclusion Argument^ and worries about mental causation. Part 
of the purpose o f this work is to defend Nonreductive Physicalism against this 
reductionist attack. If I can defend Nonreductive Physicalism, which assumes 
Irreducibility, against the problem of mental causation, then there is no need to argue 
further for the Irreducibility thesis. Thus, I will not discuss the irreducibility of the 
mental to the physical any further.
The Causal Closure of the Physical has only infrequently been defended. Kim 
(1996 and elsewhere) defends it by claiming that it is a basic presupposition of 
Physicalism, that to deny it is to deny the completeness o f physics and to postulate 
mysterious entelechies and downwards causation. Further, he argues that the in-principle 
incompleteness o f physics makes it impossible to study physics alone without including
‘ Critics o f irreducibility include Bickle (1992), Chuichland (1984), Kim (1992 and 1993b), and Searle 
(1992). Defenders include Fodor(1974), Peieboom and Komblith (1991).
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some element of psychology or other higher-order discipline. On the other hand, some in 
the popular media have sought to deny the Causal Closure o f the Physical, but the 
mechanisms they have postulated are lacking in plausibility. Although a more detailed 
discussion of these issues is warranted, I will not address the question here. I will, 
instead, focus on two premises that are more controversial.
Philosophers have given reason to doubt two other premises, the Supervenience 
thesis and the Exclusion Principle. In the chapters that follow, I will address the 
possibility that these principles might be false, and see if their falsity can allow for some 
mechanism by means of which the mental might be causally relevant.
 ^I have in mind Kim (1993b).
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C h a p t e r ?
Superv en ience  a nd  M en ta l  C a u sa tio n
7.1 Introduction
In this chapter I will examine whether the falsity of the Supervenience Thesis can 
allow for mental causation. 1 will explore some reasons that one might give for thinking 
mental or content properties do not supervene on physical properties. Then 1 will 
consider whether any of these reasons for failure of supervenience allows for mental 
causation. My thesis is that, although the Supervenience Thesis is almost certainly false, 
at least for content properties, this failure of supervenience does not allow for content, or 
the mental, to be causally relevant.
Probably the most common and appealing response to the Exclusion Argument is 
to argue for a dual-explanandum^ view. A dual-explanandum view of mental explanation 
is that the mental and physical are two different domains requiring separate explanations. 
Behavior and some mental effects can be caused and explained by the mental whereas 
mere bodily movements and physical effects require only physical causes and 
explanations. The dual-explanandum theory’s postulation of two separate sets of 
explanations, and given explanatory realism, the dualism that entails, fits nicely with our 
commonsense and scientific explanatory practice. And dual-explanandum theories, as 
they surely ought, allow our mental and special science explanations to remain as real 
and scientifically respectable as physics explanations. Moreover, these theories do not 
buy mental causation by postulating any mysterious downwards causation. O f the
'  **DuaI-«(pIaiianduin,’* rather than “duai-explananda” or "dual explanans" is Kim’s (1991) preferred term. 
The choice o f nomenclature does not matter. I will follow his usage merely for consistent.
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possible solutions to the problem of mental causation, dual-explanandum theories best fit 
our scientific practice and general physicalist commitments.
However, dual-explanandum views founder on the two principles of 
Supervenience and Exclusion. If the mental supervenes on the physical, then the mental 
is determined by the physical, and so there is no need to postulate this extra causal power 
for the mental. There may be two explananda, but if supervenience obtains, then there is 
only one explanans. And, according to the Exclusion Principle, because there is already 
one cause (or explanation) there cannot be another. So, dual-explanandum theories, 
although they meet our intuitions best of the possible theories o f mental causation, are 
incompatible with these two premises of the Exclusion Argument. So, for one to accept a 
dual-explanandum theory, one must reject at least one of these premises.
As we noted in chapters two and three, there are several different varieties of or 
ways of formulating supervenience. The three most common types o f supervenience are 
weak, strong and global supervenience, each formulated as relations between sets of 
properties. Weak and strong supervenience are both construed as local supervenience 
claims. Kim formulates these claims as follows.
Weak supervenience:
Necessarily, for any object x and any property F in A, if x has F, then there exists a 
property G in B such that x has G, and üf any y has G it has F. (1987b, reprinted 
1993a, 80)
Strong siqtervenience:
Necessarily, for any object x and any property F in A, if x has F, then there exists a 
property G in B such that x has G, and necessarily if any y has G it has F. (1987b, 
reprinted 1993,80)
Global supervenience:
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Any two worlds indiscernible with respect to B-properties are indiscernible with 
respect to A-properties. (1987b, reprinted 1993a, 82)
I argued in chapters two and three that strong supervenience was closest to 
capturing our intuitive notion of the dependence of the mental on the physical. I also 
argued that, given the common belief that causal relevance requires necessitation of 
effects, strong supervenience is necessary for the Exclusion Argument to be valid. Thus, 
when I discuss failure of supervenience, I will generally mean failure of strong 
supervenience. However, the first two reasons I give for failure of supervenience will 
affect all of the supervenience claims. The third reason 1 give will affect only the first 
two, weak and strong, but will still allow for global supervenience to obtain.
The failure of mental content to supervene provides an intuitive way of 
overcoming this problem for a dual-explanandum view. Failure of supervenience seems 
to allow for an autonomous domain, behavior or the mental, which is not determined, or 
not fully determined, by the physical. Thus, the mental could cause mental effects or 
behavior, and the physical could cause physical effects and pure bodily movements. If 
these two domains are autonomous, then the Exclusion Argument could not exclude 
either firom causal relevance. I will conclude that even though it is likely that the mental 
or mental content does not supervene on the physical, no mechanism is adequate for the 
mental to be causally relevant
I will give three reasons one might reject the supervenience thesis. I will explain 
how each of these reasons might support a dual-explanandum theory. Finally, I will 
show that, for each of these reasons, the dual-explanandum theory cannot provide an 
adequate theory of mental causation.
7.2 Cfiticbm of Supervenience
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Several philosophers* suggest that the solution to the problem o f mental causation 
may rest on the failure of the mental to supervene on the physical. Three types of 
evidence suggest that mental properties do not supervene on physical properties. For any 
of these reasons for failure of supervenience to allow for mental causation, there must be 
some dual-explanandum theory that takes advantage of this failure of supervenience. For 
failure of supervenience to allow for mental causation, there must be two explananda that 
require separate explanations. I will examine what dual-explanandum theories might 
appeal to each of the reasons for failure of supervenience.
First, the conceivability of absent or inverted qualia is sometimes thought to entail 
the logical possibility of failure of phenomenal properties to supervene on the physical. 
Second, the failure of properties of quantum systems to supervene on properties of parts 
of these systems may provide some reason to doubt that the mental supervenes on the 
physical. Third, the role of context in individuation of content and special science 
properties shows that these properties do not supervene on local physical properties.
7J. Consciousness
To solve the problem of mental causation each of these possible reasons for 
rejection of supervenience must support a theory of mental causation. One might appeal 
to a failure of supervenience for consciousness to support a dual-explanandum view of 
conscious effects. For example, if  my conscious mental states are not determined by the 
physical, then logical space exists for the mental to cause these conscious mental states. 
My pain may be causally relevant to my conscious knowledge of it on this view, but my 
pain does not cause my behavior since my behavior supervenes on die physical actions I
* Baker(1993) rqects supervenience and any other metaphysical commitment Menzies (1988) rejects 
what he calls “causal reductionism” or supervenience o f causal powers.
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make. Jackson (1982), for example, allows for a dual-explanandum view involving 
mental-to-mental causal relevance because he believes that pure Epiphenomenalism 
would raise problems of knowing our own minds.
Jackson’s dual-explanandum view, as other such views do, conflicts with the 
Supervenience thesis and the Exclusion Principle. For example, if our knowledge of our 
own minds is determined by the physical, then there is no need for a mental cause of this 
knowledge. And if there is already a cause of the knowledge, then there cannot be 
another, conscious, cause of it. Jackson’s view, then, can only work if one of these 
premises, the Supervenience thesis or the Exclusion Principle, is rejected.
Jackson and other qualia boosters appear to have a ready response to this 
problem, however. As noted above, the first possible reason to think the mental does not 
supervene on the physical is that, as some philosophers (e.g. recently Chalmers 1996) 
have argued, it is conceivable, and therefore logically possible, that phenomenal 
properties do not supervene on physical properties. Absent qualia (or in Chalmers’s 
terms "qualia zombies’*) and inverted qualia cases seem conceivable^.
It is conceivable that one could have the very same physical or functional states 
that one actually has but have no correlated conscious, qualitative or phenomenal state. 
For example, Fred hits his thumb with a hammer; his nervous system sends a signal to 
his brain; his C-fibers fire; and he feels a sensation of pain in his thumb. The intuition 
behind absent qualia cases is that it is logically possible that all those physical or 
functional effects occur to Fred, but Fred feels nothing at all. It seems conceivable' that
'  K i^ke’s (1972) modal argumoit against type and token identity theories can be seen as a land o f absent 
qualia argument
* One might claim that nothing that is logically impossible is really conceivable but only apparently 
conceivable. The basic point can be matte assuming that these cases are only apparently conceivable.
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he have all the same physical or functional states but not feel anything at all, or at any 
rate, his physical or functional states may have no qualitative or subjective feel. These 
cases are sometimes called “absent qualia” cases because we imagine that one has a 
physical or functional state but these states lack qualitative content.
Inverted qualia cases are that it is conceivable that a person might have the same 
physical or functional states as anyone else actually has, but these states have a different 
qualitative feel for this person. Thus, Fred might have green sensations when looking at 
red objects and vice versa. So, he might look at a ripe tomato and have the qualitative 
sensation that Ted has when Ted looks at a something green, say the grass in his well- 
tended front lawn. Both the absent qualia and the inverted qualia cases claim that qualia 
are conceivably different even with the same underlying physical state. Qualia, if these 
cases are genuinely possible, do not supervene on physical or functional states. The 
claim that conceivability entails logical possibility is, to the say the least, contentious and 
1 do not wish to support or contradict it here, but any philosopher who accepts the logical 
possibility of phenomenal properties differing without a difference in physical properties 
would deny that the mental supervenes on the physical.
It is one thing to deny supervenience of qualia on the physical but another to 
show how this failure of supervenience may allow for mental causation. Supplementing 
Jackson’s dual-explanandum theory for qualia with a rejection of only the Supervenience 
thesis entails that the only things that could be caused by the mental would be those 
things that did not supervene on the physical. This means that, since consciousness fails 
to supervene, only conscious, qualitative effects could have mental causes. So, Jackson’s 
dual-explanandum view appears to solve the problem of mental causation by appealing
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only to the failure o f supervenience of conscious mental events on physical events, a 
failure that he, or at least other qualia boosters, may accept
However, there are several problems with this theory. First this solution depends 
on the contentious claim that conceivability entails logical possibility. This problem is 
quite serious, but I will ignore it to avoid going too far afield. Even if this claim is 
correct other problems threaten this solution. Second, this solution may not avoid the 
problems of reference that full-blooded Epiphenomenalism had. Third, since this view 
appeals to failure of supervenience only for logical necessity but not nomic necessity, it 
does not help with the problem of mental causation since causation is only a nomic 
relation. Fourth, this solution does not give the kind of mental causation we want. Fifth, 
this theory seems to involve a mysterious parallelism between the conscious and the 
physical or panpsychism. Avoiding both of these problems seems to lead one directly 
back to the problem of mental causation.
Jackson (1982) postulates a limited Epiphenomenalism, which I am here 
suggesting is a kind of dual-explanandum view, in which the mental can be causally 
relevant at least to our beliefs. Jackson thinks causal relevance of the mental is necessary 
for us to know our own minds. Assuming a failure of supervenience as an auxiliary 
hypothesis^ one might make room for causal power of the mental only if the knowledge 
or beliefs one has about it are not themselves determined by the physical. If we assume 
that conscious mental states do not supervene on the physical, then we should think only 
that conscious mental states can have mental causes. If the other premises o f the 
Exclusion Argument are true, then the only room for causal relevance of our minds is for
I do not know whether Jackson would conunit to this additioiud hypothesis.
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the mind to be causally relevant to events or properties which are not determined by the 
physical.
For one to accept this solution, based on this proposed dual-explanandum view, 
one should expect the theory to solve the problems of knowledge of one’s own mind that 
prompted Jackson’s limitation on Epiphenomenalism in the first place. If  knowledge is a 
conscious mental state, then this dual-explanandum view does solve that problem. If 
knowledge is conscious, on this view, it fails to supervene on the physical. And if 
knowledge fails to supervene on the physical, then it can be caused by the mental without 
violating the Exclusion Principle. Thus, if knowledge is conscious, on this view, the 
mental can be causally relevant to our knowledge of i t
It is not obvious that this dual-explanandum theory will solve all the problems 
associated with Epiphenomenalism. Knowledge is not always conscious. Procedural 
knowledge, or know-how, seems to be largely unconscious. Perhaps even some 
propositional knowledge is unconscious, if we can have unconscious beliefs. Moreover, 
additional problems beset Epiphenomenalism that are not addressed by this solution. 
Specifically, Epiphenomenalism is incompatible with our ability to refer to our own 
mental states, but our ability to refer is not itself a conscious state (although some acts of 
reference may be conscious). So, a dual-explanandum view, based roughly on Jackson’s 
idea that the mind can be causally relevant at least to first-person knowledge of it, only 
avoids some of problems with Epiphenomenalism. This dual-explanandum theory avoids 
problems of conscious knowledge of our own minds but not problems of reference to our 
own minds.
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The third problem is that mental causation is only a nomic relation, so this reason 
for rejecting supervenience does not provide logical space for mental causation. 
Conceivability of absent or inverted qualia cases provide reason for rejecting 
supervenience only for logically necessary coimections between the mental and the 
physical. The conceivability objection does not provide reason to reject claims of nomic 
necessity. It may be logically possible that qualia differ without a physical difference, 
but it is not, at least on this view, nomically possible that qualia differ without a physical 
difference. Since causation is only a nomic relation, this theory provides no room for the 
mental to be causally relevant since in all nomically possible worlds, the mental is still 
determined by the physical. The mental still supervenes strongly on the physical, on this 
view, when the strength of the modal operators is only nomic not logical necessity. Thus, 
this conceivability objection provides no solution to the problem o f mental causation.
The fourth problem is that this solution does not give the kind of mental causation 
that we want. If logical space is made for mental causation by a failure of conscious 
states to supervene on the physical, then this theory only allows for the mental to cause 
conscious mental events. It does not allow for the mental to cause behavior or other 
nonconscious events. Thus, on this view, since my act of getting a beer is not itself a 
conscious event, my desire for a beer does not cause me to get a beer. My desire for a 
beer can only cause other mental events, like my knowledge or conscious belief that I 
desire a beer. So, this solution allows for only some mental causation and not all the 
mental causation we want
The fifth problem is that this view seems to involve a mysterious parallelism 
between the mental and physical and, perhaps, panpsychism as well. I f  consciousness is
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not hooked up to the physical in some way, then it is an extraordinary accident that 
consciousness correlates as it does with brain states. Moreover, the view suggests 
panpsychism. If the mental can be causally relevant because there is logical space for 
conscious states that are undetermined, then this theory suggests that any causes for 
conscious events are mental causes.
However, not all qualia have mental causes. Some conscious events, assumed for 
the sake of argument not to be physical events, say Tim’s pain, are caused by physical 
events, events with no mental properties at all. For example, a rock falling on Tim’s 
head causes him pain, which, on this view, does not supervene on the physical state that 
underlies i t  Tim’s pain is not determined, therefore, by the rock falling on his head. But 
if this is correct, either Tim’s pain is accidentally correlated with the rock falling on his 
head or Tim’s pain is caused by some nonphysical event correlated with the rock’s 
falling. Neither of these possibilities is at all plausible. The first possibility suggests a 
mysterious parallelism between the mental and the physical. The second possibility 
suggests panpsychism. Thus, it must be that the rock’s falling on Tim’s head really 
causes his pain. Physical causation or determination of some conscious events allows for 
the world to hook up to conscious events to avoid panpsychism. Physical determination 
of some conscious events avoids the problem of parallelism for some but not all 
conscious events. But the idea that the physical determines some conscious events 
contradicts this theory’s solution to the problem of mental causation. That solution 
depended on a failure of supervenience or determination of consciousness by the 
physical.
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Moreover, if Tim’s pain can be caused by a physical event, we have no reason to 
think that other mental events require mental causes rather than physical causes. If 
conscious mental events can be caused by physical events, even though it is logically 
possible that the conscious event is not determined by any physical event, there is no 
reason to think any conscious mental event needs a mental cause. For every conscious 
event, like Tim’s pain, we are faced with a similar dilemma in deciding whether the event 
has a physical cause or correlate. It seems from neuroscientific evidence that every 
conscious event has some physical correlate. We must conclude either that each physical 
correlate is sufficient for the conscious event or that only some physical correlates are 
sufficient for conscious events. If we take the former horn of the dilemma, we no longer 
have a solution to the problem of mental causation. If the physical correlate is sufficient, 
then the conscious state is determined, and we no longer have logical space for it to have 
a mental cause. If we take the latter horn of the dilemma, then we need some theory for 
why some conscious events are determined by physical correlates and others are not. It 
is hard to see how one would begin formulating such a theory. Thus, this solution does 
not provide a reason to think the putative mental causes really are causally relevant.
So, supporting a dual-explanandum view for consciousness with the claim that 
qualia do not supervene on their physical realization will not provide a solution to the 
problem of mental causation. Even if the contentious claim that conceivability entails 
logical possibility were true, several apparently insurmountable problems would remain. 
These arguments seem obvious enough that this suggested solution should have been a 
nonstarter, and these arguments against it belabored the obvious. Nonetheless, the idea 
of a limited Epiphenomenalism, or a dual-explanandum view, that avoided some of the
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problems with a full-blooded Epiphenomenalism seemed tempting. The only way to 
make use of this idea without rejecting the Exclusion Principle is to appeal to a failure of 
supervenience. These reasons for failure of supervenience do not provide a solution one 
can live with. So, we must look to other reasons for a failure of supervenience to provide 
a dual-explanandum response to the problem of mental causation.
7.4 Quantum Holism
The second reason one might have for doubting that the mental supervenes on the 
physical comes from quantum mechanics. Certain quantum systems have determinate 
properties although parts of those systems lack locally determinate properties'. For 
example, two particles emitted in opposite directions would individually lack determinate 
momenta, but, because of conservation of momentum laws, the two-particle system has a 
determinate net momentum of zero. Some quantum systems, thus, have holistic 
properties; whole systems have determinate properties while their parts lack locally 
determinate properties.
One might believe that the mind is itself a quantum system, as Eccles (1994), 
Popper and Eccles (1977), and Penrose (1989) apparently do. This response is 
implausible because it would appear to involve mysterious nonphysical mental forces 
acting directly on other mental events. The possibility that mental entities directly affect 
other mental entities without any physical implementing mechanism is quite mysterious 
and appears to involve direct causation from one ghostly entity to another. Moreover, 
since some quantum effects are, apparently, irreducibly random, this view would have
'  The caveat that the mdividual particles lack locally determinate properties is important The individual 
particles may have determinate properties relative to a measurement as claimed by Bohr’s Copenhagen 
Interpretation, but the measurement apparatus is nota local proper^ of the particle. Supervenience, as we 
have interpreted i t  requires local physical properties as a stqiervenience base.
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mental events occurring randomly. Since our thoughts and actions certainly do not 
appear to be random, the mind does not seem to be a quantum system. Thus, appeals to 
direct quantum effects of the mind are implausible.
A more plausible interpretation of this quantum holism is that the failure of 
fundamental features of the world to supervene on their parts should shake our 
confidence in the reductionism philosophers often read into science. Perhaps the world is 
rife with failures of supervenience, the claim goes, so reasonable naturalists should not 
conclude that every layer of the putative hierarchical organization of the world 
supervenes on the one below; nor should philosophers conclude that all special science 
properties are determined by their realization bases.
A dual-explanandum theorist could take advantage of this failure of 
supervenience by appealing to a hierarchical series of causes each independent of the one 
below i t  I will call this view a “holist dual-explanandum” view. Thus, the mental could 
cause the mental because no physical (or chemical or biological) cause determined the 
mental. Because Fred’s action of getting a beer does not supervene on any locally 
determinate properties of the parts of his action, it becomes possible that his desire for a 
beer can cause his action. The layered structure of the world, thus, could involve a 
layered set of causal relations, each independent of those below.
There are two problems with this theory. First, the evidence for this theory of the 
structure of the world is weak. Adducing any remotely conclusive evidence for or 
against this interpretation of the evidence from quantum holism goes far beyond the 
scope of this work, and is, perhaps, not yet empirically available. However, there is some 
reason to think this anti-reductionist worry is not well-supported by the existing
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evidence. These Allures of local determinism in quantum mechanics have seemed so 
implausible as to be nearly inconqirehensible. Many respectable physicists, including 
most notably Einstein, were simply unable to accqpt the failure of local determinism. 
The very revolutionary nature of the evidence from quantum mechanics suggests that 
such Allures o f local determinism are not conunon in the sciences. Essentially, quantum 
mechanics raised such problems for a realist view of the world precisely because such 
radical failures of supervenience are extremely rare and were previously unseen.
Moreover, extensive evidence &om neuroscience involves perfectly determinate 
properties of the brain-activation of certain neural centers, release of certain 
neurotransmitters, damage to specific areas of the brain—that correlate with determinate 
mental properties. Thus, at least in the case that most interests us, the case of mental 
causation, the evidence suggests that brain properties are determinate and, therefore, the 
evidence suggests that quantum holism does not provide reason to reject supervenience 
of the mental on the brain’.
The second problem with appeal to quantum holism is that, even if this theory 
were correct, it would not provide a good theory of mental causation. First, we need to 
be clear on how this theory might allow for mental causation. On this theory, the brain, 
or parts of it, would not have determinate properties at the same time that the mind had 
determinate properties. For example, I could have a pain but my brain, or parts of it, may 
have no determinate property corresponding to that pain. In addition, my belief that I am 
in pain, or perhaps my pain behavior, would also be determinate while the underlying 
brain states or physical movements would not be determinate. Thus, on this view, my
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pain could cause my belief that I am in pain without any brain states determining the 
belief because, in fact, there are no determinate brain states to determine the belief. For 
quantum holism to allow for mental causation, mental items would have to be 
determinate without determinate brain states, and those mental items could cause or 
quause other mental items or behavior for which there is no determinate underlying 
items. Evidence from quantum holism seems to allow for a dual-explanandum view of 
mental causation.
This holist dual-explanandum theory leads to the same worries (from section 7.3) 
about parallelism and panpsychism that the theory based on failure of consciousness to 
supervene on the physical did. The parallelism objection is that it appears that the mental 
correlates mysteriously with the underlying physical or brain properties. The 
panpsychism objection is that if the only reason we can give for mental events to be 
causally relevant is that events occur that do not have physical determiners, then external 
causes of mental events appear to be themselves mental. This possibility suggests that 
mental events properties occur external to anyone. These problems suggest that a holist 
dual-explanandum view will not allow for mental causation.
The parallelism objection to the holist dual-explanandum view is that the 
correlation between mental and physical items appears completely mysterious. If  there is 
no determination from the physical to the mental or mental to physical, then it is 
mysterious how our mental lives correspond so closely to the activities of our brains. On 
this view, no determinate physical events correlate with the mental or macroscopic event, 
so there is nothing physical for our mental lives to correspond to. The holist dual-
’ It might be argued that this evidence is only evidence for observed properties o f the brain. Once the brain 
is observed, even on the quantum theorist" s view, the brain has determinate properties. But this brain
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explanandum view appears to avoid this problem, but the attempt to avoid it raises other 
problems.
This response raises problems of its own. First, mental events or properties really 
do correspond to brain events or properties. The evidence 6om neuroscience, for 
example from PET (Positron Emission Tomography) scans that allow for observation of 
activity in the brain while the subject is conscious, shows a correspondence between the 
mental and brain activity. The holist dual-explanandum theorist would have to respond 
that PET scans provide examples only of observed brain activity, not simply brain 
activity. The evidence from quantum mechanics is that physical properties are 
indeterminate only until observed. So, the case of correspondence between the mental 
and the brain during a PET scan cannot count against the view because the view only 
claims that unobserved brain events have no determinate properties.
However, this response is inadequate because it implies that mental events could 
not be causes when the brain events are being observed. For example, the brain event 
underlying my belief that I am in pain is completely determinate when my brain is 
observed, so my belief, in those circumstances, is completely determined by the brain. 
So, assuming the Exclusion Principle, my pain cannot also determine my belief that I am 
in pain. So, on this holist dual-explanandum view, the mental would become 
epiphenomenal whenever the brain is observed. But the problems with 
Epiphenomenalism are quite general and apply even when one is undergoing a PET scan. 
Thus, the holist dual-explanandum view only avoids the parallelism objection by 
supposing that mental events are undetermined only when their underlying brain events
research has not discovered any o f the indeterminacy efkcts that make quantum mechanics so mysterious.
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are unobserved, but that implies that Epiphenomenalism is true when the brain states are 
observed.
The problem of panpsychism is that the holist dual-explanandum view appears to 
countenance mental entities external to brains. Many mental (or special science) events 
are caused by physical (or lower level) events. To repeat the example from 7.3, a 
physical event, a rock falling on Tim’s head, may cause a mental event, Tim’s pain. To 
think that Tim’s pain is not caused by the rock we must either think that Tim’s pain and 
the rock falling on his head are accidentally correlated in some mysterious way or we 
must think that Tim’s pain was caused by some mental event correlated with the rock’s 
falling. We have already discussed the problem of parallelism. The other solution is to 
suggest that the rock has some mental property or that its falling is somehow a mental 
event. This view is panpsychist; it countenances mental properties in rocks and other 
physical objects that we do not think of as mental. Since panpsychism is unacceptable, 
some mental events must have physical, nonmental, causes or determiners. But it is 
mysterious why some mental and behavioral effects have mental causes and others do 
not, on this view. If the mental is not required to cause mental events, like Tim’s pain, 
then it is hard to see why the mental is necessary as a cause for any mental event. One 
could attempt to give some theory explaining why a mental cause is necessary for some 
event but not others, but it is hard to imagine how such a theory would go. So, even if 
this somewhat dubious inference from quantum holism to a general claim about the 
structure of the world, the holist dual-explanandum view, were correct, it would not 
provide a plausible way for mental causation to occur. We should, then, reject theories 
of mental causation based on evidence from quantum holism.
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7.5 Individuation by Context
The third, and best accepted, type of evidence for a failure of supervenience 
involves individuation of the mental or special sciences at least in part by context. I will 
not yet describe a particular dual-explanandum theory which might take advantage of this 
failure because so many dual-explanandum theories have been proposed. Instead I will 
first describe the evidence that, because of the context-dependence of at least some 
content or mental properties or events, the mental does not supervene on the physical.
Evidence of the role of context in individuating content or other properties only 
shows that weak and strong supervenience fail for these properties. Context can be fixed 
by fixing all the physical properties and their distribution for a world. So the following 
evidence constitutes a reason to reject weak and strong supervenience but no reason to 
reject global supervenience.
The first main area of evidence involves mental content. Mental content 
properties do not supervene on neurophysiological (physical) properties. For example, 
Putnam (1975) has argued that meanings 'ain't in the head.’ The meaning of my thought 
that ‘water is wet’ is not individuated by what is in my head, either physiologically or 
psychologically, but by my causal relations to the physical substance H2O. A person 
with a physiologically and psychologically indiscernible brain on Twin Earth in which 
the lakes are filled with some other chemical, say XYZ, would have thoughts about XYZ 
and not H;0. So, the meaning o f my word, ‘water’ and the meaning o f whatever token 
occurs in my brain, say #water#, is individuated not by local physical properties of mine, 
for example my neurophysiology, but by the causal context in which my word or thought
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occurs. Putnam’s examples are widely thought to show that meaning cannot be 
individuated by local physical properties'".
Burge (1979) argues that mental content, such as the belief that I have arthritis, is 
individuated (at least in part) by the society of which I am a part. Meanings of mental 
tokens are fixed by the society, so whether my thought ’I have arthritis,’ is actually the 
thought that I have arthritis or whether it is the thought that 1 have some different 
ailment, which we can call tharthritis, is individuated by facts about the society of which 
I am a part. Pumam’s and Burge’s arguments show that mental content or meaning of 
mental tokens does not supervene on local physical properties.
Davidson (1986) has argued that intentional states, such as beliefs and desires, are 
individuated by causal relations to objects in the world". For example, a molecule-for- 
molecule duplicate of me that comes into existence in the middle of a swamp by a cosmic 
accident could not have the desire to visit Vienna because it has no causal relation to 
Vienna. I may have the desire to visit Vienna because I am causally related to Vienna, 
but my double is not so related to Vienna. Davidson adds the claim that mental content 
individuates mental states like beliefs, desires and thoughts. Since the content of these 
states does not supervene on local physical states, the states themselves do not supervene
The original purpose o f the example was to show the anti>Fregean point that there can be no one thing 
that is both the meaning o f a term and the thing we grasp when we understand the term. The example o f 
water and twin-water makes this point The stronger conclusion above is widely thought to follow as well.
' ' This claim appears to contradict Davidson’s (1970) claim that the mental weakly supervenes on the 
physical. I do not know whether he sees these claims as contradictory. According to weak supervenience, 
as long as beings in the same world share the same physical properties, they have the same mental 
properties, but there is no necessity that beings in other possible worlds that share physical properties with 
beings in the acttial world should have the same mental properties as beings in the actual world. As long as 
the swamp-thing is a merely possible individual, then there is no outright contradiction with weak 
supervenience. This move seems implausible, however, and it seems unlikely that Davidson would adopt 
i t  Moreover, supervenience fits uneasily with Davidson’s radical interpretation as hutividuattve o f mental 
states because it is easily possible on that view for there to be a change in interpretation without a physical 
change.
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on the physical. One could have difTerent intentional, and hence mental, states without 
having different local physical states. Davidson, thus, is committed to a claim that goes 
beyond those of Putnam and Burge. He must be committed to the claim that the mental 
does not supervene on the physical because the content does not supervene on the 
physical. Whatever Davidson’s additional commitments, three independent, and 
apparently convincing, arguments make the case that mental content does not supervene 
on local physical properties.
In addition, at least some special science properties do not supervene on their 
realization bases. Fodor (1974) argues that special sciences and their laws are 
autonomous of the implementing mechanism. Fodor argues that laws of special sciences 
like economics require appeals to properties that are multiply realizable in 
heterogeneously disjunct physical states. No single type of physical property is likely to 
pick out the properties necessary for laws of economics. For example, laws of economics 
appeal to money, and money is not identical with any type of physical item. Wampum, 
credit cards, and green pieces of paper have no physical properties in common that might 
be relevant to their being money. So, money is not reducible (i.e. identical) to any 
physical type.
A further conclusion one might draw is that money is individuated contextually. 
Given Fodor’s examples, it appears that special sciences may appeal to context- 
dependent properties. Not only do realizations of money not have any physical property 
in common, no physical property is sufficient for something to be money. Money is 
individuated by its role in society. Green pieces of paper indistinguishable from
Davidson’s thought experiment here may be the weakest ofthethiee arguments. Some 
philosophers simply do not share Davidson’s intuition in this case.
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American dollar bills would not be money in other contexts. So, money does not 
supervene on any local physical properties. Two objects could be indiscernible in all 
local physical details but one could be money because it occurs in one context, and 
another might not be money because it occurs in a different context So, the special 
sciences often appeal to real properties that do not supervene locally on physical 
properties. So, Fodor’s (1974) argument for the irreducibility and autonomy of the 
special sciences provides a reason to reject the supervenience of the special science 
properties, including mental properties since psychology is a special science, on their 
physical realizations.
A minimal conclusion of these arguments is that at least content properties and 
possibly some mental properties do not supervene on local physical properties. Instead, 
these special science or content properties are individuated at least in part by the context 
in which they occur. For my thought to be a water-thought requires that I be in the 
correct context. Whether the context is a causal-historical or social context does not 
matter for the discussion here. Whatever theory, if any, turns out to be correct, content 
properties are not individuated locally; they depend on some sort of context My further 
conclusion &om Fodor’s argument shows that it is possible that mental properties, insofar 
as they are fixed by their context, fail to supervene on local physical properties.
As I noted in the first chapter of this work, there are often thought to be three 
distinct problems of mental causation for Nonreductive Physicalism. These problems 
are, first, the problem generated by Davidson’s Anomalous Monism, second, the problem 
generated by the extrinsic nature of mental content, and third, the problem of mental 
causation generated by the Exclusion Argument. The second problem is the one mainly
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concerned with mental content as individuated widely or extrinsically. Thus, the 
extrinsic nature of mental content is often thought to raise the problem of mental 
causation rather than solve it.
One could make the latter two arguments part of a single argument in dilemma 
form (as Kim [1998] does). If content is intrinsic, then it supervenes on the physical and 
thus the Exclusion Argument shows that it is causally irrelevant. If content is extrinsic, 
then it does not supervene on the physical, and because all causation is local, extrinsic 
content is causally irrelevant. Either way, content is causally irrelevant. Thus, although 
it is tempting to separate these two problems here, it is important to the problem of 
mental causation to show that a solution to one problem does not simply land one in the 
middle of the other problem.
7.6 Some Inadequate Solutions
As 1 have argued, for a dual-explanandum theory to be correct, it must include a 
rejection either of the Supervenience thesis or the Exclusion Principle. Any of these 
reasons for the failure of supervenience would give reason to reject the Exclusion 
Argument as unsound, but they do not necessarily provide an explanation for how the 
mental might be causally relevant. 1 will briefly consider three suggested solutions that 
seek to bypass the Exclusion Argument Then I will consider at greater length one 
solution that tries to confront the Exclusion Argument head on.
7.6.1 Burge*s Solution
Merely observing that mental content does not supervene on the physical does not in 
itself constitute a solution to the problem of mental causation. For example, Burge (1993), 
correctly on my view, accepts that mental content does not supervene on the physical but
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does not see this M ure as impacting the problem of mental causation. Burge relies on 
explanatory practice and our ordinary notion of causal powers to allow for mental 
causation. He argues that common explanatory practice picks out some regularities as 
causal, and since this explanatory practice assumes mental-to-mental causal relevance or 
mental-to-physical causal relevance, mental properties are causally relevant. Burge 
realizes that relying on regularities alone fails to distinguish epiphenomena &om causally 
relevant properties, so requires instead that common explanatory practice be our guide in 
picking out causal relevance.
However, Burge’s solution leaves something to be desired. First, his assumption that 
common explanatory practice assumes causal relevance may simply not be true, and is 
certainly not justified without additional argument. Second, he does not provide an 
explanation to the philosophically more important question of how mental causation may 
occur. Third, common practice is defeasible, and the Exclusion Argument may provide 
reason to defeat it
Kim (1995) points out the first two problems with Burge’s appeal to common 
practice. First, it has not always been accepted that rationalizing explanations are causal 
explanations, so common practice does not obviously assume causal relevance. For a 
significant part of this century philosophers'^ thought that rationalizing explanations were 
not a variety of causal explanation at all. The reasons cannot be explored here in detail. The 
main arguments involved the logical and normative connections between an action and an 
intention. For example, Malcolm argues that intentions are logically connected with actions 
in a way that causes cannot be. On a causal view, he argues, I could have a desire to drmk a 
beer without drinking the beer even if all conditions are ideaL However, if all the conditions
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are ideal, and I do not drink the beer, Malcolm claims, I do not have the desire to drink the 
beer. It is part of the concept of desire that I cannot have the desire without acting upon it, 
ceteris paribus. Causal relations do not have this feature. It is not part of the concept of a 
cause that it bring about a certain effect even ceteris paribus. Thus, my desire to drink a 
beer, on this view, does not cause me to drink the beer.
Moreover, normative considerations apply to reason explanations but cannot apply to 
causal explanations. Reasons cannot cause actions because of the normative character of 
reason explanations. Take, again, the example of my drinking a beer. My reason for 
drinking a beer may be good or bad, justified or unjustified. But a cause can be neither good 
nor bad, neither justified nor unjustified. These arguments may be ultimately unconvincing. 
I do not have the space to consider the arguments as carefully as required to determine their 
soundness. However, they are sufficient to show that one carmot simply assume that the 
common practice of intentional and reason explanations are causal explanations. Common 
practice does not in any obvious way assume mental «tplanations are causal.
Second, as Kim also points out, even if explanatory practice assumes that the mind is 
causally relevant, this fact does not explain how it is possible for the mind to be causally 
relevant The problem of mental causation is not that we do not think the mind is causally 
relevant but that we do not have a metsqrhysical picture of the mind and the world that allows 
for the mind to be causally relevant The question is not so much whether the mind is 
causally relevant but rather how it is possible for the mind to be causally relevant And this 
question Burge’s ^ rpeal to common practice does not answer.
A third problem for Burge’s argument is that our common practice may be nustakert 
In this case, we may mistakenly attribute causal relevance to mental properties. Scientific
"  For instance, Anscombe (1963) Malcolm (1968), and Wtt^ensiem (1958)
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considerations bave often overcome common practice. Perhaps the case of mental causation 
is another case in which scientific considerations, suitably informed by philosophy, should 
overcome our common practice. These three reasons are sufficient to reject Burge’s 
solution. Appeals to explanatory practice alone cannot be sufGcient to solve the problem of 
mental causation". Thus, some substantive theory of mental causation that takes into 
account the Exclusion Argument is necessary to solve this problem of mental causation.
Although rejection of the Supervenience thesis or the Exclusion Principle is 
necessary for a dual-explanandum view, among those philosophers who reject 
supervenience, few have given theories, let alone dual-explanandum theories, of how the 
mental could be causally relevant. Lynne Rudder Baker (1993) and Jerry Fodor (1989) 
both give dual-explanandum theories that are compatible with a rejection of only the 
Supervenience thesis. Baker (1993) rejects any metaphysical principle, preferring to rely 
on common practice. Fodor (1989) does not specify which premises of the Exclusion 
Argument he finds objectionable. Both theories, however, rely on appeals to causal 
powers as determined by laws, and because these causal powers and laws, given the 
arguments above, may not supervene on their physical realizations, these theories may 
benefit firom a rejection of the Supervenience thesis without also requiring rejection of 
the Exclusion Principle. Therefore, these theories are properly categorized as dual- 
explanandum theories in which special science entities cause other special science 
entities independently of their implementation.
Baker and Fodor need not deny the Exclusion Principle, The Exclusion Principle 
only applies to events or properties whose occurrence is determined by more than one
"  Common explanatory practice may. however, be part o f an argument for a particular solution. For 
example, it may provide a reason to accept a dual-explanandum view.
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complete set of causes or causally relevant properties, and if content, mental or special 
science properties do not supervene on the physical, then the physical does not determine 
the mental. The point here is not to interpret Fodor’s or Baker’s actual view but to show 
that their dual-explanandum theories require only rejection o f the supervenience thesis.
7.6.2 Baker’s Solution
Baker (1993) suggests that we take laws to give causally relevant properties. 
Laws of nature, on this view, advert to a property of a cause which gives rise to some 
further properties or events. The problem with this theory is that not all laws are causal 
laws. As Fodor (1989) points out, the ideal gas law is clearly not a causal law. The ideal 
gas law says that for an ideal gas (one without interactions among its particles) the 
pressure, volume and temperature of the gas are related in a law-like way, but the 
pressure does not cause the temperature to be such and such; nor does the temperature 
cause the pressure to be so and so. Instead, the law represents a macroscopic 
generalization from the facts of statistical mechanics of the particles in the gas. So, 
Baker’s appeal to laws will not solve the problem of mental causation as presented by the 
Exclusion Argument
7.6 J  Fodor’s Solution
Fodor (1989) notes that not all laws are causal and so suggests instead causal 
laws as grounding causally relevant properties. The properties adverted to in causal laws 
are causally relevant, on Fodor’s view. And Fodor is confident that some notion of 
causal law can be given independently o f a notion of causal powers or causal relevance. 
If Fodor is correct, then mental causation can be given a  grounding independent of its 
physical realization or implementing mechanism.
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It might be objected that Fodor’s proposal gets the relationship reversed. Perhaps 
entities fit into causal laws because they have causal powers, not vice versa. In other 
words, one might think that the causal powers are the fundamental existants, and the 
causal laws are parasitic on them'*. Determining whether the properties or the laws are 
more fundamental is a difficult question, the pursuit of which is outside the scope of this 
work. Thus, I will criticize Fodor on another front.
Even if causal powers depend on causal laws, it is far from clear that a reductive 
theory of causal laws is possible. It is hard to see how any logical or modal relation 
could capture the metaphysical difference between a genuine causal power and a 
nomically correlated common effect. Epiphenomena could be nomically correlated with 
actual causal powers in such a way that no formal distinction between them could be 
found. For example, it may be a law of nature that all renates are chordates, but the two 
properties, having hearts and having kidneys, are clearly distinct. The property of being 
a renate may cause certain physiological effects whereas the property of being a chordate 
does not have these effects. But no nomic correlation could distinguish this causal 
relationship from a nomically indiscernible relationship between the property of being a 
chordate and those effects. No modal relation or asymmetry relation is likely to 
distinguish one property as causally relevant and the other as causally irrelevant
One might respond on behalf of Fodor’s claim, assuming that special science 
properties do not supervene on the physical, that no such nomic correlations could hold 
between physical and special science properties. This response, however, misses the 
point of the objection. The objection is that Fodor could give no characterization of a 
causal law without assuming the causality of the law itself. Whatever formal, modal or
'* Barbara Hannan (1994) argues in this vein.
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logical relation Fodor thinks might capture the causal power of the law is simply not 
likely to determine that laws with identical formal features involve properties that are 
causally relevant rather than epiphenomenal.
This brief review of some recent attempts to solve the problem of mental 
causation suggests that attempts to bypass the Exclusion Argument are not likely to 
succeed. Any attempt to solve the problem of mental causation, the exclusion problem, 
should deal directly with the soundness of the Exclusion Argument
Dual-explanandum theories must address the Exclusion Argument. Those 
solutions that woric by rejecting supervenience will have to make use of the context- 
dependence of mental content or special science properties. Rejecting supervenience 
because of conceivability of absent or inverted qualia and rejecting supervenience 
because of quantum holism both lead to problems with connections between the physical 
and the mental. Neither of these theories explains how such connections are possible. 
Dual-explanandum theories that appeal to a failure of supervenience because of context- 
dependence, on the other hand, allow for connections between the mental and the 
physical. A physical item within the proper context determines the mental or content 
item, on this view. Thus, there is no mystery about how the mental and physical are 
related; they do not require a mysterious parallelism. I will consider one further attempt 
to solve the problem of mental causation by explicit appeal to failure of supervenience.
Recall that there is more than one problem of mental causation. One problem is 
that presented by the Exclusion Argument. Another problem is that presented by 
Davidson’s Anomalous Monism. Still a third problem is that presented by the failure of 
mental content to supervene on the physical. This third problem is raised against those
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philosophers who believe that mental content is not individuated locally but who believe 
all causation is local. These two assumptions appear to show that mental content, 
because it fails to supervene on the physical, cannot be causally relevant. Several 
philosophers have tried to solve this last problem. A sketch of a general solution to the 
problem of mental causation for extrinsic properties can show how such a solution might 
be applied to the problem of the Exclusion Argument. However, I will argue that such a 
solution cannot solve the problem of mental causation for the Exclusion Argument 
without rejecting some other premise of the argument.
7.7 Wide Content and Wide Behavior
The dual-explanandum view I will discuss here instead of worrying about the 
failure of mental content and wide behavior to supervene on the physical makes use of 
this failure". The failure of wide behavior to supervene leaves logical space for mental 
content to determine wide behavior. Purely physical states of the brain cause narrow 
behavior, but wide content causes wide behavior.
On this theory the context of a mental token is causally relevant to wide behavior 
but not to narrow behavior. The distinction between narrow behavior and wide behavior 
is the following. Narrow behavior is simple bodily movements, whereas wide behavior 
is behavior that consists of more than simple bodily movements". Consider, for 
example, my wide behavior of making my bed. I can go through the narrow behavior 
involved in making my bed without actually making my bed. For example, I could make 
someone else’s bed, or perhaps I could mime making a bed. My wide behavior of
"  No solution in the literature closely resembles the one I suggest here. Heil and Mele (1991) and Dretske 
(1988) provide dual-explanandum theories that are directed at the problem o f the causal relevance o f wide, 
extrinsically individuated, content, but these views do not directly address the problem raised by the 
Exclusion Argument
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making my bed can only occur when I actually make my bed. On this theory, without my 
behavior occurring in the proper context (in this case, intuitively, a causal-historical 
relation to my bed), the wide behavior would be different. If I weren’t causally related to 
my bed, then I would not be making it, but doing something else. Thus, the context, 
possibly including the mediate causal history, that individuates mental content is causally 
relevant to wide behavior.
Noting the causal relevance of context does not solve the problem of mental
causation for extrinsic content, however. Context may individuate content, but, unless
content is type or token identical with that context, then content itself has not been shown
to be causally relevant. Dretske (1995), for example, endorses the type identity of mental
content with the context that individuates it. He writes.
Content, after all, is extrinsic. If it reduces to anything, it reduces to some set of 
physical relations existing between what is inside the head and what is outside.
This is a type-type identity theory, but not the classic (Smart-Feigl) identity 
between a type of mental state (e.g. the belief that F) and a type of brain state, 
but, rather, an identity between intentional content and the set of external 
relations that give brain states their representational character. This is 
reductionism, yes, but (if you please) wide reductionism. (1995,147-48)
Accepting the causal relevance of context, alone, tells us nothing about the causal
relevance of the mental content. Given the existence of causally relevant context, the
context, and the physical states of the brain, may be sufficient for any effects that occur.
Thus, assuming the Exclusion Principle, mental content could be an epiphenomenal
effect of the genuinely relevant context To avoid this conclusion, without rejecting the
Exclusion Principle one must assume that mental content is identical to the context itself.
To put the problem another way. If we assume that the only reason 
supervenience of the mental on the physical fails is because of the context-dependence of
"  This distinctioii comes from Heil and Mele (1991).
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behavior and the mental, then it is possible for the Exclusion Argument to exclude the 
mental yet again. Fixing the physical context o f the mental event must be sufficient to 
fix the content of the mental event If the mental globally supervenes on the physical, 
then it appears possible to exclude the mental properties of the world as a whole. For 
example, the physical context of the my desire for a beer determines that the desire be for 
a beer, but the content of that desire need not be causally relevant (or quausally relevant) 
to my drinking being a beer-drinking unless the content is identical to that complex set of 
relational physical properties. The complex set o f physical relational properties is 
sufficient to bring about the beer-drinking, and given some physicalist theory of content, 
they are also sufficient to making the drinking a beer-drirddng. Thus, the wide behavior 
can be determined by the physical and the physical context, so, applying the Exclusion 
Principle, since there is a complete physical cause, in this case a complex set of relational 
physical properties, the mental event cannot be causally relevant.
The only solution, then, is to appeal to an identity between mental content and the 
context that individuates it. In this way, we can preserve the mental token’s causal 
relevance since it is identical to something that is admittedly causally relevant Before 
considering how an identity theory might work, we need to consider what items are 
thought to be identical. The identity theory can be either an identity of content types or 
content tokens. The type identity theory would identify content types with types of 
complex physical relations. For example, the content o f my desire for beer is that it is a 
desire for beer. The physical relations underlying this content are likely to involve some 
causal or nomic connections between me and beer (and possibly my linguistic 
community). The type identity theory for content is that this connection, whatever its
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nature, constitutes a type which is identical to the content type beer. An identity theory 
of content tokens would be the view that this instance of my desire for beer has as 
content some particular causal or nomic relation between me and beer.
On this theory, then, content is a property of an event, and that content is identical 
to a complex physical relation. The mental tokens fall under the content type. Say, my 
desire for a beer causes me to get up and go to the fridge. The content of that desire is 
that it is a desire for a beer. That content is identical to some complex physical relation 
between persons and beers. My desire falls under that content type because it falls under 
that complex physical type. And the content of my desire is causally relevant because 
the complex physical property it is identical to is causally relevant.
A type identity theory, like the one Dretske (1995) espouses, solves the problem 
of mental causation for content". If the mental content type is identical with the causally 
relevant context that individuates it, then the mental content type can be causally 
relevant. The mental type, since it is identical to a physical type, can cause physical 
events. Moreover, since the mental type and the complex physical type are identical, 
physical events occur in virtue of that single type. There is no question of whether events 
occur in virtue o f the physical type or the content type since they are one and the same. 
If mental content is type identical with a physical type, then the Exclusion Argument 
cannot have even the minimal property dualism it requires.
"  It is not clear how Dretske intends this identity theory to help in his (1988) solution. For Dretske (1988) 
behavior is a causing o f a physical movement My behavior is something 1 do rather than something that 
happens to me. Content on his view, is the structuring cause, or the background conditions that make an 
event a behavior rather than a simple movement The content o f my desire, as a  beer*desire, is what makes 
my movements beer-getting behavior. However, the identity claim he espouses in his (199Q seems to 
accord to content because o f its identity to physical relations, a role as an ordinary, o r in his terms, 
triggering, cause o f a movement Thus, Dretske’s solution in his (1995) does not ^ ipear compatible with 
his general theory o f mental causation in his (1988). Nonetheless, DretAe's response seems to help with 
the problem presented here.
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The type identity claim is &miliar from the Exclusion Argument The difference 
here is that the identity claim is not the identity of a mental event with a brain event; 
instead the identity is between mental content and a complex physical relation. We have 
no clear idea what this complex physical relation might be because we have no clear idea 
of what physical relation individuates mental content. Nonetheless, this theory claims, 
whatever complex physical relation individuates content is type identical to the content 
itself.
However, it is unlikely that these complex physical types are identical with 
mental content types. One can raise several objections to this view. First, what 
individuates something is generally not identical to it. Second, it is likely that content is 
realized in heterogeneously disjunct sets of physical relations. Third, this solution works 
only for mental content and not for qualitative conscious states.
The first objection is that what individuates a thing is generally not identical with 
it. For example, the individuating conditions for a species o f animal may involve the 
animal having certain physical structures, e.g. a jaw muscle that attaches to a certain 
place on the jawbone, and have certain reproductive habits, e.g. individuals who 
interbreed are considered part of the same species. But these individuating conditions 
themselves are clearly not identical to the species. Assuming that context does 
individuate content, it remains to be argued that context is identical to that content 
Periiaps the only argument for this claim is that it solves the problem of mental causation.
The second problem with the type identity claim is simply that the identity does 
not seem to hold because o f multiple realizability. Mental content, say that my desire is 
for a beer, is realizable in a wildly disjunctive set of relations between brain tokens and
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beers. Every possible case in which someone desired a beer, on a type identity theory, 
would have to instantiate this complex physical relation, but it seems unlikely that this 
relation could obtain for every brain token #beer# and the beer itself. It is likely that 
#beer# tokens arise in a heterogeneously disjunct set o f ways with no physical type in 
common. For example, my thoughts about beer might arise from first hand experience 
with Budweiser (“The King of Beers"), whereas an extremely devout Mormon may never 
have tasted or even seen beer first-hand but only read about it in church publications. It 
is unlikely that any single type o f physical relation could cover these two cases and all 
the myriad other ways one might come to have thoughts about beer. No type of physical 
relation or connection seems to cover all the possible ways one’s mental tokens could 
come to represent an object.
One difficulty with raising this objection is that no one has a finished theory of 
meaning or mental content that is free from counterexample. No theory has given 
uncontroversial necessary and sufGcient conditions for individuation of content. Until 
that has been done, it is impossible to attempt to give a counterexample to the identity 
claim. However, the frtct that no theory of content is without signiGcant problems or 
counterexamples shows, I think, that no identity theory for content is possible since some 
set of individuation conditions would be necessary for an identity claim.
The other variety of identity theory that remains possible is an identity of mental 
content tokens with complex physical relation tokens. On this view, one instance of 
mental content is identical with some particular physical relation. Thus, my desire now 
for a beer is identical to a complex relation token between me and a particular beer (and a 
particular context). This view avoids the multiple realizability objection because it does
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not postulate some single physical type common to all beer-thoughts. On this view, a 
mental content token, because it is a physical relation token, can cause a physical effect. 
So, postulating a token identity between content and a complex physical relation appears 
to solve the problem of mental causation for the Exclusion Argument".
Certain questions remain, however. Specifically, we still need to know whether it 
is in virtue of the content token’s falling under a content type or falling under some 
physical, relational type that the effect occurs. A token identity theory avoids concluding 
Token-Epiphenomenalism, but it does not necessarily avoid concluding Type- 
Epiphenomenalism. For example, when one wonders about the causal relevance of my 
pain token, one can ask whether, when I hit my thumb with a hammer, the pain event 
caused my screaming or whether my screaming occurred in virtue of the event being a 
pain. Certainly a token identity theory does away with worries about whether the pain 
can cause my screaming (where, one supposes, the screaming is also at least token 
identical to a physical event). However, this response does not answer the question of 
whether my pain, qua pain, causes my screaming, qua screaming. Similarly, one can ask 
whether desire, qua beer-desire, is relevant to my physical movements qua beer-drinking.
The only way this theory can work, as far as I can tell, is if the content (or mental) 
properties and the physical properties cross-classi^ the same event tokens. Thus, my 
bodily movement is both a beer-drinking and an arm and throat movement. There is only 
one event here with two distinct properties. The event is caused by a physical event 
token which also has two distinct properties, one is a content property of the desire being 
a desire for beer, and the other is a complex physical relational property. One event
"  Taking this evidence to show that only a token-idenoty theory can be conect, and thus to show that 
constitution physicalism is fidse, would be premature, however, since I will find reasons to rqect this
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causes the other unproblematically since they are both physical events, but the event qua 
beer-drinking occurs in virtue of the desire qua beer-desire, and the event qua physical 
movement occurs in virtue of the cause qua complex physical relation.
The content property and the complex physical relational property are distinct 
types, which can be causally (or quausally) relevant, but are also identical tokens, and so 
can cause physical events. I would be happy to endorse this solution for content 
properties, and any other properties individuated by context, except for two problems. 
First, the content property of the effect is already fixed by the physical properties of that 
effect, and so there is no need for the content properties of the cause to be relevant 
Second, even if this solution worked for content, it would provide only a partial solution 
to the problem of mental causation because it would not help with causes or properties 
that supervene on the physical.
The first problem with this solution is as follows. We noted that this solution to 
the problem o f mental causation only denies weak and strong supervenience. Content 
properties are still thought to globally supervene on the physical. Context has a role in 
individuating content properties, but that context may be entirely physical context The 
physical cause and the correct physical context, fix the content property o f the effect. 
But if the content property of the effect is fixed, or determined, then, by the 
Generative/Determinative Exclusion Principle, that property cannot have another 
determiner. Thus, the content property of the effect cannot have the content property of 
the cause as a determiner. The content token can cause, but the content property of that 
token cannot be causally relevant to the content property of the effect This is so because
solution.
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the effect’s content property is already determined by the physical properties of the cause 
and the context, the complex relational property or set of relational properties.
Thus, identity theories for content are inadequate solutions to the problem of 
mental causation. The type-identity theory is unlikely to be true because of multiple 
realizability and the token-identity theory does not solve the problem of mental causation 
raised by the Exclusion Argument. So, identity theories for content are unlikely to solve 
this problem of mental causation. And, because of this fact, theories that appeal to 
mental content’s failure to supervene cannot solve the problem o f mental causation raised 
by the Exclusion Argument
Finally, even if this identity of content with a complex physical relation were 
possible, this solution would only solve the problem of mental causation for mental 
content. This theory provides no solution for the problem of mental causation for qualia 
or other mental states that are individuated narrowly. And, contrary to philosophers like 
Lycan (1996) and Tye (1995) and others, who argue for a representational theory of the 
mind, some mental properties, in particular qualia, are not individuated widely.
Qualia Extemalism is, on my view, incorrect (Qualia Extemalism is the view that 
qualia are individuated widely. My disagreement with these views is that they seem to 
rely on realism about the represented properties or objects. For example, on this view, 
my red quale represents a real feature of the world, redness. This view seems plausible 
enough if  there really is such a feature as redness. However, the items in the world that 
are sensed as red are a heterogeneous lot, and worst of all, some of these features of the 
world are uncontroversially not red, as is the case in the case o f certain visual illusions. 
Bidwell’s ghost, for example, is an illusion in which one perceives a bluish-green color.
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but the apparatus that presents the bluish-green image is a “half-black, half-white disk, 
with a slot through which a red lamp flashes." (Hardin, 1990, 555) This example is by 
no means the only example in which one perceives a color that is objectively not in the 
real world, and the visual modality is not the only modality in which such illusions occur 
although it is the most widely-discussed in philosophy. It does no good to claim, as 
Lycan (1987 and 1996) does, that these qualia represent unactualized possibles because 
these illusion cases completely parallel cases o f veridical perception except that the 
perceived colors do not exist For example, in the case of Bidwell’s ghost something in 
the world causes the quale just as an actual bluish-green object might cause a quale. But 
the apparatus in Bidwell’s ghost is in no way bluish-green. These cases are completely 
parallel, and yet Lycan’s analysis would treat them as distinct. So Lycan’s analysis is 
incorrect Cases like these show that realism about color and other so-called secondary 
properties is unlikely to be true, and so the realism about these properties that qualia 
extemalism relies on is unlikely to be true.
If 1 am right that qualia extemalism is incorrect the Exclusion Argument would 
create a problem of mental causation that could only be solved in a piecemeal manner. 
This solution based on a failure of supervenience would provide one solution for mental 
content and perhaps a different solution, if  one is to be found, for other mental events or 
properties, like qualia, that are individuated narrowly.
7.8 Conclusion
The claims of this chapter are the following. Dual-explanandum theories fît with 
our explanatory practice and provide the only solution to the problem of mental causation 
that avoids postulating downwards causation. Dual-explanandum theories, however, to
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solve the problem of mental causation must postulate either the failure of supervenience 
or the falsity of the Exclusion Principle. The dual-explanandum theories devised to take 
advantage of potential failures of supervenience either raised other problems or failed to 
solve the problem raised by the Exclusion Argument.
I considered three possible reasons one might have to reject the supervenience 
thesis, and discussed dual-explanandum theories that might take advantage o f these 
failures. The first theory I rejected supposed that the conceivability (or apparent 
conceivability) of absent or inverted qualia suggested that qualia did not supervene on the 
physical. This theory raised several problems including that it involved a mysterious 
parallelism between the mental and the physical and involved a variety of panpsychism. 
The second theory I considered supposed that quantum holism might provide reason to 
reject supervenience at the macro-level, including rejecting supervenience of the mental 
on the physical. I rejected this reasoning because of the weakness of its empirical claims 
and because it had the same parallelist and panpsychist problems as the previous theory.
Finally, I argued that dual-explanandum views that rely on mental content’s 
failure to supervene could not solve the Exclusion problem. These dual-explanandum 
theories must assume an identity between the context and the mental content. A type 
identity theory, I argued, was unlikely given the probability o f realization of content in a 
heterogeneously disjunct set of physical relations. A token identity theory for content, on 
the other hand, appeared not to solve the problem of mental causation as raised by the 
Exclusion Argument Neither identity theory solved the Exclusion problem. So, appeals 
to failure o f supervenience for mental content do not provide a causal role for content
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Theories of mental causation that rely only on failures o f supervenience do not 
solve the problem of mental causation as it is raised by the Exclusion Argument. Dual- 
explanandum theories, like those discussed in this chapter, require in addition rejection of 
another problematic premise, the Exclusion Principle. I will turn to a discussion of the 
Exclusion Principle in the next chapter.
It is important to note before discussing the Exclusion Principle that a general 
strategy of applying modus tollens to the Exclusion Argument cannot be maintained for 
the case of mental content or other properties that fail to supervene on the physical. If 
one admits that the Supervenience Thesis is false, one cannot then take the validity of the 
Exclusion Argument to show that some other premise of the argument must be 61se. 
Thus, I will not pursue such a strategy, but will instead pursue independent reasons for 
thinking the Exclusion Principle is either false or allows the Exclusion Argument to be 
invalid.
The modus tollens strategy is still available to my opponents for cases in which 
supervenience obtains. Thus, if a type identity theorist successfully argued that the 
Exclusion Principle were true, and the Exclusion Argument valid, he could then maintain 
that the irreducibility requirement must be false for those mental items, like qualia, that 
supervene on the physical. Therefore, to defend my position successfully, I must give 
independent reasons either for the falsity o f the Exclusion Principle or for the invalidity 
o f the Exclusion Argument
In addition, the modus tollens strategy is also available for cases in which global 
supervenience obtains. If global supervenience, which is compatible with the most
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plausible arguments against strong and weak supervenience, obtains, then one could still 
argue that another premise must be false, provided the Exclusion Argument is valid.
All o f these considerations are essentially irrelevant to my strategy in the final 
part of this work. I do not pursue a strategy of applying modus tollens to the conditional 
corresponding to the Exclusion Argument. Instead I pursue the possibility of mental 
causation by giving independent reasons that this argument, even with a global 
supervenience thesis for content properties or a strong supervenience thesis for mental 
properties, is invalid. Thus, I will argue that mental causation is possible, if 
Nonreductive Physicalism is true, because the Exclusion Argument is invalid.
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Ch a p t e r s  
Th e  Ex c lu sio n  P rin ciple
8.1 Introduction
In previous chapters I have presented the Exclusion Argument against the 
possibility o f mental causation and have argued that the conclusion of the Exclusion 
Argument could not be true. Thus, I concluded that the argument must be unsound. The 
premises that seemed most likely to be false were the Supervenience thesis and the 
Exclusion Principle. I argued in the previous chapter that the falsity of the Supervenience 
thesis did not provide a way for a dual-explanandum theory to take advantage of its 
falsity, and so failure of supervenience could not solve the problem of mental causation.
One might think that rejecting the supervenience thesis is sufficient for the 
Exclusion Argument to be unsound. Thus, there is no point in pursuing the argument any 
further. This reaction would be premature, however.
There are several reasons to continue pursuing the Exclusion Argument and for 
evaluating the Exclusion Principle. First, the best arguments in the previous chapter for 
rejecting the supervenience thesis only applied to content properties. The arguments for 
failure of supervenience based on absent qualia cases or quantum holism were not 
entirely convincing. Thus, mental properties, non-content properties, still appear to 
supervene on the physical. So, for those properties at least, we still need to find a flaw in 
the Exclusion Argument to show how it is possible for them to be causally relevant.
Second, global supervenience appears to obtain for mental content properties. 
Global supervenience may still sufGce to make the Exclusion Argument valid even for 
content properties. The physical properties o f a world fix the mental properties o f that
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world, so the mental may still be thought to play no causal role. Thus, we need to find 
some other flaw in the Exclusion Argument to allow for the possibility of mental 
causation.
Finally, even if the Exclusion Argument were admitted to be unsound, that would 
not remove the Exclusion Problem in general. Because the reasons for failure of 
supervenience could not provide a mechanism for mental causation (or causal relevance 
of content), the mental still seems to be excluded fiom causal relevance. There still 
seems to be nothing for the mental to do, barring implausible parallelist views, even if the 
mental M s to supervene on the physical. Thus, the mental still seems to be excluded 
fiom causal relevance. Thus, investigation of the Exclusion Principle and the reasoning 
fiom it is still necessary to show how mental causation is possible.
In this chapter 1 will argue that the Exclusion Principle is itself to blame for the 
apparent causal irrelevance of the mental. The Exclusion Principle is either false, if it is 
formulated in a naive way, or it makes the Exclusion Argument invalid, if formulated in a 
more sophisticated way. 1 will give reasons to reject the naive Exclusion Principle and 
for accepting a more sophisticated Exclusion Principle which is compatible with mental 
causation.
First, I will show how one simple version of the Exclusion Principle might be 
false by considering an argument by Stephen Yablo (1992). I will accept Yablo’s 
counterexample but give reasons to reject his solution to the problem. Second, I will 
consider some additional evidence for the falsity of Yablo’s Exclusion Principle. Third, I 
will argue for Kim’s (1989) more sophisticated Exclusion Principle. Fourth, I will argue 
that several views of the relation of the mental to the physical are compatible with this
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Exclusion Principle. Finally, I will consider some objections to my solution to the 
problem of mental causation.
8.2 Yablo on Mental Causation
Stephen Yablo (1992) offers an elegant solution to the problem of mental causation 
by arguing that the mental and the physical are related as determinable to determinate. If the 
mental and physical are related in this way, then they clearly do not compete for causal 
relevance. This solution to the problem of mental causation nicely captures and explains the 
most prevalent intuitions about the relation of the mental to the physical. However, his 
analysis is unlikely to be correct because, I shall argue, it does not naturally fit the facts 
about the mental and the physical. Yablo’s theory could gerrymander a set of mental and 
physical properties or events that had the proper correlations to fit his theory of mental and 
physical as determinable to determinate, but these gerrymandered cases cannot provide 
evidence of a close fit between these two Qrpes of relations.
Two facts do not fit Yablo’s theory of the relation of the mental to the physical. 
First, not all mental properties supervene on physical properties as Yablo’s solution requires. 
Thus, his solution is incomplete and, if forced to take these cases into account, it is ad hoc. 
Second, the fact that some physical properties are outside the scope o f mental properties 
contradicts Yablo’s model of mental properties as determinables of physical determinates.
First, I will set up the problem of mental causation as it appears in the Exclusion 
Argument in the terms Yablo uses. Second, 1 will explain Yablo’s solution to this problem 
in terms of the determinate/determinable relation. Third, I will argue that the determinable- 
determinate relation does not fit the relation of the mental to the physical.
8J.1 The Problem o f Mental Cauiatfoii
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The two modem variants o f Nonreductive Physicalism both appear to lead to 
Epiphenomenalism. The first variant of Nonreductive Physicalism is the view that the 
mental is constituted by the physical but is neither type nor token-identical to it'. Mental 
events, then, are distinct fiom physical events. Therefore, the problem fi>r the Constitution 
Physicalist is one of whether mental events can be causes.
The second variant of Nonreductive Physicalism combines Token Physicalism with 
Type Dualism. This view is that the every event or state is physical, but that mental 
properties do not correspond one-to-one with physical properties. To take an oversimplified 
example, my pain right now is a C-fiber firing, but for something to be a pain is not for it to 
be a C-fiber firing because octopi or Martians might feel pain without having C-fibers. 
Mental types are not identical to physical types, but mental tokens are identical to physical 
tokens. Any particular event is physical, but no mental property of an event is identical to 
any physical property. So the second variety of Nonreductive Physicalism combines Token 
Physicalism with Property (or Type) Dualism. Both varieties of Nonreductive Physicalism 
involve a variety of dualism as well.
Each variety of dualism, or Nonreductive Physicalism, gives rise to a distinct variety 
of Epiphenomenalism. McLaughlin (1989) following Broad (1925), recall fiom chapter 
three, characterizes the two types of Epiphenomenalism as follows.
Type Epiphenomenalism (Type-E). (a) Events can be causes in virtue 
o f 611ing under physical types, but (b) events cannot be causes in virtue of 
falling under mental types.
Token Epiphenomenalism (Token-E). (i) Physical events can cause 
mental events, but (ii) mental events cannot cause anything. (1989,109-10)
‘ Because the mentat and the physksl have different modal praperties, these philosopheis dunk, the mental is 
constituted by the physical but» not identical to i t  As an analogy, a statue, Goliath, is not identical to the 
physical substance that makes it up, call it Lung»!, because Goliath could exist without one o f his fingers 
whereas Lumpl could not And Lumpl might never have beenastatue, if  it had been made huo something else, 
but Goliath could not have been other than a statue. The Goliath-Lumpl exanqile comes fiom Gibbard (1975) 
althouÿ Gibbard (haws a different conclusion.
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These two Epiphenomenalisms arise fiom the Exclusion Argument, a set of 
premises, for the most part constitutive of Nonreductive Physicalism, which lead to the 
conclusion that the mental cannot be causally relevant I will present Yablo’s version of the 
Exclusion Argument briefly because it calls attention to his objection to the Exclusion 
Principle. Yablo’s (1992) version of the Exclusion Argument consists of the following 
premises^.
(1) If an event jc is causally sufficient for an event y, then no event jc* distinct fiom x 
is causally relevant to y {exclusion).
(2) For every physical event y, some physical event jc  is causally sufficient for y 
(physical determinism)?
(3) For every physical event jc  and mental event jc * , x  is distinct fiom jc * . (dualism).
(4) So: for every physical event y ,  no mental event jc *  is causally relevant to y  
(epiphenomenalism). (1992,247-48)
This argument immediately entails that our minds are irrelevant to our actions. Moreover, it
entails that our minds cannot be causally relevant at all. Yablo writes.
Every event z o f whatever type is metaphysically necessitated by some 
underlying physical event y, whose causally sufficient physical antecedents are 
presumably sufficient for z as well. But then by the exclusion principle, z’s 
mental antecedents are irrelevant to its occurrence. So mental phenomena are 
absolutely causally inert (1992,248)
The argument proceeds as follows. Because of physical determinism and the 
Exclusion Principle, the mental cannot affect the physical. Since the physical fixes the 
mental, the mental is unnecessary for other mental events, and so, by the Exclusion 
Principle, the mental cannot be relevant to either the mental or the physical. The mental, 
then, is epiphenomenal or causally inert Yablo’s argument when given in terms of events.
 ^Yablo gives the argument in terms o f events but notes that the argument could be given equally well in 
terms o f properties noaatis muumdis.
 ^As Yablo notes m a footnote, this princqile is flawed if physical mdeterminism is true, but whether the 
physical is deterministic does not seem the nnportant point The principle could be replaced with some 
other that does not assume determinism, for «am ple, one that assumed that all physirâl probabilities were
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entails that mental events cannot be causes, and so leads to Token-E (and Type-E*). The 
argument, when given in terms of properties, entails that no event occurs in virtue of any 
mental property of the cause, and so leads to Type-E. Yablo tries to avoid both varieties of 
Epiphenomenalism.
8.2 J  Yablo’s Theory
Yablo proposes a model for the relationship of the mental and the physical that 
avoids the problem of mental causation. According to Yablo, the physical is the determinate 
of the mental’s determinable. If the physical and mental are related as determinate to 
determinable, then, Yablo argues, the causal Exclusion Principle should not apply to them 
because determinates and determinables, intuitively, do not compete for causal influence. 
Yablo characterizes the relation of determinate to determinable as follows,
(A) P determines Q iff; for a thing to be P is for it to be Q, not simpliciter, but in a 
specific way. (1992,252)
The easiest way to grasp this notion is by means of example. Crimson is a determinate of
the determinable red. Red is a determinate o f the determinable colored. Crimson is a
subcategory o f the category red, but there is nothing added to the notion of red that results in
crimson. To be crimson is not to be red and something else but to be red in a particular way.
Determinables supervene asymmetrically on determinates^. Anything that is crimson is
fixed by antecedent physical events. Another candidate to replace determinism as the principle is the 
Causal Closure o f the Physical, that any physical event that is caused has a physical cause.
* Token-E entails Type-E but not vice versa. If no mental event can be a cause, then no event can be a 
cause in vutue o f being a mental event It is possible, on the other hand, if  mental events are physical 
events, finr the event to be a cause in virtue of being physical but not in virtue o f being mental. McLaughlin 
(1989) discusses these pomts in greater detail.
It is interesting to note that determinables supervene strongly on determinates in Khn's (1987b) terms. I 
will assume that strong supervenience is the ^ p e  o f supervenience at issue. If  one believes that the mental 
can only weakly supervene on the physical, then one would not be convinced by Yablo *s subsumption o f 
the mental-physical relation to the determinable-determinate relation. Furthermore, if  the mental only 
globally supervenes on the physicaL then Yablo’s solution does not fit the actual mental-physical relation.
I will assume, as does Yablo, that the supervenience m question is strong supervenience. However, I will
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necessarily red but it is not the case that anything that is red is (necessarily) crimson.
Yablo notes that the relation of asymmetric determination is the common 
philosophical view of the relationship o f the mental to the physical. The physical 
determines the mental, but, because of the multiple realizability of the mental on the 
physical, it is possible for some event to have a particular mental property without having a 
particular physical property. Pain can occur in different creatures that share no relevant 
brain properties. So, Yablo characterizes the asymmetric determination of the mental by the 
physical as,
(M) Necessarily, for every mental property M, and every physical property P which 
necessitates M, possibly something possesses M but not P. (1992,255)
But (M) gives the same correlation of properties that the determinate-determinable relation
does.
Determinates and determinables do not, intuitively, compete for causal relevance. 
Because the Exclusion Principle, as given by Yablo, rules out causal relevance of 
determinables, it must be Êüse. If any event or property is sufGcient for an effect, then no 
other event or property can be causally relevant However, it is implausible that 
determinates rule out causal relevance for their determinables. For example, a stoplight is 
red and colored^. If I see a stop light and stop, the red of the stoplight is causally relevant to 
my stopping, but, according to the Exclusion Principle, the color of the light (the fact that it
argue that content does not supervene either strongly or weakly, so neither strong nor weak supervenience 
captures the mental-physical relation.
‘^though identifying the red-token with the color-token may provide a reason the instances are both 
causally relevant, Yablo does not think the putative identity would solve the problem. He writes, “Imagine 
a glass which shatters if  Ella sings at 70 decibels or more. Tonight, as it happens, she sang at 80 db, with 
predictable results. Although it was relevant to the glass’s shattering that the volume was 80 db, it 
contributed nothing that it was undier 90 db. Therefore, an efficacious determinate can have an irrelevant 
determinable.” (Yablo, 1992, p. 259) Yablo thinks this exanqple shows that the putative token identity 
does not make all determinables causally relevant because the determinable under 90 db it clearly not 
relevant to the glass’s shattermg even though its determmate 80 db it causally relevant, so identifymg
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is colored) is not causally relevant Yablo believes this result is obviously absurd; causal 
relevance of a determinate cannot exclude causal relevance of the determinable. Thus, he 
concludes, the Exclusion Principle is Êüse since it excludes genuinely causally relevant 
properties. Moreover, any revision of the Exclusion Principle^ weak enough to allow both 
determinates and determinables to be causally relevant would not exclude mental properties. 
I will take up this last issue in a moment, but first I will argue that Yablo’s theory of the 
relation of the mental to the physical is incorrect
8.2 J  Criticism of Yablo
Yablo argues to the best explanation to support his theory of the relation of the 
mental to the physical. The evidence he gives fit into essentially two categories. First, he 
gives some reason to thirüc the determinate-determinable relation fits our conception of the 
relation between the mental and the physical. The standard conception in philosophy of 
mind of the relation between the physical and the mental fits nicely with the metaphysical 
determination relation that obtains between determinate and determinable. Yablo believes 
this close fit between the two types of relations is not a coincidence. The second category of 
evidence is fecundity of the hypothesis. Specifically, as we have already seen, the 
hypothesis solves the problem of mental causation. These points, Yablo believes, are 
evidence in favor of his hypothesis.
We have already seen how Yablo’s hypothesis solves the problem of mental
instances o f determinates and detennmables will not guarantee causal relevance for the determinable, 
according to Yablo.
 ^Such as the more sophisticated statements o f the Exclusion Principle given by Kim (1987a) and (1989a) 
Kim’s version o f the Exclusion Principle is that there can be no more than one complete and independent 
causally relevant property. On Yablo ’s view of the mental, the mental and physical would not be 
independent properties, so there is no reason to think Kim’s ptmciple is fidse. It is sufficiently weak, however, 
that one could not conclude fiom it that the mental is causally irrelevant Therefiire, Yablo’s model for the 
menial-pitysical relation »  sufficient to avo&i the problem of mental causation as suggested by Kim’s exclusion 
argument as well as the exclusion argument presented by Yablo.
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causation. The first type of evidence, when considered in its entirety, however, counts 
against, rather than for, Yablo’s hypothesis. The physical-mental relation does not fit the 
determinate-determinable relation for two reasons. First, not all mental properties supervene 
on the physical. Second, physical properties occur without corresponding mental properties 
which could not be the case if the mental were a determinable to the physical’s determinate.
J.1 Content Properties Failure to Supervene
First, mental properties, and special science properties generally, do not always 
supervene on the physical properties of which, according to Yablo, they are determinables. 
One requirement of the determinable-determinate relation is that fixing the determinate fixes 
the detemtinable; determinates asymmetrically necessitate their determinables. So, 
anything that is scarlet must also be red. Not all mental properties are fixed by their physical 
properties in this way. Content properties, for example, depend on one’s connection to the 
world and to the society of which one is a part For example, my thought that "water is wet ” 
is only a thought about water because of some causal/historical or social relations between 
my mental tokens of “water” and water in the external world or the society o f which I am 
part This relation cannot be captured by local physical properties of the brairt Because of 
this fitilure of content properties to supervene locally on physical properties, Yablo’s 
hypothesis leaves out at least one type of mental properties. Thus, since only some mental 
properties supervene on the physical, Yablo would be unjustified in taking supervenience to 
be essential to the relation of the mental to the physical.
Yablo recognizes this problem and gives several responses. First, he notes that it is a 
mistake to think that the events or properties mvolved in the siqrervenience relation must be 
localized brain events tiiat can occur in isolation from their neural contmct This response is
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adequate for properties, e. g. pain or itchiness, that are plausibly determined by the whole 
brain*. However, this response does not address the Ailure of content to supervene on local 
physical properties. Yablo’s response to this failure has several parts. In a footnote, he 
writes.
So-called “wide content" mental events raise related but different problems 
which 1 don’t discuss. Possibly they will have to be allowed as exceptions to 
the physical/mental determination thesis; in that case, the paper should be 
read as defending the causal potency of ofAer-than- “wide content” mental 
events. Two remaries, though, to put this in perspective: First, it is
controversial how often such events are genuinely efficacious, in particular 
because their “narrow" counterparts seem ordinarily to be more 
commensurate . . .  with their supposed effects . . .  Second, determination is 
only the most obvious of a number of intimate identity-like relations equally 
unsupportive of the “x/ was sufGcient, so X2 was trrelevanf’ reflex." (1992,
271)
Yablo’s response to the possibility of wide content events, e. g. my thought that 
water is wet, is four-fold. First, he implies a certain skepticism about the existence of these 
wide content properties. This essay is not the place to argue that content properties are 
wide. 1 will assume that that thesis has been well-established elsewhere.^
Second, he argues that his solution can still work for those properties that supervene 
even if not all mental properties do. This response is ad hoc given Yablo’s need for a close 
fit between the mental-physical relation and the determinable-determinate relation. 
Essentially, Yablo’s response here is to claim that his solution, which depends on the mental 
having a certain relation to the physical, works for all mental properties that do have that 
relation. Admittedly, content properties constitute a variety of mental properties, but 1 see 
no reason to think that content properties are distinct in any way that matters except insofor
'  Assuming even this much locaUzatioa may be contentious. Proponents o f the Representational Theory of 
the Mind often contend that phenomenal properties are individuated externally. Thus, they claim that 
phenomenal properties are not in the head any more than content properties are. See Lycan (1987), chapter
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as they Ml to supervene on the physical. To assume that their M ure to supervene is in 
itself sufficient to justify a separate treatment of them is to beg the question.
Third, Yablo questions the causal relevance of "wide content” and asserts that 
“narrow contenf is a better candidate for causal relevance. This work is, again, not the 
place for a detailed discussion of the arguments for and against the existence of so-called 
“narrow content,” but, whatever the merits of the notion of narrow content, Yablo cannot 
accept the standard reasons for believing in i t  Therefore, Yablo cannot accept the existence 
of narrow content except as an a /  hoc measure.
Fodor’s (1987) argument for the existence of narrow content can be put crudely in 
the following way.
(5) At least some mental content is causally relevant
(6) All causal relevance is individualistic.
(7) Therefore, at least some mental content is individualistic.
The conclusion is that some individualistic or “narrow” or local content must exist to be 
causally relevant The nature of this narrow content remains unclear. In fact, one cannot 
even express any example of narrow content because any statement must be in a language 
and so must be wide. In any case, Yablo cannot accept Fodor’s assumption that the mental 
is causally relevant since Yablo is presenting an argument for the mental’s causal relevance. 
Yablo cannot appeal to narrow content since the notion of narrow content was invented to fit 
our concept of localify of causal relevance. Yablo cannot rely on a supervenient type of 
content to save his theory since that notion of narrow content was stipulated to be local. The 
only reason (or primary reason) to think narrow content exists is because it would provide 
the kind of local or supervenient properfy that fits our notion o f only local causal relevance.
8 and (1996), chaplets 4-5, and Tye (1995) for more discussion. I noted my reasons for rejecting this 
qualia extermdism in the previous chiqiter.
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But that assumption is closed to Yablo because be is arguing for a relation of the mental to 
the physical that is local, in which the mental supervenes on the physical. Appealing to 
narrow content assumes what Yablo must show, that the fit of mental to physical is that of 
determinable to determinate. Essentially, the notion of narrow content was constructed for 
the purpose of giving a supervenient type of content, so Yablo cannot appeal to it as an 
independently justified notion of content that conveniently fits his needs. Thus, Yablo 
cannot make use of the notion of narrow content except as an od hoc measure to avoid the 
problem that not all mental properties supervene on the physical.
Yablo’s fourth response, that the Exclusion Principle does not seem to apply to other 
identity-like relations, may be correct However, unless one agrees with his other responses, 
this response provides a reason to reject Yablo’s hypothesis about the relation of the mental 
to the physical in favor of one of these other identity-like relations. If the Exclusion 
Principle fails to apply to other identity-like relations, then one of them may be the actual 
relation of the mental to the physical.
8 J  J  Physical Properties without Corresponding Mental Properties
The second problem for Yablo’s hypothesis is that some physical properties do not
correspond to any mental property. This Act is inconsistent with the mental and physical
being related as determinable to determinate. Determinables are inclusive of their
determinates. According to Rosenberg,
P)]eterminables and determinates plainly differ in scope. Determinable 
properties are broader or more general than their corresponding 
determinates; detenninate properties, narrower or more specific than their 
superordmate determinables. Determinables and determinates of a given 
fiimily thus form a hierarchy of scope-inchisions, after the manner of 
coloured and red^  red and crimson  ^ ûid crimson and Harvard crimson.
(1995,116)
’ Seminal articles on wide content are Putnam (1973) and (1975) and Burge (1979).
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So, there can be no object that is red or blue or yellow without that object being colored. No 
determinate can exist outside the scope of its determinable.
Contrary to Yablo’s claim, then, the physical cannot be the determinate of the 
mental determinable. Yablo considers it possible that mental properties not correspond to 
any physical properQr. Thus, he thinks that physical properties are not inclusive of mental 
properties. That fact, if fact it is, supports Yablo’s hypoth^is. However, Yablo does not 
consider that some physical properties are outside the scope of the mental properties. 
Certain physical structures do not have any mental property associated with them. My C- 
fiber firing may correlate with pain, and some different neural firing may correlate with 
some other feeling, say an itch, but the physical structure of a rock clearly has no mental 
property associated with i t  Examples of physical properties which fall outside the scope of 
the mental are embarrassingly easy to find. Rocks, chairs, tables, stars, and atoms all have 
physical properties but no correlative mental property. However, since determinables 
include their determinates, no determinate can M  outside the scope of its determiruible. 
Since some physical properties clearly fall outside the scope of any mental properties, the 
physical cannot be a determinate of a mental determinable.
Perhaps this criticism is unfair to Yablo. For Yablo can argue that only some 
physical properties are determinates of their mental determinables, but not all physical 
properties are determinates of a mental determinable. Thus, my C-fiber firing would be a 
determinate of the determinable pain, but the physical structure of a rock is not a 
determinate of any mental determinable. Only some physical properties, like active brain 
states, are determinates of a mental determinable.
There are two problems with this response. First, the response is, once again, ad
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hoc. It is possible that only some physical properties are determinates, but if Yablo wishes 
to argue from the close fit o f the determinable-determinate relation to the mental-physical 
relation, he cannot include all and only those mental and physical properties that have that 
close fit The evidence for Yablo’s claim is that a close fit obtains between the mental- 
physical relation and the determinable-determinate relation. But if Yablo gerrymanders the 
pairs of properties that he considers in support of his thesis, then he has given up the reason 
he had for his theory. It is possible that some sets of properties meet his specifications, but 
only gerrymandered sets o f properties do. Thus, Yablo no longer has good evidence for his 
thesis.
Second, the response overlooks the 6ct that the physical structure of the rock 
determines that the rock has no mental property. The physical features of the rock are as 
responsible for its lack of mental properties as my C-fiber firing is to my having a pain. The 
physical properties of an object still determine the mental properties, or lack of mental 
properties, of that object Yablo’s possible reply that only certain physical properties are 
determinates of mental determinables conspicuously fails to explain the fact that rocks and 
other purely physical objects lack mental properties. A theory of the mental ought to 
explain why brains have mental properties and other physical objects, like rocks, lack 
mental properties. A good theory of the mental ought to explain not just why some physical 
properties have mental correlates, but also why other physical properties do not Yablo’s 
theory, interpreted as claiming that some physical properties are determinates of mental 
determinables, does not explam why these other physical properties are not determinables o f 
mental properties. There is one thing to be explained, why some physical properties 
correlate with mental properties and others do not Yablo’s theory can only explain why the
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physical properties that do have a correlative mental property have one, but does not explain 
why these other physical properties lack correlative mental properties. Thus, although 
Yablo’s theory may fit with some limited set of evidence of the relation of the mental and 
the physical, the totality of the evidence does not support his theory.
&2.4 Concluding Remarks on Yablo
Yablo’s model of the relation of the mental to the physical fails to accord with our 
ordinary conceptions and with some obvious facts. This evidence does not prove that the 
relation of the mental and physical is not one of determinable to determinate, but it 
undercuts his reason for drawing that conclusion. Yablo derives his conclusion only for a 
limited set of mental and physical properties. He provides an elegant solution to the 
problem of mental causation by hypothesizing that the mental is the determinable of the 
physical determinate. However, the evidence contradicts his hypothesis since the relation of 
the mental to the physical does not meet the requirements for Yablo’s theorized relation. 
First, some mental properties do not supervene on physical properties, so Yablo’s solution 
only works for those properties that do supervene. But this response is ad hoc and fails to 
give some relevant fixture that might distinguish the supervenient fiom nonsupervenient 
mental properties in any non-question-begging way. Second, some physical properties are 
outside the scope of the mental which could not be the case if the mental were the 
determinable of the physical. Yablo could limit the set of physical properties to those which 
do correspond to a mental property, but that would also limit the evidence for his view in an 
ad hoc way. Yablo’s view is not incoherent or inconsistent, but the set of evidence that 
supports his view is essentially gerrymandered to have the right fit The evidence, overall, 
does not support his theory of the mental as a determinable o f a physical determinate.
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Yablo provides an excellent example, however, of a case in which the Exclusion 
Principle is false. He opens the door for other conceptions of the mental and the physical to 
provide counterexamples to the Exclusion Principle. Some close identity-like relation 
between the physical and the mental seems necessary to allow them not to compete for 
causal relevance. In the next section I will give a few more counterexamples to the naive 
Exclusion Principle. Then I will mention some theories of the mental that fit with rejection 
of Yablo’s Exclusion Principle. Finally I will raise some problems that need to be addressed 
by my theory.
My solution to the problem presented by the Exclusion Argument is to reject 
Yablo’s Exclusion Principle. If the Exclusion Principle is false, then the argument is 
unsound, and so it is possible for the mental to be causally relevant. If we accept a qualified 
or weakened Exclusion Principle, like the one advocated by Kim, that principle will not 
exclude the mental from causal relevance on one of a number of theories o f the mental.
8 J  Rejecting the Exclusion Principle.
Aside from Yablo’s counterexample, several other counterexamples to the Exclusion 
Principle have been given. These counterexamples are all cases in which correlated events, 
events related to each other either conceptually or nomically, are causally relevant First 
mediate causes of an efiect are causes of that effect even though immediate causes of that 
effect are complete causes. Second, sometimes more than one property is relevant to an 
effect even if one alone is sufficient The general lesson of these counterexanqxles is that 
correlated events or properties need not compete for causal relevance.
The first counterexample, from Goldman (1968) is that of mediate causes. A 
mediate cause, C, o f some effect X is the immediate cause o f some effect B which then
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immediate ly  causes A. In fiict, a mediate cause could be related to an effect by an indefinite 
series of causal links. ^  is a complete cause ofX in that no other cause is necessary for B to 
bring about the effect A. Imagine, for example, in a pool game that I strike the cue ball with 
a pool cue; the cue ball strikes the eight ball; and the eight ball goes into the comer pocket 
My striking the cue ball causes the eight ball to go into the comer pocket; it is not ruled out 
fit)m being a cause by the Act that the cue ball is the immediate cause of the eight ball going 
into the comer pocket The Exclusion Principle, again, is the thesis that if any effect has a 
complete cause, then it cannot have another cause. Since the immediate cause is a complete 
cause of the effect the Exclusion Principle incorrectly excludes mediate causes as irrelevant 
when they are not
Brian McLaughlin (1989) gives several examples involving properties that do not 
compete with each other for relevance‘s. Following the general spirit of his examples, we 
can construct a case which contradicts the Exclusion Principle. Imagine that Bill, who is 
married, attempts to marry again. His being married is causally relevant to his being 
arrested for bigamy, but his having a wife is also causally relevant to his being arrested for 
bigamy. These two properties, the property of being married and the property of having a 
wife, do not compete for causal relevance even though they are not identical properties.
Imagine a further example in which I try to hail a taxi by raising my arm. I raise my 
arm quickly to get the driver’s attention. My raising my arm quickly gets the driver’s 
attention, but does this mean that my raising my arm does not get the driver’s attention? 
Presumably not Neither the event of my raising my arm nor the event o f my raising my 
arm quickly excludes the other finm causal relevance. According to Yablo’s Exclusion
This shift ftom events to properties addresses the possibi%  of Type-E rather than Token-E, but otherwise 
does not matter to the argument
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Principle, the two events must conq)ete for causal relevance, but these conceptually related 
events do not exclude each other from causal relevance. Therefore, the naive Exclusion 
Principle is 61se for conceptually related events.
These cases, it should be emphasized, are not cases in which there is really only one 
event-type. No Exclusion Principle could apply to two identical events; showing that it did 
not apply would be trivial. But in this case, I am making the nontrivial claim that events that 
are conceptually or nomically related do not exclude each other. So, we need to note that 
the events described are not identical event-types". I could raise my arm without raising it 
quickly. The stoplight could turn red without turning exactly that shade of red. In either of 
these cases, counter to the Exclusion Principle, two closely related but non-identical events 
or properties are both causally relevant Thus, we must reject the Exclusion Principle as it is 
stated above, that if there is a complete cause of an effect, then there can be no other cause 
of that effect
8.4 A New Exclusion Principle
Suppose we now accept that the principle as stated is frlse. We can, however, state
the Exclusion Principle in a way that makes it true (in the spirit of Kim, 1987a).
If there is one complete, independent cause of an effect then there cannot be 
another cause for that effect
This statement of the Exclusion Principle cannot be shown to be false by any of the 
counterexamples mentioned. Mediate and immediate causes of an effect are causally 
dependent the other pairs of events or properties are conceptually dependent So, the
“ One might think these examples represent identical event-tokens but distinct event-^pes. It really makes 
no di£Terence which view one holds. If the event-tokens are identical, then the distinction is whether the 
distinct properties ofthe single event compete for causal relevance. Ifthe event tokens are distinct if (or 
example, I could perform exactor this arm-raising without doing it qukkly, then the question is whether the 
distinct events compete as causes. All that is required to make the point is that the two events to M  to be type- 
idcntkaL
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counterexamples to the Exclusion Principle as originally stated do not apply to the modified 
Exclusion Principle.
Having rejected one Exclusion Principle, one wonders whether one should accept 
any Exclusion Principle. Kim's (1987a) main argument for the Explanatory Exclusion 
Principle depends on his claim that having more than one explanation creates an epistemic 
tension.
(8) Two purposes of explanatory practice are simplification and unification.
(9) Giving multiple explanations of a single phenomenon cuts against the purpose 
of simplification.
(10) Showing dependencies among différent explanations better unifies the 
explanation.
(11) Therefore, the practice of explanation should involve reducing multiple 
explanations to a single explanation and showing how the multiple explanations 
dq)end on each other.
This argument so 6 r  supports only the Explanatory Exclusion Principle, an 
epistemic principle not a metaphysical principle. Kim (1989a) argues further that this 
epistemic principle supports a general metaphysical principle. Assuming explanatory 
realism, we can see that an objective relation must hold between our theories and the world. 
If that is so, then the purposes of simplification and unification are taken as likely to lead to 
true explanations. If those explanations are true, then something about the world must 
correspond, in some way, with those explanations. So, the Explanatory Exclusion Principle, 
although itself only an epistemic principle, corresponds with a metaphysical Exclusion 
Principle. Kim takes this Exclusion Principle to be a Causal Exclusion Principle, but he 
recognizes that the principle must tqtply to any potential explanandum or any relation that 
grounds an explanation. So, as noted in chapter three, Kim can formulate a more general 
principle.
Generative/Determinative Exclusion Principle-, there can be no more than one
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complete, independent determiner of any event or property; if there is a 
complete, independent determiner of an event or property, then there is no 
other determiner of that event or property.
This more sophisticated Exclusion Principle is both broader and narrower than 
Yablo’s Exclusion Principle. First, it is broader in that it applies both to effects and to 
properties of events. The mental properties of an effect are not, in any normal sense, caused 
by the physical properties of that effect or by the cause of the effect The G/D Exclusion 
Principle is broader than Yablo’s principle in that it includes properties as well as causes.
This more sophisticated Exclusion Principle is narrower as well, however, since it 
does not rule dependent phenomena to be causally irrelevant This new Exclusion Principle 
does not exclude the mental from causal relevance, as long as the mental depends on the 
physical. Moreover, Kim’s arguments support the less strict Exclusion Principle, the one 
that does not exclude mental causation. Thus, we can accept an Exclusion Principle that 
allows for mental causation and coheres with explanatory practice, while at the same time 
rejecting the stricter principle that is inconsistent with mental causation.
The Exclusion Argument with Yablo’s Exclusion Principle is valid but unsound; the 
Exclusion Argument with the G/D Exclusion Principle is invalid. Yablo’s Exclusion 
Principle is Êüse since it incorrectly excludes conceptually or nomically related events as 
causally irrelevant The G/D Exclusion Principle, on the other hand, does not exclude 
causes that are conceptually or nomically related to each other, and, if the mental is related 
to the physical in such a way, the Exclusion Argument does not exclude the mental fiom 
causal relevance. The Exclusion Argument in its schematic form, as presented in chapter 1, 
but with the replacement of the G/D Exclusion Principle for a more generic Exclusion 
Principle goes as follows.
215
(12) Dualism. Mental and physical items are both real.
(13) Irredttcibility. No mental item is identical to any physical item.
(14) Supervenience. Mental items supervene on or are determined by physical items.
(15) Causal Closure o f the Physiccd. No physical effect has a nonphysical cause.
(16) Generative/Determinative Exclusion Principle', there can be no more than 
one complete, independent determiner o f any item; if  there is a complete, 
independent determiner of an item, then there is no other determiner o f that item 
(except in cases of causal overdetermination).
(17) Mental causation is not a case of causal overdetermination.
(18) Therefore, Epiphenomenalism. No mental item causes any effect
Mental to mental causation is compatible with these premises if the mental is not 
independent of the physical. The Causal Closure principle rules out the possibility of 
downwards causation, causation of the physical by the mental, but these premises allow for 
mental to mental causation (or quausation). In other words, a dual-explanandum theory is 
compatible with the Exclusion Argument. Thus, the Exclusion Argument is invalid. Even 
if these Physicalist assumptions are true, mental to mental causation is possible if the mental 
depends on the physical.
The schematic Exclusion Argument involves an oversimplification. As we saw in 
chapter three, more than one type of Causal Closure principle is possible, and not all such 
principles require mental causes to be causally irrelevant to physical events or properties. A 
brief reminder of the exclusive and nonexclusive types of Closure principles, from chapter 
three, may be helpfiil here.
The first two Closure principles are exclusive. They claim that there can be no 
mental cause of a physical effect These principles would be rendered false if it were 
possible for both a mental and a [Aysical cause to cause a physical event 
Causal Closure o f the Physical:
Necessarily no non-{diysical event causes a physical event 
Causal Closure o f Physical properties:
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Necessarily no non-physical property is causally relevant to any physical efifect or 
to any effect insofar as that efifect is physical.
The exclusive Causal Closure principles may well be 61se given the
counterexamples to Yablo’s Exclusion Principle. Yablo’s Exclusion Principle, we saw, was
false, and, if we accept the counterexamples to Yablo’s Exclusion Principle, then periiaps
we should also reject the exclusive Closure principles. I can think of no direct evidence that
would show the Exclusive Causal Closure principle to be false. The counterexamples to
Yablo’s Exclusion Principle all involved uncontroversial cases. The case o f causal
relevance of the mental to the physical is part of the question at issue, so we cannot assume
that it is true or 61se without argument
The safer assumption is to take a Nonexclusive Causal Closure Principle to be true.
Arguments for the Closure principle, I noted in the introduction to this set of chapters, are
fairly uncommon, but one argument often given by Kim (1993b and elsewhere) is that to
deny Causal Closure of the Physical is to suppose some direct causation on the physical by a
mysterious mental entity, an entelechy, by some kind o f telekinesis. However, this
argument does not give reason in support of the Exclusive Causal Closure Principles but
only the Nonexclusive Causal Closure Principles. Nonexclusive Causal Closure Principles
say that there can be no direct causation of the physical without there also being a physical
cause. Nonexclusive Causal Closure Principles could be given as follows.
Nonexclusive Causal Closure o f the Physical for events:
NecMsarily, for any physical effect, there is a physical cause for that event
Nonexclusive Causal Closure o f the Physical for properties:
For any physical property of an effect necessarily, there is a physical property of 
the cause Âat is relevant to the physical effect and to that effect insofar as it is 
physical.
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These Causal Closure principles need not exclude the mental from relevance to the 
physical. Thus, rejecting this exclusive Closure principle, and accepting a weaker 
nonexclusive Causal Closure, which is all we are justified in supposing ùom Kim’s 
argument, allows us to accept some theory other than a dual-explanandum view. If the 
mental can be relevant to the physical, then there is no need to postulate dual-explananda. 
We can suppose that a single explanandum sometimes has more than one cause or property 
causally relevant to its occurrence. As long as the events or properties are properly 
correlated, then they can both be causally relevant to a single effect.
Rejecting Yablo’s Exclusion Principle and the Exclusive Causal Closure principles 
allows for more possible solutions to the problem of mental causation. Rejecting these 
principles allows for a single-explanandum solution to the problem of mental causation. 
However, explanatory and scientific practice still militate in favor of a dual-explanandum 
theory if one is to be had. Our practice generally explains events at one level by means of 
events at the same level. For example, behavior, beliefs and desires are generally explained 
in psychological or folk psychological terms. Sometimes we do give reductive 
explanations, or explanations of an event in terms of microstructure or lower-level 
implementation, but we rarely give explanations of physics in terms of the mental'^ . So, a 
dual-explanandum view, although not necessitated by the Exclusion Argument, properly 
understood, still best coheres with our explanatory practice.
8,5 Mental Causatioii
Showing what is wrong with the exclusion argument is not itself sufficient to show 
how the mental can be causally relevant How does such causation occur? Any theory that
Excqitmg the iniegral use o f measurement as part o f quantum mechanics.
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assumes the mental depends on the physical is compatible with the 
Generative/Determinative (hereafter G/D) Exclusion Principle. Thus, the G/D Exclusion 
Principle does not determine the correct theory of the mental-physical relation. Supporting a 
theory of the relation of the mental to the physical must appeal to more than just the 
Exclusion Argument, and canvassing reasons for different theories is outside the scope of 
this woric. However, the Exclusion Argument does constrain the choice of possible theories 
to ones in which some close dependence relation holds between the mental and the physical.
Several common theories of the mind are compatible with the Exclusion Argument 
One theory is that the physical realizes or implements the mental. The mental is, sometimes, 
conceived to be a second-order property of the physical realization. A second theory is that 
the mind is a macroscopic entity constituted by a physical brain. Thus, the mental 
mereologically supervenes on the physical. A third theory is that the mental ‘emerges’ horn 
the physical given certain organizations of matter. On this view, the mental is a distinct 
entity from the physical but is dependent on the physical. Any of these views o f the mental 
allows for mental causation compatible with the G/D Exclusion Principle. Any of a number 
of common Nonreductive Physicalist views that does not take context-dependence to be 
individuative of causally relevant properties is compatible with this G/D Exclusion 
Principle.
I would like to propose, somewhat tentatively, a Nonreductive Physicalist dual- 
explanandum theory of mental causation. On this view, the physical is the lower-level 
implementing mechanism for the mental. The mental causes behavior by means of a 
physical implementing mechanism. On this theory, my neural firing is not a behavior I do, 
but the neural firing is the physical implementation by means of which I behave. This
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notion of the physical as an implementing mechanism is common in discussions of the 
mental, other special science properties, and about macroscopic events constituted by 
microevents. For example, we might say that the increased kinetic energy o f the particles 
constituting a gas implemented the increase of pressure in that gas. Or we might say that the 
silicon chips and their operations implemented a computer’s calculation. Thus, compatible 
with the G/D Exclusion Principle, a natural understanding of mental causation is that the 
mental causes mental or behavioral effects by means of a physical implementing 
mechanism.
For a dual-explanandum view of this sort to work the explananda must be distinct 1 
have already discussed reasons for irreducibility of the mental to the physical. Reasons for 
thinking behavior is irreducible to mere bodily movements are reminiscent o f these reasons. 
One possibility is that behavior is not type identical to physical movements. Behavior is 
multiply realizable in diffoent physical movements. For example, I could signal a left turn 
with different bodily movements. I could hit the turn signal on my car or I could put my 
arm out the window. Different physical movements might constitute the behavior of going 
to the fridge to get a beer. Lots of different physical movements could constitute beer- 
getting behavior because of differences in location o f beer and differences in the person 
getting the beer. On this view, behavior may be token identical with the physical 
movements that constitute it, but the behavior type is not identical to any type of bodily 
movements. Thus, the mental could be relevant to the intentional act of behavior, to the 
physical movement’s falling under that behavior-type. The mental quauses other mental 
effects and behavior.
The cause insofiur as it is mental, on this view, may be causally relevant to the effect
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insofor as the effect is mental. Recall Morgan's (1989) neologism quausation. The mental 
is said to quause mental effects if and only if the effect is such a mental effect in virtue of 
the mental property of the cause. Accepting only the G/D Exclusion Principle, on a Token 
Identity view, allows the mental to quause other mental effects and behavior. Even though 
the mental property. Mi, of the effect is determined, the mental property of the cause can 
still be relevant to Mi.
On other views, behavior is not even token identical to the bodily movements that 
constitute it Behavior has different properties than the physical movements constituting it 
For example, my act of assassinating President Kennedy has different properties than the 
bodily movement or set of bodily movements that constitute i t  This behavior has a property 
that no one physical movement I make has, namely the time during which the act occurs. 
My assassinating Kennedy does not occur at the time that I pull the trigger 6om my vantage 
point on the grassy knoll. Assassinating Kennedy requires that he be dead at the end of the 
behavior, and Kennedy does not die until after he has been taken to a hospital. So, my 
assassination of the President cannot be identical with my pulling the trigger. Thus, 
behavior cannot in general be identical to any single physical movement
Moreover, behavior is not identical to any series o f movements that constitute it 
My assassinating the President could have differed in some details without ceasing to be that 
very behavior. For example, say that my assassinating the President is constituted by a 
series of events including my buying the gurt hiding on the grassy knoll, firing the shots, 
running away, and the events involved in the President dying. I could have done at least one 
of those bodily movements (ignoring for the sake of simplicity that some of these events are 
complex actions in their own right) differently and still have committed the very same action
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of assa-syinating the President But I could not have done any of these movements 
differently while these movement remained the same set of bodily movements. Thus, my 
behavior is not identical to any bodily movement or the set of bodily movements that make 
it up".
Since behavior and the movements or sets of movements that constitute it are not 
identical, one can give a mental explanation of behavior without denying any premise of the 
Exclusion Argument Since the mental is not identical to the physical, a mental cause of a 
mental effect does not also need to be a cause of a physical effect Thus, the Causal Closure 
principles and the Exclusion Principle allow for mental to mental causation or mental 
quausation.
This theory is my solution to the problem of mental causation as it is raised by the 
Exclusion Argument. Let me note a constraint on my solution, and then I will deal with 
objections to the theory. The constraint is that a theory of mental causation cannot postulate 
new causal powers for the mental. Other typical dual-explanandum theories attempt to 
show how the mental adds some new, unique causal explanation of behavior. But this 
attempt violates the constraint on dual-explanandum theories that they cannot posit new 
causal powers for the mental without rejecting the dependence of the mental on the physical. 
The mental cannot have a new causal power unless it causes some events that are not 
already determined. Thus, finding new causal powers for the mental requires rejecting the 
dependence of the mental on the physical. And, as 1 argued in chapter seven, rejecting that 
premise does not provide an adequate theory of mental causation.
"  I have ignored the possibillQr that one might have a mixed set o f views on irreducibility o f behavior and 
the mental. For example, one might have a Token Physicalist view of behavior but a Constitution 
Physicalist view o f mental events. These mixtures o f views would complicate matters, but I believe the 
general solution I am proposing could be rephrased fi>r those mixed views.
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However, since my theory rejects Yablo’s Exclusion Principle and accepts the G/D 
Exclusion Principle, I need not find any new causal power for the mental. Instead I can 
admit that the physical completely determines behavior, but insist that it is still possible that 
the mental determine behavior. Therefore, my theory of mental causation is compatible 
with the Exclusion Argument.
8.6 Objections
I would now like to raise some objections to my solution to the problem of mental 
causation and respond to them.
8.6.1 Novel Causal Powers
The first common objection is that rejecting the exclusion principle does not make 
room for the mental to have any new causal power. Since the physical already complete 
causes everything, one might ask, what does the mental add to the causal power the physical 
already has? In fact, I think this lack of new causal power is an advantage of my theory. As 
I have noted, the proper response is not to enumerate some new causal power of the mental. 
Instead the response is to diagnose the question as an erroneous way of thinking about the 
problem. The mental doM not need to add any causal power to cause behavior. The 
counterexamples to the Exclusion Principle should be sufficient to convince us that the 
mental can be causally relevant as long as it depends on the physical. Requiring a new 
causal power for the mental is simply the wrong way to think about mental causation.
8.6.2 What God Needs to Do
Another objectirm along the same lines is that if there were no mental causation but 
only physical causation and determination of the mental by the physical, the worid would be 
completely indistinguishable fix)m the way it actually is. If mental causation does not make
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any difference to the world, then it cannot be real. Or put another way, if God created a 
universe with only physical causation and determination relations, that world would not 
differ fiom our own. If our world does not differ from the world without mental causation, 
then we should believe ours is the simpler world, the world without mental causation.
Again, this way of thinking about the problem is misguided. Requiring the mental 
to make a noticeable difference in the world is a mistake given that the mental is dependent 
on the physical. I think this objection is reminiscent of the empiricist objection to the notion 
of causation. The empiricist objection is that regularities captured all there was to say about 
the world. What could causation add to the world? If God made all the regularities, he 
would not need to add causation. Causation, the argument goes, is unnecessary, and so we 
should never postulate it
The proper response on the part of the realist about causation is to say that causation 
explains those regularities. The regularities supposed by the empiricist are not a brute 
unexplainable fact Causation explains and grounds those regularities. The mental 
causation theorist can give the same answer. Mental causation in part because it is part of a 
complete cause, explains the regularities. Mental causation is no more an unnecessary 
postulate than causation is.
One might object further that the physical explanation is all the explanation one 
needs. But mental causation is still part of that explanation. The physical explanation 
cannot be complete and independent without including the mental. Thus, this objection no 
more gives reason to reject mental causation than it does to reject causation. And I am 
confident that causation is a secure part of our ontology.
8.63 Epiphenomenal Causation
2 2 4
Another problem with the G/D Exclusion Principle is that it does not exclude 
epiphenomena. If epiphenomena are nomically related to or depend on an actual cause, then 
they are not excluded as causally irrelevant by this principle. For example, imagine that 
someone explains epileptic seizures as demonic possession. Neuroscience gives a better 
explanation in terms of uncontrolled neural firings. With Yablo’s stricter Exclusion 
Principle, we could then rejection the demonic possession theory. However, the clever 
demonic possession theorist could claim that the demons are nomically correlated with 
uncontrolled neural firings, and so his explanation is still correct, albeit incomplete in itself. 
So, the G/D Exclusion Principle is too weak to exclude entities that are genuinely causally 
irrelevant as long as they depend on causally relevant entities.
This argument differs firom the previous objections in that it does not give a reason 
to think the Exclusion Principle is incorrect, but says that if the Exclusion Principle is as 
weak as 1 have argued, then it is impossible to exclude epiphenomena. The weakness of the 
Exclusion Principle does not show that we can give no reason to reject any entities as 
epiphenomenal. First, it still allows us to exclude epiphenomena if they do not depend on 
the physical. Thus, in the case of the demonic possession argument above, the demonic 
possession can be ruled out as a cause if it can be reasonably argued that demonic 
possession does not or cannot depend on brain activity.
However, the G/D Exclusion Principle does not exclude epiphenomena that really 
depend on the physicaL For example, in the case of the whistle on a steam engine, we 
cannot apply the weaker Exclusion Principle to mle that the whistle does not cause the 
train's movement, ptovitfed the whistle nomically correlates with the train moving. How, 
then, do we determine whether some event really causes another?
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First, if my arguments in the second section of this work, chapters four through six, 
are correct, then there really are no epiphenomenal particulars. My arguments in that 
section were that the mental cannot be epiphenomenal, but it seems that most of those 
arguments could apply to any particular property or existent If those arguments are correct 
then the real question is not whether an existent is causally relevant simpliciter but causally 
relevant to a particular efifect We still need to determine whether a cause is relevant to 
some efifect but we need not worry about whether an existent can be a cause at all. Noting 
this &ct does not solve the problem but it does to some extent ameliorate it
The response to this objection has to be, I think, that we should not expect the 
Exclusion Principle to exclude everything that is causally irrelevant As an epistemic 
principle, the Exclusion Principle is imperfect it does not give a sufficient condition for 
excluding epiphenomena that depend on genuine causes. It may be that sometimes we will 
not be able to distinguish an epiphenomenon from a genuine cause, but limitations on our 
ability to know should not be surprising. The G/D Exclusion Principle cannot rule out 
dependent epiphenomena as causes even assuming we have all the possible information.
Perhaps no single principle determines whether some entity is causally relevant, but 
some relations may ground genuine causes and others may not, and as a matter of common 
practice people are able to determine which cases ground genuine causation and which 
relations only involve epiphenomena. An appeal to common practice here is not 
inappropriate since we have already answered the questions of whether the mental is 
causally relevant (by arguing that Epiphenomenalism is incorrect) and how it might be 
causally relevant (by rejectmg the overly strict Exclusion Principle). All the tqxpeal to 
common practice does here is guess how one might in practice discern which entities are
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genuine causes and which are not We could wish for a principle that excluded 
epiphenomena in all cases, but perhaps no such principle would be possible.
8.6.4 Second Class Causation
A third objection is that models of mental causation like mine make relegate mental 
causation to a second class status. It is alleged that mental causation, on this theory, is less 
real than physical causation or peAaps not real causation at all. Kim’s (1984) supervenient 
causation is such a view that appears to relegate mental causation to a second-class status. 
According to Kim, for something to be a supervenient cause is for it to be "a causal relation 
that is reducible to, or explainable by, the causal processes taking place at a more basic 
physical level.” (Kim 1984, reprinted 1993a, 107) If mental causation is reducible to or 
explainable by some more basic causation, then Kim’s theory seems to make mental 
causation a second class citizen. Further, this notion of second-class causation does not 
seem to make sense. The mental can either cause or it cannot, and there is no room for 
anything else.
Although Kim has recently abandoned his theory of supervenient causation, the 
theory is worth discussing since it will show how my theory can avoid the same accusations. 
Kim clearly wants the supervenient cause to be a genuine cause. However, for an apparent 
cause to be explainable in terms of more basic physical processes is for that relation to be 
epiphenomenal, for the more basic relations to be the real cause. Put another way, nothing 
in Kim’s theory will distinguish a supervenient cause &om an epiphenomenon. For 
something to be a supervenient cause is for it to have only the causal powers of the more 
basic level. And that is what it is for something to be an epiphenomenon, to have no causal 
power of its own but only the causal power of the events that correlate with i t  Supervenient
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causation appears to be chimerical, a relation that correlates with the genuine physical 
causation but is not itself not real. So, Kim’s notion of supervenient causation does not 
{^ ppear to give real causation, and, to the «dent that my view takes advantage of the same 
Exclusion Principle for mental causation, my view appears to have the same problem.
One certainly does not want to claim that supervenient causes are some second-class 
variety of cause. If mental causation is to occur, then it must be as real as any causation. If 
the mental does not cause, then it is just a byproduct, an epiphenomenon. So, for my 
solution to allow for mental causation, mental causation must be real.
However, I think the question is misguided in this case. Recall some of the 
counterexamples to Yablo’s Exclusion Principle. The redness of the light is, we think, 
causally relevant to one’s stopping, but we have no inclination to ask whether the color of 
the light was also causally relevant The color really is causally relevant, and it is not a 
second-class cause even though it depends on the redness of the light to exist. Since the 
mental depends on the physical in some sufficiently close way, the mental can be causally 
relevant just as the color of the stoplight is. The temptation to distinguish these properties 
and demand that only one be causally relevant is misguided. The mental can be causally 
relevant just as events dependent on more basic events can be.
Finally, one might ask whether my solution requires something like Kim’s (1992 
and 1993) Causal Inheritance Principle. Kim argues that because the mental depends on the 
physical, the mental must inherit its causal power fix>m the physical. Otherwise, the 
mental’s causal power emerges magically from nowhere. For example, on Kim’s view, if 
my instance pain is to have an effect on my removing my hand from the stove, that instance 
of pam must gain its causal power from the physical hnplementing mechanism. The causal
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power of this pain-token must be identical to the causal powers, or some subset of the causal 
powers, of its physical instantiation. Again, if the mental inherits its causal power from the 
physical, then the mental seems relegated to second class causal status.
My first inclination is to resist the CZP, but on careful consideration, I think that it is 
not unreasonable as a claim about instances. Certainly on a token-identity view, each 
mental token is no more than a physical token, and so the mental token can have only the 
causal powers that the physical token it is identical to has. As a theory about types, CIP 
would be deficient, but as a theory about tokens, as Kim intends it to be, it can still be true.
On Constitution Physicalism, the mental token is not identical to the physical token, 
and so it is questionable whether the mental token’s causal powers must be identical to the 
physical token’s. However, since we accept mereological supervenience, we must accept 
that the mental token has no new causal power lacked by the physical. So, on either token 
Physicalism or Constitution Physicalism, instances of mental events can have only the 
causal powers of their underlying physical instances.
Kim’s metaphor of inheritance may be misleading, however. Nothing in the notion 
of dependence of mental causal powers on the physical requires that mental causation have a 
second-class status or that it be less real than physical causation. This way of thinking is the 
same type of error that would lead one to think that because the mental depends on the 
physical, the mental is somehow a second class entity or is less real than the physical. My 
pain’s causal powers are no less real than my pain itself is. The conclusion that the mental 
has a second class status is a nonsequitur. It simply is not the case that the dependence of 
one entity on another makes the &st entity less real than the second, whether these entities 
be existents, properties or causal powers.
229
The main reason I can see for resisting the notion of the CIP is that it seems as 
though some mental entities and their causal powers are not exhausted by the physical. The 
mental and other higher level properties often appear to be context-dependent And this 6ct 
appears to give these entities unique causal powers that are not fully captured by the 
physical. For example, economic entities like money have certain causal powers given their 
role in society. Money seems to have unique causal powers, as described by the laws of 
economics, that go beyond the causal powers of the disjunctive physical realizations of 
money, say green pieces of paper, credit cards, etc. If context-dependence is an ubiquitous 
feature of the world, then it is important to explain the causal powers of context-dependent 
entities. I will address this objection separately.
8.6.5 Extrinsic Causal Relevance
The final objection is that my solution's requirement of dependence of the mental on 
the physical appears incompatible with causal relevance of contextually individuated 
entities. Mental content, as I discussed in the previous chapter, does not supervene on the 
physical, and so, there is no room for it to be causally relevant on this theory of mental 
causation. Money, on this theory, since it is context-dependent, does not have the close 
relation to the physical for it to be causally relevant Y et it seems obvious that money is 
causally relevant Thus, my theory of mental and higher order causation must be 61se. 
Similar examples of mental content t^pear to show that my theory cannot work. The causal 
relevance of context-dependent entities seems to show that a dependence relation cannot be 
necessary for causal relevance.
My response to this objection has several parts. First, we should note that the 
problem of mental causation o f the Exclusion Argument is distinct fiom the problem of
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mental causation for extrinsic properties. The problem as presented in this work has been 
focused on the Exclusion Argument, an argument which presents the problem of mental 
causation only for those properties or entities that supervene on the physical. So, it is not 
necessary that this theory of mental causation also solve the distinct problem of mental 
causation for extrinsic properties.
However, one does not want to present a theory of mental causation that solves the 
problem only for a single type of problem and precludes a solution to other problems. 
Moreover, one does not want to provide a disjunctive solution for similar types. That is, if 
the mental is a single type of entity, providing a solution to the problem of mental causation 
for only some mental entities but not others is still inadequate.
Accepting the weak G/D Exclusion Principle may still allow for mental content to be 
causally relevant Mental content does seem to depend on some complex physical relations. 
Worlds that are indiscernible with respect to all their physical properties and relations are 
indiscernible with respect to content properties. These physical relations are extrinsic or 
relational properties, but presumably, causally relevant Explaining how these extrinsic 
properties are causally relevant is a matter of solving the distinct problem of mental 
causation for extrinsic properties. So, assuming only the G/D Exclusion Principle, mental 
content that depends on these complex physical relations can be causally relevant as well. 
The Exclusion Principle only excludes entities that do not depend on the physical, so mental 
content may still be causally relevant on this account Given rejection of Yablo’s overly 
restrictive Exclusion Principle, one need not espouse an identity of content-types with 
physical relation-types; one need only claim that the content-type depends in the right way 
on these physical relation-types.
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One final note on this problem with my solution to the problem of mental causation 
is that my solution works better on this count than a type identity theory does. One of the 
main thrusts of this w o* has been to solve the problem of mental causation for 
Nonreductive Physicalism. A return of type-identity theories has been fueled in large part 
by the problem of mental causation'^. The objection that my view of mental causation is 
incompatible with causal relevance of extrinsic or content properties applies equally well to 
the type-identity theorist So the type identity theorist cannot use this objection as fodder 
against the Nonreductive Physicalist. Thus, the goal of this work to defend Nonreductive 
Physicalism against the “New Reductionism" has been largely successful. My theory of 
mental causation for events or properties that supervene on the physical deals at least as well 
with extrinsic mental content as a type identity theory does.
8.7 Conclusion
Mental causation is consistent with Nonreductive Physicalism since the Exclusion 
Argument is invalid. The Exclusion Principle itself, when properly understood, does not 
exclude the mental fiom causal relevance given that the mental depends on the physical. 
The Exclusion Argument‘s presents a problem of mental causation that requires us to reject 
some apparently plausible broadly physicalist assumption or to find a close relation of the 
mental and physical to which the Exclusion Principle does not apply. Rejecting Yablo’s 
Exclusion Principle is a well-motivated way of solving this problem of mental causation. 
Moreover, rejecting this principle allows us to say how mental causation might occur. The 
counterexamples to Yablo’s principle lead to a more sophisticated Exclusion Principle that 
(bes not exclude the mental fiom causal relevance. Adopting this sophisticated Exclusion
See especially Kim (1993b)
"  Perhaps the problem should just be called the Exclusion Problem at this point since the Exclusion
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Principle does not necessarily provide everything we could wish for in a solution. It does 
not allow us to exclude epiphenomena. But it solves the problem of the Exclusion 
Argument without abandoning any basic precepts of Physicalism and without positing 
mysterious downwards causation of the mind without any physical mechanism. Finally, it 
avoids a return to type-identity theories that are inconsistent with multiple realizability and 
the Nonreductive Physicalist consensus in recent philosophy of mind. As I have tried to 
show, the nonreductivist has resources to deal with the problem of mental causation that are 
equal to or better than those available to the type identity theorist.
Argument may be unsound for reasons ejqilored m the previous chapter.
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